How Has the War in Ukraine Transformed Russia’s Ecosystem of Influence Abroad?

Who Are the Actors Behind Russian Interference?

Russia's ecosystem of information influence, responsible for most interference, is primarily, but not exclusively, supervised by the state. Three categories of actors can be identified, either directly linked to the Kremlin or more or less autonomous.

State actors also encompass Russian "digital diplomacy" and the communication services of actors linked to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, embassies, or the Ministry of Defense. Since February 2022, these actors have adopted a much more aggressive and unrestrained communication style, deviating significantly from traditional diplomatic norms. The X account of the Russian embassy in South Africa, which boasts over 170,000 followers, is a key channel disseminating Russian strategic narratives on X, including through disinformation. Intelligence units in charge of influence operations, rooted in the KGB's "active measures" during the Cold War, have also contributed to this apparent escalation of Russian interference in recent months. Notable among these are the GRU's 54777 unit and the FSB's 5th Service, which recently gained attention for carrying out the "Stars of David" operation.

There are also unofficial actors, known as "adhocratic" (ad hoc), to whom the Russian state delegates or outsources some of its sovereign functions related to influence operations and the use of force. Yevgeny Prigozhin, head of the Wagner group and the Lakhta project, was the prime example of a"geopolitical entrepreneur", leveraging its financial resources to advance both the state and its own agenda. Since his death, the network has been undergoing dismantlement, fragmentation, and partial absorption by Russian security services and the Ministry of Defense, both in Russia and abroad, notably through the creation of the "African Corps", the new expeditionary force in Africa.

My colleague Colin Gérard and I also identify new actors, whom we describe as influence contractors or disinformation providers. These actors specialize in covert political engineering and the manipulation of "political technologies", are subcontracted by the Russian administration to refine its information operations. This includes digital marketing companies like Dialog, ASP and Struktura, which have been involved in the RRN/Doppelgänger operation. Dubbed "Doppelgänger" by the NGO EUDisinfoLab, from a German word referring to a "look-alike" or "evil double" in folklore, Doppelgänger is a significant manipulation campaign that specializes in impersonating institutional sites - like the French Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Armed Forces - or legitimate media to disseminate false information, often related to the war in Ukraine. The operation also relies on an ad hoc online platform, RRN (Reliable Recent News).

Dialog, ASP and Struktura are also involved in Russia's interference in the current US presidential campaign: these entities, as well as several members of RT staff, have recently been prosecuted and sanctioned by the Departments of Justice (DoJ) and Treasury. The FBI has also seized 36 websites connected to Doppelgänger.

There are also financial incentives behind these collaborations. RT, for example, is linked to Afrique média, a "pan-Africanist" and pro-Russian web-TV based in Douala, the economic capital of Cameroon, and founded by Cameroonian journalist Justin Tagouh, which broadcasts RT content in French on a daily basis. This flexible ecosystem employs a range of influence practices, from soft power to corrosive methods like manipulation and deception, and tailors its approach to different target audiences.

What Is Russia's Main Argument?

Propaganda is not only used to make people "believe something", but also "to make them believe nothing". Part of this ecosystem of influence and disinformation focuses on altering perceptions and discrediting information and the media at large. Russian attacks on the Paris Olympic and Paralympic Games and the consistently controversial coverage of the Games by RT and Sputnik seek to legitimize Russian positions, disparage the "liberal West" and disseminate lies. - But Russian influence operations go far beyond such objectives. The broader aim is to cultivate a post-truth regime, where the distinction between truth and perception, fact and belief, information and opinion, reason and emotion is blurred. This ultimately undermines what Hannah Arendt, in Between Past and Culture, referred to as "factual matter"-the shared, consensual foundation vital for managing pluralism and conflict in liberal democracies.

This process of equating fact with opinion relies on relativist rhetorical devices and the frequent use of sarcasm, mockery, and irony. It can also involve promoting the idea -particularly harmful in an electoral context-that any statement merely contributes to the prevailing confusion, reinforcing the perception of democratic systems as inherently dysfunctional.

