Why There Cannot Be a US–EU–China Triangle

Russia and China are suddenly offered golden opportunities. In March 2023, Xi Jinping had publicly told Vladimir Putin: "now there are changes that have not happened in 100 years. When we are together, we drive these changes". Donald Trump’s turn against allies and partners and his embrace of Russia are at least as epochal as the 2022 invasion.

A 180° turn of U.S. policy toward Russia, the contempt for truth and distortions by America’s leading trio resonate with Georges Orwell’s 1984. It is unavoidable that some caught in the headlights look for exits, including with new international configurations. Europe has its share of advocates of peace at any cost with Russia, seeing Ukraine’s fate as very separate from our own. Why shouldn’t there be advocates of a new rapprochement with China, as a balancing act with Washington

Europeans cannot bet on a major policy reversal in Washington under this team or even as an outcome of mid-term elections: these are two years away, and much of the damage that is currently being inflicted cannot be reversed. Chief among them is the notion of trust, and the reliability of the alliance’s article 5. Yet, whatever the surge in support for Europe’s own defense, the results will at best take years to plug the gaps that the United States had always filled—from intelligence to weaponry. We are 450 million Europeans, but a comparatively weak hard power during this transition, and one (or two simultaneous) trade war will be costly.

China’s Interests: Which Remain Distinct from Russian Ones

But how China exploits that golden opportunity is a more complex puzzle. Some of China’s stakes are identical to Russia’s, and some differ. Notably, China has a global manufacturing and trading footprint, while Russia remains an energy and materials provider to the world mainly. While Eurasian security has close connections, strengthened by China and Russia’s "friendship without limits" since February 2022, Trump’s submission and quasi-surrender to many Russian demands, even before a negotiation starts, could represent an issue for China. This is not about the infamous "reverse Kissinger" scheme, which has no basis on the Russian side. Why should Putin trust a fickle and unstable United States? Why should he deprive Russia of a major source of technology that is increasingly a full alternative to the West, and of a major Chinese market for natural resources?

China provides essential support as an alternate access to monetary and capital markets, as a provider of technology including at the minimum for dual-use, if not complete weapon systems. China’s sales of vehicles, aircraft and vessels including components increased by a factor of 10 over the last five years, electrical equipment and machinery’s surge was fourfold. China has in fact been an indirect conduit for Western high tech equipment banned from direct export with, for example, 1.5 billion dollars of crucial electronics between the invasion of Ukraine and the end of 2023. This comes on top of considerations on political regimes and ideology. While Donald Trump personally vindicates authoritarianism, that does not cover the gaps between political systems and societies.

Yet, seen from the perspective of Beijing, the unfolding situation presents two risks. The first one is economic but not a major issue. Russia has had to bow down to China’s conditions on energy purchases, with reportedly low gas prices. While Power of Siberia 1 was completed in November 2024, Power of Siberia 2 is stalled, reportedly because of Chinese price demands. A lifting of U.S. or Western sanctions would weaken China’s hand in this regard.

Much more important to Beijing is the uncertainty about Trump’s ultimate designs on China. Forcing a Russian peace over Ukraine and withdrawing troops and support from Europe comes with two contradictory consequences for China. Suddenly, actual U.S. support  for Taiwan looks more doubtful. Not only is Trump, in many ways, a flag carrier for isolationists, but the Ukraine experience could be carried over to the Taiwan straits. Not only does the new administration extract commitments from Taiwan’s chip giant TSMC to invest 100 billion dollars to the United States, but Trump indicates to its CEO that this is a move to a "safe place"—which positions the opposite for Taiwan.

Trump and China: Trick or Treat?

On the other hand, reallocating military resources from other theaters obviously increases the (potential) focus on China. While the Pentagon’s budget is being cut, some sectors are not, and these concern directly China, for example with the pledge to increase maritime construction in the United States and speed up the delivery of Virginia class nuclear submarines—to date, the most potent weapon against the People’s Liberation Army, and even without including nuclear deterrence capabilities. Depending on whether Donald Trump favors the hawks in his entourage or the isolationists, the outcome might be very different for China.

Trump tariffs at 10 percent were no real issue, given Chinese price deflation and a lower renminbi. At 20 percent they become worrisome—mainly because this lends credibility to a rise all the way up to 60 percent and, in fact, faster than the one envisioned by some inspirers of Trump’s tariff policy. According to Trump and Scott Bessent, the new Treasury Secretary, the counter damage to America is transitory and not a priority. In the words of Trump on March 4: "There'll be a little disturbance (…) But we're okay with that," and in those of Bessent two days later: "Access to cheap goods is not the essence of the American Dream." That is of course worrisome to China, even if one disregards the linkage increasingly made by the U.S. administration between geoeconomic demands and geopolitics.

China’s Renewed Charm Offensive Toward Europe

It is therefore no surprise that China’s discourse toward the United States changed immediately after Trump’s State of the Union address and the announcement of a second wave of tariffs on Chinese goods. Until then, official mouthpieces had remained remarkably short on words to describe the new administration. Chinese and pro-China influencers had often gushed with praise of Trump’s realism: his recognition of a value-based foreign policy’s vanity, his acknowledgment of multipolarity and of a new global power balance, and, of course, the relinquishment of any democratic mission. It is on March 5 that the spokesman of the Chinese embassy to the United States tweeted: "If war is what the U.S. wants, be it a tariff war, a trade war or any other type of war, we’re ready to fight till the end". China has a field day to emphasize its stability against Trump’s permanent creation of uncertainties. In that sense, Lu’s statement is meant to egg on European reactions towards Trump. But Lu Shaye also said Europe should not be excluded from Russia-U.S. negotiations with Ukraine. China can bask in expressions of neutrality and good will, given that Donald Trump has taken so much space as a threatening and ostracizing individual. One might add that this also serves as a discreet warning to Moscow: never take us for granted.

