Europe’s China Temptation Won’t Pay Off

The deepening skepticism over the future of the transatlantic alliance—fueled across Europe by the wave of initiatives of the Trump administration, ranging from its stated ambitions to annex Greenland to J.D. Vance’s speech in Germany and the proposal for U.S. control over Ukrainian resources, under European military protection— inevitably brings the "China card" into question. Can Europe loosen its alignment with Washington on China policy—an alignment that, though shaped by distinct European interests and far from absolute, remains significant? And could merely invoking this possibility influence the Trump administration’s approach to transatlantic relations?

The temptation is already present. At the World Economic Forum in Davos in January, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen softened her stance on China, emphasizing that Europe should “strive for mutual benefits” in its dialogue with Beijing. This marked a notable shift from her previous position, which had been sharply focused on protecting Europe from China’s industrial overcapacity, the Chinese military’s access to European technology, and Beijing’s unwavering support for Russia’s war effort in Ukraine.

At the Munich Security Conference, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s agenda—marked by meetings with several European leaders—clearly signaled Beijing’s intent to cultivate this temptation. By merely adopting a more measured and diplomatic tone in contrast to Washington’s brutal rhetoric, China is positioning itself as a welcoming, receptive and conciliatory partner.-

It is only natural for Europeans to explore every possible avenue for diversifying their foreign policy, especially as too many converging signals from Washington suggest that the transatlantic relationship is unlikely to yield new benefits in the years ahead, and may instead come at an increasing cost to Europe.

However, the greatest pitfall of the China temptation lies in the illusion of potential gains. Unfortunately, spending precious time and resources to court Beijing is unlikely to offer Europe any tangible benefit.

Consider, for instance, China’s pivotal role in supporting Russia’s war effort, particularly in defense electronics and machine tools. While China’s assistance could, in theory, cease if the Russia-Ukraine conflict were frozen and Western sanctions on Moscow were lifted, European attempts to influence Beijing have thus far proven ineffective. A striking example of this was Xi Jinping’s visit to Paris in May: despite all the warm symbolism and France’s emphasis on the China-Russia dynamic, there was no tangible change. Confrontation has proven just as ineffective. The EU’s 2024 sanctions on 37 Chinese entities linked to Russia’s military-industrial complex had so little impact that Beijing simply chose to ignore them.

What about trade reciprocity and the rebalancing of economic relations? As long as China continues to have unrestricted access to the EU’s single market, where it exports €515 billion worth of goods, it has little motivation to make concessions on what it already obtains effortlessly and without significant threats.

Chinese diplomats like to suggest that China could engage in a more transactional relationship, free from ideological disputes, and that substantial progress could be made if Europeans defined clear priorities. However, if neither China’s support for Russia nor a major rebalancing of EU-China economic relations are on the table, what strategic benefits could Europe realistically expect from a “reset” in its relationship with Beijing?

China will not solve Europe’s problem of insufficient industrial capacity in artillery and ammunition production—one of Europe’s main challenges in supporting Ukraine. Nor will it help lower significantly Europe’s excessively high energy costs. The idea of building Chinese nuclear power plants in Europe is fundamentally at odds with the security priorities now driving the EU’s agenda on critical infrastructure.

From a geopolitical perspective, China’s interest in Europe is primarily defined by what it seeks to prevent. Beijing’s top priority is to avoid the formation of a cohesive transatlantic strategy aimed at containing China’s technological rise. The biggest risk for China is a European policy that seeks to exclude certain Chinese products from the European market—whether through escalating trade defense measures or in response to China’s support for Russia’s war effort. The remark made by former Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, that only trade is strategic in EU-China relations, has never been more relevant.

In recent years, these two priorities— hindering transatlantic cohesion and preserving unrestricted access to the European market—have come under increasing pressure. Yet, for China, the threat has never reached a critical level that would necessitate a strategic recalibration toward Europe. Instead, Beijing has relied on the mere threat of escalating economic security measures into a full-scale trade war to deter Europe from adopting tougher policies. So far, this strategy has proven effective.

Europe’s strategic strengthening must instead be rooted in a domestic agenda focused on reindustrialization, innovation, and defense investment. An economic diplomacy of diversification is essential to support these urgent and necessary investments. While reassessing China’s flexibility is always worthwhile given that all states need to reconsider their options in a shifting global landscape, it is highly likely that Beijing’s stance will remain as rigid as ever—because the current status quo overwhelmingly benefits China.

Copyright Image : LUDOVIC MARIN / POOL / AFP

Xi Jinping in Beijing,  April 6th 2023.