[Trump’s World] - Europe: "The U.S. Trade War Serves a Civilizational Nationalism"

INSTITUT MONTAIGNE - It is often said that Donald Trump’s approach is purely transactional. However, the objectives of his administration appear deeply ideological, particularly when it comes to Europe. The MAGA sphere supports far-right parties, and Vice President J.D. Vance made this very clear in his February speech in Munich. What is your assessment?

IVAN KRASTEV - Donald Trump may be a genius, but if so, he is a genius of inconsistency-this is the core challenge. One never knows if he is bluffing, largely because he does not know himself. His transactional logic is thus far less systematic than it is often assumed; in reality, ideological stakes shape his relations with, for instance, South Africa, Europe, or Brazil. To understand his policy, two underlying trends must be observed

On one hand, there is a "de-ideologized" foreign policy, where an obsession with trade deficits explains an international outlook in which traditional U.S. alliances-once considered as pillars of American power-are now seen as expendable, if not outright harmful. The President views alliances as potential traps that could drag the country into wars he abhors and fears. The strike on Iran, for example, was a one-off operation.

On the other hand, there is a civilizational nationalism, defined by the ambition to rebuild the West around Christianity and "whiteness." It is an a-historical nationalism-one "without history"-in the sense that it is not tied to any specific people or territory. This second approach is largely driven by Vice President J.D. Vance. It guides foreign policy decisions in Europe and Latin America, regions perceived as essential to the reconstruction of "the West." This explains why the United States imposed a punitive 50% tariff on Brazil in retaliation for the legal proceedings against former President Jair Bolsonaro, accused of attempting a coup, even though the trade balance with Brazil showed a $200 million U.S. surplus.

IM - Brazil is indeed a perfect case study. It reveals the limitations of a purely transactional framework for understanding Trump’s decisions: Brazilian trade is oriented toward China-its top trading partner, accounting for 24% of imports and 41% of exports-so it would be in the U.S.'s interest to strengthen ties with Brasília.

IK - Precisely. This demonstrates that the trade war also serves the goal of constructing a new type of international order aligned with the norms of civilizational nationalism, particularly as promoted by the so-called "Miami group"." This group, based in Florida, includes influential figures who fled authoritarian leftist regimes in Latin America-Nicaragua, Venezuela, or Cuba. Miami plays a role in shaping the American far right similar to the one New York played in the 1940s and 1950s, when the city, a hub of liberalism during the Cold War, welcomed exiles from Eastern Europe fleeing communist regimes. This "Miami group" is quite influential within the Republican Party, and their weight explains policy decisions that defy a purely America First rationale. These measures are not economically motivated, but ideologically driven. While Trump is opportunistic, the Miami group is far more uncompromising, advocating for a "Greater West." These differences will undoubtedly generate tensions.

In Europe, where the "Trump effect" is already being felt, there are also proponents of civilizational nationalism, especially within far-right parties aligned with MAGA ideology. The continent is one electoral cycle behind the United States: the consequences of this alignment may become more visible in time, but the far-right’s rise is already reshaping the political balance and fueling calls for a cultural redefinition of the European project.

The "Trump effect" is thus double-edged: on the one hand, alignment with the Trump administration provides support and normalization to far-right parties-extending what French President Emmanuel Macron, during the January 2025 Ambassadors’ Conference, called the "reactionary international." On the other hand, this pro-American alignment can alienate voters, driving them toward centrist alternatives. Both the far right and traditional parties are being reshaped by the "Trump effect."

IM - Radical right-wing parties in Europe are aware of this ambivalence: the Rassemblement National and Giorgia Meloni are cautious not to appear too close to the U.S.…

IK - That’s the difficulty. The far right has traditionally been anti-American. Support from J.D. Vance forces them to revise their stance and send a more "pro-Trump" message. It will be extremely difficult for the far right to maintain this line if Trump withdraws support from Ukraine, especially in Eastern Europe. 

Beyond partisan positioning and electoral strategy, the entire European Union is facing uncertainty. A new divide is emerging between Western Europe-where anti-Trump sentiment is predominant, notably in France and Germany-and Eastern Europe, where that is much less the case. The EU has weathered such transatlantic divergences before, such as during the 2003 Iraq War. However, the contexts are not equivalent. At the time, regardless of views on the U.S. invasion, a pro-American consensus prevailed. That is no longer true. Today, with far-right forces stronger in the East than the West, the divergence is deep. In Poland and Hungary, which lie on the front lines, dependence on U.S. security guarantees is far greater than elsewhere. Just before the invasion of Ukraine, the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) surveyed European citizens: in the East, fears focused on invasion and occupation, while in the West, the dominant concern was nuclear war. Risk perception of Russia diverges sharply-and that, of course, shapes attitudes toward the United States.

We must therefore assess the Trump effect in all its complexity: partisan trends and geographic realities, fragmentation and realignment alike. Tariff developments will be crucial. Should they rise again, despite the June Turnberry negotiations, the economic shock would have wide-reaching political repercussions, though uneven across countries.

IM - Given these risks, what should the EU’s strategy be? 

IK - It’s a difficult question. The EU faces two major pitfalls. The first would be to overreact with symbolic retaliatory measures that may have poorly anticipated consequences. Not only do some member states diverge slightly from Brussels in their stance on Trump’s administration, but they also vary in their exposure to the U.S., particularly Italy and Germany. Trump will seek to treat European countries differently based on their positions, posing a real challenge to EU unity. 

The second, equally dangerous risk would be for the EU to comply with Trump’s demands, downplaying the political shift underway in the U.S., and thereby risking political paralysis.

If I had one piece of advice for Brussels, it would be to engage in a form of "passive-aggressiveness," focusing on three critical parameters not directly in link with U.S. relations.