And it is on the same day that China’s "charm offensive" towards Europe was rekindled. After the era of "wolf warrior" diplomacy from 2020 to 2023, it was first started in late 2023, but only to be paused with the advent of the EV subsidy investigation and tariff controversy. It is now rekindled, and the first messenger is none other than Lu Shaye, former ambassador to France, now named special envoy to Europe and previously known as the leading "wolf warrior" diplomat. Until that date, no word had been heard from him. Suddenly, he has surged with informal remarks supporting Europe: "When you look at how the Trump administration has implemented a brazen and domineering policy towards Europe, treating its allies in this way, honestly, from a European perspective, it’s quite appalling."

China has a field day to emphasize its stability against Trump’s permanent creation of uncertainties. In that sense, Lu’s statement is meant to egg on European reactions towards Trump. But Lu Shaye also said Europe should not be excluded from Russia-U.S. negotiations with Ukraine. China can bask in expressions of neutrality and good will, given that Donald Trump has taken so much space as a threatening and ostracizing individual. One might add that this also serves as a discreet warning to Moscow: never take us for granted.

This has been followed by more vague entreaties and declarations in front of the press from Wang Yi, China’s returned foreign affairs minister, again in a context of criticizing the United States. In the tradition of China’s formal charm offensives, its behavior is adapting to new circumstances, including towards Brussels. Following Ursula von Der Leyen’s call for a balanced engagement with China, China’s public diplomacy has deployed again towards the European Parliament—still formally under sanctions, but which has removed the curbs on lawmaker meetings’ with Chinese diplomats. By contrast, Kaja Kallas, the EU High Representative, was denied a meeting with Secretary of State Marco Rubio in Washington in late February. An advance mission by Europe’s External Action Service (EEAS) was received at a high level in Beijing—before the Commission’s President is set to visit Beijing in late March.

A Lack of Substance Behind Beijing’s Words

Obviously, Washington’s unacceptable behavior–-from Ukraine to Greenland, meddling in European politics with open support to the far right, and trade threats that are very likely to materialize shortly—may argue for Europeans to seek their own path regarding China. The foundation on which the transatlantic Trade and Technology Council (TTC) was built under the Biden administration has been largely destroyed by its successors.

It is going to be difficult for the EU to face a trade war on two simultaneous fronts. There were differences of perceived interests among Europeans on this score.Even if the Commission did a remarkable job of crafting united responses to China recently, it is now faced with the same task as regards the United States, which are moving to a Chinese-like bilateral approach to Member States. Issues such as outward investments screening to China and attitudes toward potential major Chinese investments in Europe can be divisive.

China’s Potential Role in a Ukraine-Russia Ceasefire

Another hope is taking hold. Were a move to ceasefire in Ukraine to take hold, the question of military observers or interposition troops would simultaneously arise. Absent any American participation, and with little appetite from Europeans for positioning close to the potential ceasefire line, the question of a UN peacekeeping operation and non-European contingents appears. It is said in Brussels that close to 10 member states might be open to a Chinese contingent—in part because Russians are not likely to shoot at them. Simply mentioning that possibility makes it more real.

That proposition should be scrutinized with care. First, ever since Xi Jinping committed China to a much larger peace-keeping role at the 2015 UN General Assembly, China has been doing the exact contrary: avoiding new peace-keeping commitments. Then, the issue of actual responsibility undertaken by China would be crucial: should its contingent be deployed on Russia’s side of the ceasefire line or limited to an observation and adjudication role, like that of the 1953 Korean armistice, this could be unproductive. Were this to happen, it would be devastating for the European economy to trade a potential Chinese constructive post-ceasefire role against present European concessions on issues of trade and economic security.

The EU’s current balance of trade with China is even more negative than that of the U.S. Yes, Europe is about de-risking, not decoupling. Europe might be interested in seizing a trade deal with China that would include guarantees on joint venture investments in Europe (technology transfer, quotas on Chinese suppliers)—something that would need to go far beyond the aborted Comprehensive Agreement on Investment with China in 2020. There is no sign that this might be coming.

China, facing a possible steep cliff with U.S. tariffs and likely replicas from emerging economies protecting themselves, while judging the European Union as the weaker negotiating partner, is not likely to make concessions. Indeed, officials keep stressing they want to "talk" with the U.S. administration, and some officious experts stress the need to "be patient" or to take seriously American demands.

What the above means is that Europe does face two simultaneous challenges that are not likely to fade any time soon, challenges that go deep against the basis of European construction. Ignoring one challenge, perhaps because the other comes with the wildest symbolic attacks, is at our own peril. European Union diplomacy has been put in the doghouse by Marco Rubio. Reportedly, the Commission, Vice-President Valdis Dombrovskis and Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič in particular, are doing their best to keep other lines open to American counterparts. Singularly, they wish to convince that common cooperation on key economic security issues should remain, whatever the depth of the trade (and digital) conflicts. The European Commission and its European External Action Service are doing the same with engagement toward China, and, as of today, it is not clear that engagement with the U.S. is in any way more dense.

But just as a firm and fast response to Trump’s coming array of measures is necessary, we should not mistake Beijing’s words with actual overtures. Any one-sided retreat on the part of Europeans would be interpreted as a confirmation of weakness.

At present, Beijing has begun using stronger words but remains quite restrained in its actual countermeasures to the U.S. It is clearly assessing strength and continuity of intent on the part of Washington. We will not change that by ourselves.

Copyright image : Brendan Smialowski / AFP
Donald Trump and Xi Jinping, June 29th 2019, Osaka.