EU Rotating Presidency: Poland in a Position of Strength

Polish EU presidency is taking place in a very complex geopolitical context. Difficult and decisive months of the War in Ukraine, increasing Russian influence and disinformation campaigns affecting internal politics of member states and candidate countries (Slovakia, Hungary, Georgia, Moldova, Romania), inauguration of Donald Trump’s presidency in the US, snap elections in Germany or the new European Commission’ task to prepare the next future-proof multiannual financial framework - are just some of the strategic challenges to be met. For this reason, the Polish Presidency‘s motto is “Security, Europe!” understood as making decisive progress in several interconnected security dimensions. 

As regards the former, Poland will strive for the creation of a European Disinformation Resilience Council, similar to that being currently established by the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Another dimension is energy security and ensuring that citizens and businesses have access to energy at affordable prices, as an element to boost EU competitiveness. On this front, Poland wants to make sure that nuclear energy is classified as green energy, not connected to oil or gas, and to increase investments in diversification to bring energy prices down in the context of import cuts on Russian oil and gas. 

The third dimension is economic security where Poland - perceived as a stable, strong and robust economy - feels especially apt to stimulate progress. Fixing EU competitiveness is a key priority and the Polish presidency wants to focus on cutting EU administrative burdens for businesses, reducing over-regulation and stimulating potential discussion on the shape of the future multiannual financial framework, including cohesion policy. 

For Poland, EU geopolitical security is also directly connected with supporting Ukraine in its defensive war against Russia and speeding up the EU enlargement process. Poland’s aim in this context is to open the first negotiation cluster with Ukraine entitled "Fundamental Issues", achieve support of EU member states for the full usage of the Russian frozen assets to support Ukraine, as well as to tighten and broaden sanctions on Russia and Belarus. 

To achieve all these goals Poland will organize over 20 informal ministerial meetings in Warsaw such as e.g General Affairs Council meeting in Gymnich format including the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy.

It was definitely the most sidelined EU Council presidency ever. And not surprisingly so. The Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orban had been left out of important initiatives and agreements, especially in support of Ukraine, due to his pro-Russian bias and constant veto policy. For Poland it was especially troubling that the Hungarian Presidency has effectively blocked any progress on the European Peace Facility at the level of COREPER. 

No major policy files were pushed forward, also because of the institutional reshuffle in the EP and the Commission after the June elections. However, no open boycott of the Hungarian presidency was seen on the side of EU institutions and the spirit at the final EUCO meeting in Budapest in November 2024 was quite friendly, including Ursula von der Layen openly thanking "Viktor for his great hospitality". The meeting’s outcome was the so-called Budapest Declaration on the New European Competitiveness Deal - one of the few policy areas which unite pretty much all member states. 

For Poland, the unacceptable Hungarian lack of European team spirit was best illustrated by July’s 2024 Orban’s self-proclaimed "peace mission" in Moscow and by granting asylum (in December 2024) to the former Polish deputy Justice Minister Romanowski, subject to a European Arrest Warrant. Romanowski is accused of  11 crimes, including being part of an organised criminal group and defrauding around EUR 25 millions from the so-called Justice Fund. 

Poland has the ambition to use its Presidency to re-establish its position within the B5 format of the five most important EU Member States. It is successfully using its political leverage to achieve this goal as a Ukraine-and Russia-related expert, a strong and robust economic player as well as a serious defence spender.

Yet, in many domestic experts' opinion, Polish EU-oriented ambitions are too small. After 8 years of PiS government, with an EU policy marked by conflicts with Brussels and a clearly defensive stance towards the majority of EU initiatives, it was expected that the current Polish government, led by the former European Council President, would have taken a qualitatively different and constructive course. Yet, the first year of Tusk’s administration has shown that Poland wants to “play it safe” in EU affairs. The best illustration of this approach was a clear opposition to undertake the topic of any treaty changes at the time when the European Parliament’s Constitutional  Affairs committee report on treaty amendments was voted in Strasbourg (November 2023). This attitude was pursued ahead of the Polish 2024 spring regional elections as well as the EP electoral campaign, even by the most pro EU MPs and MEPs from Platforma Obywatelska. It is still being pursued during the presidency, ahead of the upcoming Polish presidential elections in May. The underlying logic of this self-restraining strategy is to avoid controversies and appease political opponents who demonize potential EU treaty reform as an assault on national sovereignty. In this context, instead of stimulating the discussion on the future of Europe between the main EU players (i.e. France and Germany), the Polish government is consequently avoiding the topic of EU institutional reforms, focusing instead on security - which seemingly unites all parties across the political spectrum. Yet, it is important to remember that there is no escape from the topic of EU institutional reform, especially for a country so strongly backing enlargement. 