First, emphasize the EU’s enormous potential and work on competitiveness. The Draghi report points the way forward. Completing the capital markets union would send a strong signal to investors who, disoriented by American uncertainty, might redirect funds toward Europe.

The risk is that the U.S. will not tolerate any coordinated response to its tariff offensives, as shown by the Brazilian case. The 50% tariff retaliation was partly about Bolsonaro, but also meant to send a warning to the BRICS by targeting the most vulnerable of the bloc’s giants (though India faces similar tariffs). The EU must act without provoking an American overreaction.

Lastly, the EU must revisit its own basis-rendered obsolete in a world where free trade and multilateralism are no longer operative. It must reinvent itself as a Union rooted in common defense, technological capacity, and economic strength. Radical change is needed. The challenge is immense: it demands skillful domestic policy trade-offs and managing the diverse levels of development across member states.

Three countries will be decisive: Poland, France, and Germany. The asynchrony of their electoral cycles will complicate matters, as will Poland’s internal political duality-between ultraconservative President Karol Nawrocki and Prime Minister Donald Tusk-and France’s political instability.

IM - The EU also suffers from the ambiguous positions of some of its members, whose reliability is in question. How can Europeans respond? Could the very existence of the EU be at stake?

IK - Giorgia Meloni’s Italy and Viktor Orbán’s Hungary are well aware that they have nothing to gain from the EU’s disintegration. Orbán is gambling boldly on China, but Hungary (a net beneficiary of the EU) is only useful to Beijing insofar as it is part of the EU and opens access to the European market. Without that, Hungary loses its strategic value. For now, Orbán is winning: over 40% of Chinese FDI in Europe goes to Hungary.

Clinging to political or economic sovereignty against Brussels is absurd: the very survival of some member states now depends on the EU. Those who oppose their national borders to the EU must understand that the survival of their linguistic or ethnic communities is tied to the survival of the Union. But since politics is not driven solely by rationality, such arguments are no guarantee that member states, including illiberal ones, will act in the EU’s best interest. Sometimes, the irrational prevails in local political dynamics. When Emmanuel Macron says the EU is mortal, he is not wrong.

IM - Is disintegration also a threat for the United States, whose foreign policy cannot be separated from domestic politics-and from the damage the Trump administration may cause to institutions and social cohesion?

IK - The risks are real. Paradoxically, the far-right and the entire MAGA spectrum thrive by warning of America’s collapse-yet they themselves are a major driver of that risk. During the post-Cold War period, comparisons between the fall of the USSR and U.S. crises were unthinkable. Today, they are commonplace. In Suicide of a Superpower: Will America Survive to 2025? (2011), the journalist Pat Buchanan explicitly compares the U.S. to Andrei Amalrik’s Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984? (1970). Two decades ago, no one would have taken such books seriously. Today, such structural parallels are in vogue. While not predictive of historical inevitability, as journalist Masha Gessen wrote in The Future Is History (2017), these comparisons are useful warnings.

Of course, the U.S., unlike the EU or the USSR, is a nation-state. But it is perhaps more deeply defined by its democratic regime than most. Can it survive a regime change?

IM - According to a Körber Foundation study, the White House’s trade war could create opportunities for middle powers. Others argue the opposite. In your view, what role could middle powers play? 

IK - Middle powers share one belief: they are not sufficiently recognized in the international order. Most do not oppose the liberal order, but they are indifferent to it-unless it grants them the status they believe they deserve, in which case they may defend it. Joe Biden’s main error was assuming a return to Cold War-style democracy vs. autocracy opposition was possible. That’s no longer how history is written.

The Trump administration was relatively well received by middle powers, but U.S. policies should concern them. First, Trump’s erratic behavior generates uncertainty, which is damaging to the global economy-and even more so for countries that, while promising, are also vulnerable. Second, while they may cooperate to an extent, middle powers are primarily in competition with one another. No one can predict how Trump will align. Third, middle powers-almost by definition-are hyperactive. They reject binary choices and demand freedom of maneuver. The trade war forces both economic and political choices.

Yet it is hard to identify a single structural trend. A Belgian joke captures this well: three boys discuss where babies come from. The German says from heaven; the French boy says the bedroom; the Swiss boy says it depends on the canton. When it comes to middle powers, the Swiss boy is right: it depends.

IM - Everything will depend on countries’ ability to manage their vulnerabilities.

IK - Exactly. That is a factor Trump should pay closer attention to. His preference for bilateralism punishes any country that attempts to form coalitions in response to U.S. actions. And indeed, the U.S. will always have the upper hand in one-on-one relations. But the Trump administration fails to grasp that for many countries, the U.S. is not their top priority. Domestic vulnerabilities-economic, political, or military-often take precedence. Moscow, for example, opted to continue its war rather than pursue trade with the U.S., because Ukraine is its strategic priority. In the increasingly proactive behavior of middle powers lies the defining dynamic of the coming decades-more so than U.S.-China rivalry. Volatility and uncertainty are likely to persist over time. 

IM - In the world you describe, is there still room for multilateral issues like governance or climate change? Are these now irrelevant-and if so, what are the consequences? 

IK - We should expect former global governance institutions to persist as hollow shells. One issue remains central: climate. In the past, global challenges-like nuclear proliferation or climate change-demanded cooperation. But there is a crucial difference: a nuclear disaster implies immediate mass death; climate change affects people at different intensities over time. When Trump’s team denies climate change, they are not rejecting the phenomenon, but the idea of a coordinated response. They recognize a brutal reality: the U.S. cannot save everyone, so it must save itself. Elon Musk’s ambition to colonize Mars is a meaningful metaphor. Today’s leaders have abandoned the universalism of their predecessors and are opting for individual or community survival .

Collected by Hortense Miginiac
Copyright image: Alan Ducarre