A "Normal" Transition? What the Outcome of Poland’s Elections Means

By way of introduction, I will first look at how the term "democratic transition" is used. It speaks to commentators’ unease when discussing the recent parliamentary elections and to the ambivalent nature of the current political process. 

"Transition" usually refers to the end of an authoritarian regime-in other words, a regime where voters cannot change their government and/or where they have no real choice when they go to the polls. This does not describe the situation in Poland. The country is not on a path from autocracy to democracy, as in Spain after the death of Franco in 1977 or in Portugal after the Carnation Revolution in 1974. 

Similarly, the term "illiberal democracy" has its roots in the narrative of promoting liberal democracy. Usage has spread to define certain regimes, such as the government of Victor Orban in Hungary. The term is both critical and not politically neutral. If we must choose a label, then I would describe Poland under the PiS as a "hybrid regime", made up of competitive authoritarianism and/or limited pluralism. 

Yet, we cannot speak in terms of a wholly ordinary handover of power: the rule of law came under attack and state institutions have been packed with trusted PiS loyalists (in an example of "state capture", when private interests systematically shape public policy for private gain).

Donald Tusk’s list of candidates under the Civic Coalition banner came out on top of the opposition parties with 30.7% of the votes. Having promised to form a governing coalition if they were victorious, the opposition carried the day, even though the PiS officially garnered the most votes of a single party (35.38%). The center-right Third Way also had an excellent election. It secured 15% of votes and 65 seats, double the projections based on the most recent opinion polls. It now has substantial political capital to draw on. Third Way could hold the presidency of the Sejm, the lower house of parliament. The third coalition partner, The Left, fell slightly short of opinion poll expectations, with 8.61% of the vote and just 26 seats. 

Many unknowns remain, and it is too early to predict how the political situation will unfold.. 
 
The first unknown concerns the former opposition parties. Now they have won the election, will they govern successfully? This alliance seems pretty solid and has put paid to the machinations of the PiS to lure away the agrarian Polish People’s Party (PSL), one member of the Third Way grouping. We see no signs of the alliance disintegrating, despite differences, especially on certain sensitive social questions that are central to the agenda of The Left and which could spark tensions with the Polish People’s Party. 

This could weaken the PiS's chances of forming an effective opposition. Active solidarity between the President and PiS members of parliament would empower Andrzej Duda's to use his veto. It would also strengthen the party’s position in the upcoming European and local elections in 2024, especially given its strong local base.

Generalizing and applying our analysis of the Polish election results to predict outcomes in other illiberal or liberal democracies could be misleading. On the contrary, it is important to think contextually and to reason in terms of resources and political flows. Yes, it's true that the election results in Poland are a big win. But look at Switzerland. As I said, we cannot generalize. Hungary, for example, has gone much further in establishing lasting authoritarian rule and yet the opposition there is far weaker. Developments in Poland are not a template we can apply to other countries. 

But, there are lessons to be learned. One is that the values of the rule of law were defended by the opposition, civil society and a considerable number of judges. Rallying in support of these same values, the country as a whole avoided abdicating power to the right. The positive contribution of European legal standards was also important as the backdrop to these efforts.

The historical context played a big role. Poland’s long tradition of civil society mobilization, embedded in its politics since the 1980s, sets the country apart from other neo-authoritarian powers in Europe. It also explains the resurgence in activism over the eight years the PiS was in power. Civil society is extremely resilient in the country. Massive 75% voter turnout-a significant 10 percentage points higher than in 1989 is another factor worth mentioning. This was a record level of participation and should temper any thoughts President Duda might have about delaying the appointment of a prime minister. 

Brexit was held up by the opposition as the example of what not to do. Poles’ attachment to Europe has never wavered. The prospect of unblocking €35 billion from the European recovery fund, which Europe had held back citing Poland’s failure to comply with the rule of law, was also a powerful weapon in Donald Tusk’s campaign arsenal. 
 
