[Pakistan’s Great Game]- Between the United States and China: Tactics and Strategy

Certainly, the relationship between Pakistan and China is not the same as the one between Pakistan and the United States. China has, in fact, become and remained "an all weather friend" decade after decade since the 1950s, without the two countries ever approaching a breaking point that would force them to rebuild ties afterward. In other words, it is a strategic relationship that is fueled by their hostility toward a common enemy, that is India. Pakistan-as we have seen-finds in China the ally that allows it to stand up to India (all the more so since Beijing helped it acquire the nuclear bomb), while China, by supporting Pakistan, has succeeded in pinning India down on its western border, guaranteeing itself free rein in Asia.

In the crisis stemming from the Iran War, Pakistan and China remain partners. The former, as is often the case, takes some of its orders from Beijing, while the latter uses the Pakistanis-and their effective diplomats with Washington’s ear-to hasten the end of hostilities. Even more so than other Asian countries, China is indeed paying a very high price for this war, which has caused its energy costs to skyrocket and is weakening an economy already shaken, among other things, by the rise of protectionism. That Pakistan has repeatedly "reported to Beijing" during the war is clearly evident from Deputy Prime Minister Ishaq Dar’s trips to the Chinese capital in late March and again from May 19 to 21. Five days later, it was Prime Minister Shabaz Sharif’s turn to visit Beijing, where he was congratulated by Xi for Pakistan’s mediation efforts. In fact, the head of the Pakistani military, Asim Munir, was in Tehran at the same time!

While Pakistan’s relationship with China is rooted in strategic logic, its relationship with the United States is more tactical in nature-and has been since the 1950s, when General Ayub Khan boasted of his ability to play "one lion against another" (referring to the United States and the USSR at the start of the Cold War). In its dealings with the United States, Pakistan has played the role of intermediary, or even "client," within a typical clientelist framework: in exchange for the services Islamabad provided to Washington, the United States provided Pakistan with substantial aid and agreed to sell it sophisticated weapons, and even to train its officers-a privilege greatly appreciated.
 

The first major service rendered by the Pakistanis to the Americans was none other than the intermediary role played by General Yahya Khan vis-à-vis Chairman Mao in the early 1970s, which led to the United States’ recognition of the People’s Republic of China. Over the following decade, Pakistan served as an intermediary between Washington and the mujahideen tasked with driving the Soviets out of Afghanistan. And in the 2000s, Pakistan was tasked by Washington with hunting down al-Qaeda-with much more mixed success this time, as evidenced by the discovery of bin Laden’s hideout in Abbottabad in 2011.

Moreover, relations between the two countries had grown much more strained since then, following a classic pattern: whenever the United States no longer needed Pakistan-or even felt betrayed by it-it abandoned the country or even imposed sanctions on it. In 2017, Donald Trump decided to drastically cut the aid Pakistan received in connection with U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, to which Pakistan was supposed to contribute-something Trump was not convinced of.
 

Trump 2, reversing the mistrust he had felt toward Pakistan in 2017, instead bet on that country even before the war with Iran. This reversal can be explained by a diverse set of factors. As early as the beginning of 2025, the White House set its sights on Pakistan to serve as a regional security guarantor capable of combating Islamism in its area (particularly against the Taliban). In exchange, Pakistan was able to place orders for U.S. weapons that had previously been off-limits to it-much to the displeasure of New Delhi.

The blitzkrieg between India and Pakistan in the spring of 2025 dramatically accelerated the U.S.-Pakistan rapprochement. While New Delhi refused to acknowledge any role for the United States in the cessation of hostilities, Islamabad thanked Donald Trump for intervening to prevent an escalation (which Trump viewed as posing a nuclear risk). The U.S. president appreciated Pakistan’s attitude all the more because, in the wake of the conflict, Pakistan nominated him for the Nobel Peace Prize.
 

These goodwill gestures were accompanied by economic deals involving rare earth minerals-to which Pakistan agreed to grant the Americans access (particularly in Balochistan)-and cryptocurrencies. World Liberty Financial, the company owned by one of Trump’s sons and Zach Witkoff-the son of Special Envoy Steve Witkoff-signed an agreement with Pakistan in January 2026 to integrate the country’s payment system.

On the international stage, Pakistan also stepped up when Trump established a "Peace Council" for Gaza; its inauguration highlighted the close ties between President Trump, Marshal Munir, head of Pakistani intelligence, and Prime Minister Sharif. It was therefore only natural that Pakistan found itself in the role of mediator between the United States and Iran beginning in March 2026. On April 8, the country emerged as the facilitator that had made the conclusion of a ceasefire possible, and on April 11 and 12, Islamabad hosted the Iranian and American delegations, once again rendering effectively possible a dialogue-albeit indirect-that had been severed since 1979.
 

Pakistan’s role as a "good offices" mediator was praised by a large number of political leaders, including European ones. Last June, Kaja Kallas, the EU Vice President in charge of the Union’s international relations, on the occasion of the 8th Strategic Dialogue between Pakistan and the European Union in Islamabad, thanked Pakistan-"a major regional power"-for its efforts in helping to avert an "all-out war" in the Middle East.