[Pakistan’s Great Game]- At the Heart of Strategic Realignments in the Middle East

Pakistan’s middle ground-which makes it appear non-aligned with Riyadh-is now extremely valuable to the country in a context upended by the war in the Middle East.

This war is indeed reshuffling the deck by placing Israel in a new position-that of a potential regional hegemon. The concerns of certain countries in the region are fueled not only by the attacks targeting Iran but also by the occupation of southern Lebanon and strikes such as those on Qatar. This latest episode, in September 2025, caused quite a stir in Saudi Arabia. Riyadh then turned to Islamabad to conclude a mutual defense agreement under which, should either party be the victim of an attack, the other would come to its aid. In this case, given the state of the Saudi Arabian armed forces (a situation evidenced by the prolonged intervention in Yemen), Pakistan is expected to come to the Kingdom’s aid rather than the other way around.

Pakistan thus tends to position itself as a regional "net security provider," a status that can be explained in three ways:

Pakistan is the only Muslim country to possess nuclear weapons, yet this weapon was from the outset presented by Islamabad as "the Islamic bomb," to borrow Z.A. Bhutto’s phrase. This idea was initially useful to Pakistan for raising funds from powers as diverse as Gaddafi’s Libya and Saudi Arabia, but it may become relevant again at a time when Arab countries are seeking to resist the rising power of a nation-Israel-that undoubtedly possesses nuclear weapons. Moreover, the father of the Indian bomb, A.Q. Khan, sought in the 1980s and 1990s to sell Pakistani military nuclear technology to Iran, Iraq, and Libya. No one knows today whether the secret mutual defense agreement between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia includes a nuclear component-as statements from both sides on the subject are contradictory-but Pakistan’s possession of nuclear weapons, in the current context, cements its status as a guarantor of security in the region.

This status also owes much to the Blitzkrieg that pitted Pakistan against India in 2025. These hostilities, which lasted four days, effectively served as a wake-up call. While India, in response to the Pahalgam bombing, deployed a veritable armada, Pakistan was able to retaliate using equipment whose effectiveness had been previously unimagined. This was particularly true of Sino-Pakistani-made fighter jets such as the JF-17 Thunder, Chinese-made jets such as the J-10, and Chinese-made missiles (such as the PL-15E). These weapons enabled the Pakistani Air Force to shoot down at least one Rafale aircraft, and possibly more (it is difficult to provide a complete tally here, as New Delhi has remained silent about its losses). This brief war suddenly highlighted the firepower at the disposal of the Pakistani military and led several Arab countries-starting with Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Libya-to order JF-17 Thunders.

- Furthermore, China emerged during the spring 2025 war as an unwavering ally of Pakistan-publicly supporting Pakistan at the start of the conflict (a first) and assisting it by sharing intelligence gathered by its intelligence services (notably satellite imagery showing the movement of Indian forces). For Arab countries, forging closer ties with Pakistan also means gaining additional (indirect, even discreet) access to China and some of its military equipment-on which the Pakistanis may, in fact, train their own soldiers. 

- Pakistan’s operational capability was demonstrated through the deployment of troops to Saudi Arabia in the midst of the war with Iran: The governments of both countries have in fact indicated that an entire squadron of Pakistani fighter jets-16 JF-17 aircraft in total-was transported to Saudi Arabia, along with 8,000 soldiers and two squadrons of drones. It was specified that these forces could be supplemented by Chinese-made HQ-9 surface-to-air missile batteries, a further sign of Pakistan’s access to the most sophisticated Chinese equipment.

The mutual defense agreement and the deployment of forces under this new framework can be interpreted as a simple signal sent by Riyadh to the United States to let the Americans know that Saudi Arabia had alternatives to the U.S. military to ensure its protection.

But the way Washington-by failing to prevent Tel Aviv from continuing the war in southern Lebanon or even elsewhere-allows Israel to impose its agenda on the entire region reinforces the Saudis’ belief that they must seek security guarantees from Pakistan. Other countries are increasingly adopting this line of reasoning, starting with Egypt and Turkey.

At the OIC meeting in March 2026, the foreign ministers of these two countries held a meeting with their Saudi and Pakistani counterparts, despite the long-standing disputes between Ankara and Riyadh on one side, and between Ankara and Cairo on the other. The emergence of this new Quad can be explained by Israel’s growing influence, mistrust of the United States-whose role as a guarantor of regional security is being called into question-and the limitations of existing organizations, from the OIC to the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Arab League. These limitations stem in part from divisions among the actors involved. Thus, the rift between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates appears to be complete, the latter, in the wake of the Abraham Accords, having partly sided with Israel-and India, as confirmed by Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan’s brief visit to New Delhi to sign (with great fanfare) a secret defense agreement on January 19, 2026. This move can most likely be interpreted as a reaction to the mutual defense agreement between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. We are therefore witnessing a strategic realignment centered on two sets of countries: on one side, a group stretching from Israel to India via the Emirates; on the other, an emerging partnership comprising Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt. The situation is still too fluid to speak of an "axis"especially since Iran, once the war is over, could well take the lead in a third initiative.