The opposition ran a very skillful election campaign: the coalition parties consistently showed respect and goodwill towards each other, Donald Tusk was unfailingly courteous to the representatives of his future partners in government, and the opposition democracy rallies in June and October successfully galvanized voters. Rafal Trzaskowski, who won 48.97% of the vote running against the PiS in the 2019 presidential elections further contributed to the Civic Coalition’s political capital.

This was followed by the resignation of two of Poland’s top military commanders, General Andrzejczak and General Piotrowski, in the wake of a scandal involving an errant Russian missile found near Bydgoszcz, 500 km from the border with Ukraine. For the PiS, the resignations cast an unwelcome light on the ruling party's claims to be the safest pair of hands for Poland’s national security. The incident also pushed the differences between the army and the government into the public domain.

Rooted on the radical right, the party undershot expectations winning only 18 seats. Confederation is a grouping of two parties, the National Movement and KORWiN (now renamed New Hope), a party formed by Janusz Korwin-Mikke. 

The two founding parties are far more radical and conservative than the PiS. Korwin-Mikke is ultra-libertarian with views close to US libertarian ideas. He has been active on the political scene since the 1980s, and was one of the few opponents of the Round Table Agreements that paved the way for democratization in Poland in 1989. He has a controversial reputation, his frequent anti-feminist tirades positing the superiority of men over women often having been chalked up to "eccentricity". In reality, his broadsides reflect a world view informed by social and even biological domination, as is clear from his outburst that women should earn less than men because they are weaker, smaller and less intelligent and his comments during the 2012 Paralympics that disabled athletes should not be seen on television, for example! 

Nor does Confederation have the same political roots as the PiS. While the latter is one of the heirs of the Solidarity trade union, Confederation can be fascist in tone and mainly appeals to young men. Its platform is anticollectivist. The party has even berated the PiS’s "socialist" redistributive policies. Confederation is resolutely anti-European, whereas the PiS, while hostile to a federal Europe, has ultimately opted to steer clear of the dreaded "Polexit". One positive of its radical position is that it perhaps makes an alliance with the PiS an unlikely possibility-although the lure of power can make strange bedfellows.

The nub of the issue is whether or not Andrzej Duda will shake off his links to the PiS and Jaroslaw Kaczyński. He is in office until 2025 and could either opt to remain relatively impartial so as not to appear to be Kaczyński’s puppet, or play the harder coalition card. He does have the power: the President has a veto, which can only be overturned by a qualified majority, and the prerogative to dissolve the Sejm if it takes longer than four months to approve the budget. He also appoints the prime minister and could give the PiS first shot at forming a government, since it is the largest single party with the most seats, if the three opposition parties are not taken as a political alliance. Yet, even the PiS is beginning to own its failure, with some of its leaders even blaming Jaroslaw Kaczyński and questioning his strategy. 

Donald Tusk will seek to mend relations with the EU and reposition Poland as a reliable partner, compliant with Brussels’ recommendations on the rule of law in a bid to unlock the €35 billion in aid from the EU’s post-pandemic recovery plan. This will likely also mean reforming the state media.

Possible areas of tension between the coalition parties could center on social questions: The Left is in favor of abortion, while the matter is thornier for the Third Way. However, their differences should not be insurmountable.

This question has to be seen in the broader context: in reality, the majority of the supplies, consisting of old equipment compatible with Ukraine’s existing systems, had already been delivered to Ukraine. The announcement was more of an election ploy and doesn’t actually change anything. However, the move was seen as hostile and undermining the policy of solidarity with Ukraine. The opposition, on the other hand, has taken a very cautious approach to defense matters thus far. 

Political parties spawned by Solidarity have always been both very pro-European and strong Atlanticists, but not all to the same degree (the right is keener on cooperation between America and Europe, the liberals are perhaps a little less closed to the idea of a European defense policy). But they all agree that NATO is essential for Poland’s security, which makes the strategic partnership with the United States an unshakable priority. 

Image copyright : JANEK SKARZYNSKI / AFP