The Fourth Gulf War: a Trial of Weakness?

Three months after the second phase of Israeli and American military operations - the "Forty-Day War" of 2026 having followed the "Twelve-Day War" of 2025 - the Middle East has settled into a strange state of "neither war nor peace", with no favorable short-term scenario in sight. 

Jointly decided by Donald Trump and Mr. Netanyahu in the winter of 2025, the operation launched on 28 February was originally scheduled to take place in late spring 2026. The accelerated timeline - linked in part to Donald Trump’s "promise" to help the Iranian people - partly explains why it gives the impression of improvisation. It is hard to believe that Washington did not anticipate that Iran might block the Strait of Hormuz; and all credible accounts show that it was actually the case.

A Weakened Regime, but Still Standing

As we know, the Iranian regime remains in place; it has radicalised and the internal balance of power has shifted in favor of the Revolutionary Guards. It is convinced it has won a great victory over the United States. The regime-change operation envisioned by Israel was reportedly nipped in the bud by the Turkish President’s intervention with Donald Trump, preventing the mobilization of Kurdish forces in Iraq.

But the Iranian economy is exhausted. It is experiencing its most severe crisis since 1979. Since mid-April, the financial blockade ("Economic Fury") appears to be having a profound effect on the Revolutionary Guards’ oil revenues. 

If the American press is to be believed, the military assessment is mixed. Iran is said to have retained 70% of its launchers and 70-75% of its missiles, even though its ability to fire long-range missiles has been severely compromised. It is said to have regained access to 90% of its underground facilities.

Many Losers…

The war in Iran shares a commonality with the war in Ukraine in that both regional conflicts have significant repercussions on the entire global economy. However, the impact of the former is deeper and longer-lasting, as it affects critical elements of industrial value chains: while the Strait of Hormuz accounts for only a small proportion of global maritime traffic (around 10%), it is, as we know, particularly important for exports of oil and liquefied natural gas, as well as fertilizers, sulphur and helium. Not to mention the undersea cables that run through it.

Regardless of the outcome, the current war is thus already contributing to the slowdown of the global economy and is strongly prompting major players to explore alternatives in three areas:

• Transport security, notably through the refurbishment or construction of new oil and gas pipelines across the Arabian Peninsula, as well as a renewed interest in trans-regional corridors;
• Supplier diversification, with some countries expressing a desire to source supplies elsewhere (Japanese interest in American LNG, etc.) and the opportunity perceived by geographically closer suppliers (Russia’s emphasis on the benefits of the Power of Siberia-2 project for China, etc.); 
• Energy transition, with Asia potentially facing its own "Ukraine moment": calling into question certain projects reliant on LNG, and accelerating efforts to transition toward nuclear and renewable energy sources, etc.

After three months of military engagement, American observers see Donald Trump as somewhere "between Bush and Carter", that is, between the architect of a risky and perhaps counterproductive regime-change operation (as was the case in Iraq) and the leader responsible for a bitter failure in Iran (akin to the botched hostage rescue operation of 1980). Whilst the US economy is suffering less than those of other major global players, the country’s reputation has once again been tarnished, all the more so as America, having so far achieved no convincing positive results in the eyes of the world, has significantly depleted its military stocks. 

According to US media and think tanks, the Pentagon has in fact fired almost all of its long-range stealth missiles (over 1,000), a third of its Tomahawk inventory (around 1,000), and approximately half of its interceptors (1,300 Patriots, half of its SM-3s, a third of its SM-6s, and half of its THAADs). It will take several years to replenish these stockpiles, which in the meantime will limit the United States’ capacity for action, including the defense of its allies. Furthermore, as seen in Ukraine, the phenomenal disproportion in costs between attack and defense has become glaringly apparent when drones are pitted against traditional interceptors.

…and any Winners?

Are Russia and China winners or losers in the ongoing confrontation? Let us beware of sweeping judgements: the consequences for them are, in fact, two-sided. 

Moscow and Beijing can only rejoice at seeing America weakened politically and militarily, bogged down once again in an "endless war" in the Middle East that diverts its attention from both Europe and Asia. 

Nevertheless, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping have also observed, undoubtedly with surprise, that Donald Trump was capable of launching an impressive show of force. A major "war of choice"-intense, long and costly-which they undoubtedly did not expect, involving "decapitation" operations designed to impress the United States’ adversaries. And they cannot be certain that the relative failure observed so far will deter him from trying again elsewhere. Moreover, by broadening the focus, it is hard not to see in the US president’s actions over the past two years a weakening of the "family of authoritarians": the decapitation of the Venezuelan regime, a rapprochement with the new Syrian regime, support for operations against Hezbollah and Hamas, attacks against the Houthis, and now a reduction in the Islamic Republic of Iran’s capacity for external action. 