Andrzej Duda, representing the opposing political camp to the governing coalition, has some serious ambitions in the context of the Polish EU presidency. Yet, they are much more Washington than Brussels-oriented. In his New Years’ address to the nation on January 1 2025 he stated that the first priority of the Polish presidency will be tightening EU's relations with the US, which – while naturally important - is formally not among the government’s presidency priorities. 

In a similar vein, the President expressed intention to organise an America-EU summit during the Polish presidency. His spokesman said the President hopes that the government "will not obstruct or interfere with this matter". The spokesman noted that it was President Duda who first formulated the priority of the Polish Presidency about "having more America in Europe, because there are many countries that are trying to push America out of Europe". While the Polish government also acknowledges the need to nurture relations with the United States, Tusk underlines at the same time that Europe must "reawaken its ambitions and become self-reliant". These statements illustrate certain differences in the approaches to the Polish presidency. 

Some sort of tensions between the two domestic power centres could already be observed in the first days of the presidency. President Duda decided not to take part in the formal opening ceremony which took place at the Warsaw Grand Theatre on January 3. A few days later, responding to Donald Tusk's tweet about the absence of President Duda (being spotted skiing in one of the Polish mountain resorts), the advisor to the President's Cabinet said that “the government has used a serious matter like the presidency of the EU Council to make a performance in honour of Donald Tusk in the Grand Theatre”. He added that the President would not lend credibility to such activities.

In the current geopolitical circumstances Poland’s allies are those countries who express genuinely strong support for Ukraine and its EU membership, push for increased EU defence capacities and pursue a strict and uncompromising policy towards Russia. As noted by Donald Tusk during the November informal Nordic-Baltic Eight (NB8) summit in Sweden "for the first time, we are dealing with such a united, but also solid, block of countries that think the same way about the most difficult matters, such as the war in Ukraine and speak exactly the same language on key issues". It is important to note that Nordic and Baltic States are those countries who do not condition the EU enlargement upon EU institutional (treaty) reform, unlike Germany and France. 

Yet, Germany and France have always been important partners for Poland and it is clearly visible that after over 8 years of PiS government, the Weimar Triangle is currently being revitalized on several fronts. Many initiatives are undertaken at the executive as well as parliamentary levels (e.g. Weimar declaration of 25 November 2024 signed by the heads of European affairs committees of the three parliaments) to strengthen the format’s real influence in the field of EU affairs. Yet, more concrete and tangible initiatives are necessary. The Triangle should team up in a much more synergetic way to operationalise the aforementioned European Competitiveness Deal. Yet, the political and economic situation of the two Polish partners is causing concern in Warsaw, especially with the view of building a common front vis-a-vis Trump’s upcoming policy towards Europe. While the Triangle agrees to work together in a broader coalition to revitalise the Eastern Partnership in view of the ongoing Russian war and unpredictable situation in the neighbourhood and expresses strong support for Ukraine, the French - and even more German - attitude towards more concrete undertakings like e.g. operationalisation of the European Peace Facility is neither clear nor encouraging. It is important to remember that Trump expects European partners to take better care of Europe’s own security by spending more on defense and in this context both Germany and France lag behind. 

At the same time, in the Polish view, the only credible security guarantee for Ukraine is joining NATO and it cannot be ensured by a mere political declaration. There can be different peace-keeping scenarios of course but Poland will want to make sure that if anybody declares the end of war and lifts any sanctions, Russia will not be left on its own and start re-arming itself. Putin cannot be trusted at all.

