Tragedy After Disaster? War in Ukraine and Demography

In our time all Greece was visited by a dearth of children and generally a decay of population, owing to which the cities were denuded of inhabitants, and a failure of productiveness resulted, though there were no long-continued wars or serious pestilences among us.[...]For when there are only one or two sons, it is evident that, if war or pestilence carries off one, the houses must be left heirless: and, like swarms of bees, little by little the cities become sparsely inhabited and weak.
Polybius, Histories, Book XXXVII

Back in 2022, we emphasized the importance of the demographic factor in the Russian invasion of Ukraine, to the point that it could be partially analyzed as a "demographic engineering" operation: the capture of territories (and therefore populations), as well as the abduction of children, could help alleviate the Russian demographic crisis.

The military stalemate and the persistence of unfavorable demographic trends suggest that this palliative will not be sufficient to stem the decline of the Russian population, especially since the invasion is increasingly deadly for young men, whose importance is crucial for the country's demographic and economic future.

Long term projections already suggest a greater decline in the Russian population than the world average, by 2100. In fact, Russia is experiencing, at the scale of a "country-continent", the same "triple demographic blow" that affects Eastern Europe: low birth rate, high mortality, high emigration.

Above all, Russia faces a daunting combination of factors: in addition to this low birth rate, there is a high and persistent mortality rate - aggravated during the COVID crisis - and, now, the direct and indirect consequences of the war.

The root causes of this high mortality in Russia, especially among men, are well known. First and foremost, alcohol (and its indirect consequences: accidents, suicides, propensity to violence or even murder), the consumption of which is stable despite the administration’s efforts. The "vodka lobby" is frequently accused of being effective. The 10-year difference in life expectancy between men and women regularly places Russia at the top of the world rankings. It is also one of the few countries in the world in which the "deficit of men" is so significant, as they represented only 46% of the population at the time of the 2020 census. Nearly 40% of mothers are single.

The consequences of the war have further exacerbated this natural birth/mortality "scissor" effect.

With an average age of 35 for combatants, Russian losses will weigh heavily on the country's demographic, societal and economic future. With losses of around one million men (including between 120,000 and 200,000 killed) if the conflict continues, Russia is not only mortgaging its youth, but also its future. The future veterans are very likely to be a burden rather than an asset to Russian society, as they are more likely to exhibit violent (former prisoners, etc.) or antisocial (post-traumatic syndromes, drug use, etc.) behavior. This will likely also lead to an even greater decline in the birth rate: many of them will not have the will or the ability to create stable family structures.

As for the massive emigration due to the war - including to escape conscription or forced recruitment - it has added to a "brain drain" that was already well underway in the 2010s. Among the hundreds of thousands of Russians who have left the country since February 2022 (some estimates go as high as 700,000 people), many will return - in part because Moscow has tightened the conditions for remote working for Russian companies. But not all of them. For example, only 45,000 people returned in 2023. The Russian economy will therefore inevitably lose out.

The Russian authorities have sounded the alarm. In June 2024, Prime Minister Dmitry Chernyshenko warned that Russia could face a labor force deficit of 2.4 million people by 2030. The chair of the Duma Committee for the Protection of the Family, Nina Ostanina, has proposed to launch a "special demographic operation" (sic) to boost the national birth rate.
Although no comprehensive plan is visible, a number of policy directions have been taken over the past two years

• The prohibition of sex change operations and of "homosexual propaganda",
• The de facto restriction of access to abortion,
• The possibility of seizing the property of emigrants who criticize the Kremlin,
• The restriction of the right to remote work from abroad for Russian companies,
• Facilitating access to Russian citizenship for foreign volunteer soldiers,
• The prohibition of any promotion of a "childfree lifestyle".

In 2024, Vladimir solemnly addressed the subject by announcing a new fertility target for the country: 1.6 children per woman in 2030 and 1.8 in 2036.

At the same time, the Kremlin recognized that the country needed migrants more than ever. The problem for Moscow is that immigration, mainly from Central Asia, is becoming more difficult due to the combination of two factors: lower earnings (fall in the ruble) and increased risks (forced recruitment of foreigners, racism and mistrust toward Tajiks since the attack in March 2024).

The demographic situation in Ukraine is no better. Estimated, in the absence of a recent census, at some 42 million before the war - when its population was equivalent to that of France at the time of independence - it would now be only 31 million according to Kyiv in the territory controlled by the State, to which would be added 4 million in the occupied territories and 7 to 8 million Ukrainians abroad.

It is an aging population, with a significant "gap" in the 15-30 age group, and one of the lowest fertility rates on the continent, around 1.1 before the war and 0.9 today. So much so that the UN's median projection was, in 2024, only 15 million by 2100.

The war naturally worsened this situation, with a death toll estimated at between 60 and 120,000. Unlike Russia, Ukraine does not wish to enlist the youngest age groups in the defense of its territory. Kyiv's current dilemma is simple: to favor the present, by maximizing the mobilization of human resources for its defense; or to safeguard the future, by exempting this resource from recruitment as late as possible. The conscription age was 27 in 2023. It was lowered to 25 in 2024 (The United States, at one point, pressured Ukraine to lower it to 18.)

In the meantime, this heart of Eastern Europe is once again the "Bloodlands" that it was in the twentieth century, as described by Timothy Snyder in his eponymous work.

Copyright image : Yuriy DYACHYSHYN / AFP
A woman and her baby in Lviv, western Ukraine, August 23, 2022.