For Beijing, there are nevertheless undeniable reasons for satisfaction. American expenditure on munitions is depleting the Pentagon's stockpiles and reducing its capacity to endure a potential conflict in Asia. Its quasi-ally Pakistan has positioned itself as a mediator. China can continue to consolidate its image as a guarantor of international stability. And its exports of ‘green’ equipment and technologies are in full swing. 

Is Israel emerging as the winner from the current phase of hostilities? From its perspective, there are, at this stage, many reasons to be satisfied. With no wavering in its strategic vision since 7 October - which has reinforced the country’s preference for preventive or pre-emptive military action - Israel is methodically reducing the terrorist threat and can envisage a scenario in which a stabilized Lebanon might one day establish normal relations with it. It is weakening the Islamic Republic and further delaying the country’s nuclear program. In the country, it is often pointed out that the Islamic Republic has been unable to enrich uranium for nearly a year, something that has not happened for two decades. It continues to impress the region militarily - a little too much for the Saudis’ and Qataris’ liking - and has seen the Emiratis appeal directly to it for their defense. Admittedly, this has come at the cost of an army exhausted by nearly three years of war, within which, on the ground in the Middle East, discipline sometimes appears to be breaking down.

A War Far from Being Over

On the Middle Eastern front, the ceasefire is supposed to hold at least until the end of June. On the Gulf front, America is still restraining Israel and has prevented the war from escalating, which would risk the mutual destruction of energy infrastructure. But the status quo of "American blockade versus Iranian filtration" will not last forever

The complete neutralization of Iran’s nuclear program remains the primary war aim of the United States and Israel. Contrary to what is frequently heard or read, Donald Trump’s America has, with regard to Iran, fairly clear objectives, even if its strategy is not always transparent. Proof of this: Presidential Directive NSMP-2 (4 February 2025) repeated word for word the objectives of NSMP-11 (8 May 2018): "it is the policy of the United States that Iran be denied a nuclear weapon and intercontinental ballistic missiles; that Iran's network and campaign of regional aggression be neutralized; to disrupt, degrade, or deny the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and its surrogates access to the resources that sustain their destabilizing activities; and to counter Iran's aggressive development of missiles and other asymmetric and conventional weapons capabilities." At the launch of Operation Epic Fury, Donald Trump had referred to Iran’s missiles and missile production capacity, its navy, its nuclear program and its support for terrorism. 

Thus, America does not claim to have a genuine "regime change" strategy. All the more so as the total collapse of the Islamic Republic would entail risks ranging from mass emigration to friendly countries to the dispersion of Iran’s military and nuclear capabilities. In the White House, say those close to the Administration, they continue to refer to the "Venezuela" scenario. We have even seen American sources claim that former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad could have been Iran’s "Delcy Rodriguez"… 

Four Scenarios

What now? Three months after the beginning of hostilities, four scenarios are emerging: 
 

• Negotiation ( 25% probability). Right now, it primarily concerns traffic in the strait, and should then address the nuclear issue within a two-month timeframe, aiming for a "lighter" agreement than the one from 2015. At this stage, a diplomatic solution remains unlikely, as Iran believes it is in a position of strength and does not trust the United States. Not to mention that the weakness of the new "Supreme Leader" probably prevents him from imposing an agreement involving significant concessions. And that Donald Trump continues to dream of universalizing the Abraham Accords in the region.
• Showdown (30% probability). Following an ultimatum, America would resume massive strikes, hoping to convince the regime to beg for mercy, as its very survival would then be at stake. But in the event of failure, it might instead attempt to build a makeshift nuclear device, if only to assert that it is now a "nuclear power".
• Strategic defeat (20% probability). Can one imagine an American defeat? It seems unlikely, but Donald Trump’s relationship with strategic reality makes this scenario plausible. In this scenario, the Islamic Republic - which, as is sometimes said, "has never won a war but has never lost a negotiation" - would remain in control of Hormuz. This would set a dangerous precedent for freedom of navigation in international straits. Yet the US president would nonetheless claim to have "won a great victory" by having weakened the Islamic Republic militarily, perhaps recalling George Bush’s precedent in 1991. And he would turn his attention elsewhere (probably towards Cuba).
• Maximum pressure (25% probability). Finally, the preferred scenario by experts close to the administration is one of strategic patience and "maximum pressure", a slogan that already characterized Donald Trump’s first term. Convinced of the regime’s fragility and the effectiveness of the blockade, they foresee a Soviet-style fate for the Islamic Republic. To this end, they recommend stepping up efforts to disrupt the Revolutionary Guards’ funding networks, sanctioning the Iranian automotive sector, neutralizing internal (government intranet) and external (state television) communication channels, and encouraging defection and revolt campaigns (strikes, etc.). An uncertain and equally risky strategy, as the nuclear temptation would undoubtedly resurface in Iran once again.