As a result, it is exceedingly difficult to precisely measure Russia's influence on global dynamics, or to determine the specific role of the "Russian factor" in the emergence, amplification, and longevity of these movements. In places like the Central African Republic and Mali, Russian propaganda succeeds through its ability to infiltrate local media ecosystems and form connections with third-party actors. Since the invasion of Ukraine, Vladimir Putin and Russian foreign policy agents have reframed criticism of Western interventionism using the rhetoric of "anti-neocolonialism", tapping into long-standing grievances in Africa and other parts of the "Global South". In doing so, Russia creates the illusion of a historical continuity between its current presence in Africa and the Soviet Union's support for decolonization and national liberation movements. This updated anti-colonial narrative also serves as a "whataboutism" tactic, reversing the accusations against the "collective West" at a time when Russia itself is engaged in a neo-imperial war in Ukraine.

How Have Interference Actors Been Affected by the War in Ukraine?

Russian transnational state media has been significantly impacted by the fallout from the invasion of Ukraine. On March 1, 2022, just one week after Russia's incursion, the EU suspended the broadcasting of RT and Sputnik within its territory, along with other entities sanctioned for their links to the warmongering Russian state. Despite the ban and the gradual de-platforming of these outlets, European "restrictive measures" have been far from complete. RT and Sputnik have adapted to the new landscape by engaging in a game of cat and mouse, "clandestinizing" their information practices to circumvent sanctions.

To counter the significant decline in European audiences, RT and Sputnik have developed various methods to bypass sanctions: encouraging the use of VPNs, investing in alternative video platforms like Gab, Rumble, and Odysee-popular among conspiracy-driven ecosystems-fragmenting their digital infrastructure, and creating mirror sites, among other tactics. In the U.S., according to the DoJ, RT funneled $10 million into a false flag audiovisual production company, Tenet Media, to launder and spread pro-Kremlin narratives by co-opting online influencers associated with the alt-right or the MAGA movement. Margarita Simonian, head of RT and Sputnik and a leading figure in Russian state propaganda, publicly stated that she is inspired by the guerrilla tactics of Soviet "partisans" who fought against Nazi Germany, applying these methods to the information space. One can assume that Russian actors are betting on European regulatory authorities struggling to keep pace with the evolving information warfare, which could become a Sisyphean task. Meanwhile, the propaganda apparatus has shifted its focus to new audience markets such as India and sub-Saharan Africa. Sputnik France has been rebranded as Sputnik Afrique, and according to RT staff, one-quarter of RT’s English-language content now focuses on African topics, often framed through an anti-(neo)colonial lens.

How Should Europe Respond?

Firstly, it's important to note that the partitioning of informational spaces observed since 2022 is also occurring within Russia itself, not only between Russia and Europe. Most Western social media platforms have been banned or severely restricted in Russia, as evidenced by the YouTube slowdown this summer. Many independent Russian journalists saw the invasion of Ukraine as the final blow to their work, and have largely gone into exile. They are striving to adapt to this new environment, to continue providing Russian citizens with independent information, particularly on the ongoing war-a major challenge. Russian-language editorial offices of Western transnational media, such as the BBC, RFI, and Deutsche Welle, are also exploring technical ways to broadcast their content in Russia despite the censorship law passed by the State Duma in March 2022. European initiatives, like Reporters Without Borders' Svoboda satellite package aimed at reaching Russian territory, are part of this effort. In many ways, this evolving information environment recalls the practices used by both the Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War to influence audiences beyond the "iron curtain" or in the non-aligned countries of the "Third World".

Finally, it is important to remember and take into account the asymmetry between authoritarian and democratic states in "hybrid" conflict, given the operational and ethical constraints, in terms of what could be called the "ethics of informational warfare".

Interview by Hortense Miginiac
Copyright image : Alexey NIKOLSKY / Sputnik / AFP