While Poland shares the general view of the Draghi report that the European economy must become a powerhouse that is not afraid of competition, it also thinks that the report presents an incomplete vision of the EU reform mostly because it was drafted without any input from the CEE countries. This rather unacceptable omission has been raised multiple times by Polish experts and economists. In this sense, Poland would wish for a more holistic and coherent roadmap to boost the EU’s economic advantages, taking into account the internal development and GDP disparities among the Western and Eastern member states. Some of the concerns relate to the negligence of the capabilities shortages of the less wealthy member states to undergo rapid green transformation. In such context, top down imposed benchmarks and mechanisms not based on subsidiarity might in fact result in decreasing competitiveness in many parts of the EU, and not the other way round. 

As regards the Polish view on increasing economic security, there are three main priorities for the presidency: decreasing administrative burdens and over-regulation especially for small and medium enterprises as well as seeking to make the implementation of energy and climate regulations more flexible; restoring a level playing field for the EU industry in the face of protectionist practices by global competitors;  and ensuring that cohesion policy remains an important element of the EU single market aimed at boosting security and competitiveness in less developed parts of the EU. 

Mercosur and Polish agriculture is a very hot topic. Both the Ministry of Development and Technology and the Ministry of Agriculture oppose finalization of the agreement in its current form. The Polish government wants the European Commission to look not only at individual trade agreements or customs preferences, but to take into account all agreements already concluded and those under negotiation. It expects a cumulative analysis of how their joint effect will affect the areas of meat, milk and sugar which are particularly sensitive and crucial to food security in the EU. In practice, this means examining whether the effects of several trade agreements will undermine the stability of production, farmers' incomes and food availability in these agricultural areas.

Moreover, Polish defense expenses go to a large extent to the US pocket , as Poland buys many types of equipment from that country. However, at the same time, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Radosław Sikorski points out that it is in the interest of Poland to strengthen the EU’s military and defense capabilities and make Poland a leader in this respect. While Polish authorities are aware that Poland cannot solely rely on the US, it is Donald Trump who says this in the first place. The false dichotomy between NATO’s and the EU’s security efforts should finally be replaced by a synergetic approach. So while of course there will be cooperation with the US in the area of security, including in energy and technology, the Polish presidency will strongly support building the EU strategic autonomy, also to be able to support Ukraine more effectively against Russia. 

Amidst Berlin's gradual leadership failure, Emmanuel Macron has for long strived to emphasize the French intellectual initiative in the EU. Yet taking into account his own current domestic troubles with securing a stable government along with a credible budget in light of excessive public deficit and debt levels, it seems that his EU ambitions will have to be put on pause and redirected towards the domestic context. At the same time Poland, with its well-functioning and robust economy and experienced leadership in charge (former European Council president Donald Tusk and a charismatic heavy weight Minister of Foreign Affairs Radek Sikorski), appears to be a suitable candidate to the leading role on many EU policy fronts. It also seems that Macron's increasingly decisive announcements regarding support for Ukraine or the need to minimize the role of the US in Europe play into Poland’s ears. 

In light of the German stagnation and upcoming snap elections, as well as Elon Musk’s alliance with the right wing populist forces in Germany and his interference into European politics, Poland and France have a special and challenging role to play as a democratic, progressive and strongly EU-oriented tandem. There are more and more things that unite rather than divide the two countries. For example, while during the previous PiS government France's policy of strategic autonomy for Europe was seen as an attempt to marginalize the role of NATO, the current Polish ruling coalition sees very well the need to work in parallel at the NATO and EU levels in this respect. In this context, Macron's visit in Warsaw was an attempt to develop a common position on key challenges. As regards the current salient matters, the skeptical approach to Mercosur agreement also unites the two countries. 

Last Monday Radosław Sikorski was a guest of honor at the French Ambassadors' Meeting in Paris. At a joint press conference with the French Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot, Sikorski stressed that he perceived the invitation to the meeting as an expression of confidence in Poland and a confirmation of the excellent Polish-French relations. It was in fact his first foreign visit during the presidency. Also, for quite a while, the two countries have been working on a bilateral treaty on enhanced cooperation but the works were interrupted by the snap parliamentary elections in France and the following political uncertainty. It now seems that they have revived and, according to Sikorski, the treaty will be finalised in the coming months. Signing of an apparently comprehensive agreement will surely strengthen the Franco-Polish axis within the Weimar Triangle and give a renewed boost to common policy-oriented undertakings. 

Copyright Image : Sergei GAPON / AFP

Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk with Antonio Costa in Warsaw, January 3rd 2025.