[Trump II] - China in the Transatlantic Relationship with Donald Trump

Between isolationism - getting out of "endless wars", prioritizing the Chinese challenge - "let the Europeans take on Ukraine" - and a Republican internationalist halo sometimes described as Reaganite, it's hard to know where Donald Trump will lean in his second term. Opinion focuses mainly on American debates. In fact, it is often China that has taken the initiative - from economic decoupling to the rise in power and military projection, not to mention the challenges thrown in the face of its neighbors, the Sino-Russian quasi-alliance, and the constant denunciation of the United States and the West, including at the United Nations. In Beijing, debates, if they exist, are largely opaque. In Washington they take place in the open, not to mention in Europe, where member states often stand on their own national views.

Still, there are some probable invariants. Like his predecessors, Trump II will face two challenges from China: a booming economic and technological challenge, which is not accompanied by rising costs for China - on the contrary. More than ever, China is crushing competitors. The other challenge is directly strategic. In September 2023, Xi Jinping in San Francisco seemed to concede to Joe Biden that there would be no "Chinese surprise" in the election year. The United States has stepped up its efforts - With visits by ake Sullivan, Anthony Blinken, Janet Yellen - to stabilize the relationship. Yet China reinforced its support to Russia, did little to dissociate itself from Iran, and ignored the Houthi risk. It was during the summer interlude in the presidential campaign - the moment when Kamala Harris appeared to be on a par with Donald Trump - that Beijing engaged in a sham negotiation with the European Union over electric cars, and reduced tensions with India over the Ladakh border. This was accompanied by a renewed offensive in the East China Sea and against Taiwan: a way for Xi of indicating the strategic priority. There was a joint naval maneuver with Russia against Japan, and above all, for the first time, the outline of a naval blockade all around Taiwan, with the participation of numerous Chinese coastguard vessels, another first.

There are two possible answers to this dilemma: the generalized Trumpian "deal", with trade agreements on the one hand, and a strategic step-back for the future regarding Taiwan. On the first point, if a trade deal with China is accompanied by a global rise in customs duties - European trade has a large surplus with the United States - the consequences will not necessarily be negative. The average American will continue to buy his basic goods from Walmart at low prices, while global tariffs will encourage manufacturers and investors in the US for higher-end goods. On a "deal" for Taiwan, Kamala Harris herself backtracked on the strategic clarity toward which Joe Biden had trended three to four times during his tenure. Actual willingness to defend Taiwan will ultimately be judged when the day comes.

And there is also the option of engaging in both conflicts at once, or letting them play out depending on China's attitude.

Both choices will have major consequences for America's allies. Solving the Taiwan question through a sort of implicit agreement evoking the case of Hong Kong would unravel the network of American alliances in East Asia. It would put Asians in the front line, just as an abandonment of Ukraine would do for the Europeans. A trade "deal" with China accompanied by a global protectionist turn would put Europe in a complete quandary. We would become a market of last resort for the Chinese export tsunami, unless we also adopt an entirely protectionist policy. And, as major exporters of goods to the United States and importers of irreplaceable services in the digital world, we would not have the resources that some in our political world pride themselves on - "strategic autonomy (or sovereignty...)". In reality, we are often "subcontractors" (Donald Tusk) - our defense and transitional energy industries illustrate this to the point of caricature.

If he has become a very big player, thanks to the depths from which he has extricated himself, Donald Trump may opt for confrontations with China. If he remains a geopolitical tactician, as he has always been in business, these will be "deals". In the latter case, Europe has no leverage, except to concede even more to China.

Whether they are China-first supporters or internationalists, Americans need European support against China on both counts - trade and military deterrence. This will certainly be a minimum condition for continuity vis-à-vis Ukraine. If, however, European divisions and the pusillanimity of the Scholz government do not put an end to this support on our side, we will become a casualty of America’s reordering of its priorities. Strategic wavering also exists in Japan, where Shigeru Ishiba is trying to engage in a "reset" with China, while one of his advisors describes Japan as "alone". Europeans would also be well advised not to show themselves as champions of agreements with Iran, given that support for Israel is a key Trump value.

As it happens, the President of the European Commission has anticipated some of these developments: it has initiated a "geopolitical" Commission (which displeases some member states defending their prerogatives...), a commercial and technological turnaround in the face of China, a permanent transatlantic dialogue with the Biden administration (not as easy an interlocutor as one might think). These, and other positive proposals, should form the basis on which we can start working with the Trump II administration.

If we were to break with the past, and sticking to a strategic autonomy that is far from being in sight, while continuing to neglect the necessary political, budgetary and defense reforms, we would be opening the way to the third Trumpian trend: that of hard-line isolationism, with the generalization of "deals" centered on a narrow vision of American interests.

Copyright image : Jim WATSON / AFP
Donald Trump, alors 45e président des États-Unis, et Xi Jinping à Pékin, le 9 novembre 2017.