[Middle Powers] - The Corridor of Middle Powers

International affairs

Author

Michel Duclos

Special Advisor and Resident Senior Fellow - Geopolitics and Diplomacy

In Search of the Middle Powers

Throughout the summer, Michel Duclos explores the universe of the middle powers. In this fifth installment, he presents a methodological review that opens up perspectives to be explored in greater depth and focuses on the concept of the "corridor of middle powers" developed by Soli Özel.
In a changing geopolitical context marked by religious nationalism, the questioning of the role of the United States, and a European positioning that is still unsure and faced with a counter-organization of the world parallel to the Bretton Wood institutions through the BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, is France capable of thinking of itself as a middle power and shedding its nostalgia for greatness?

At the end of this series, are we in a better position to answer the question we outlined at the start of the first installment: Could the middle powers play a stabilizing role in the international order, comparable to that of the middle classes in the domestic order?

The most demanding readers-the purists-will no doubt retort "Obviously not, as the sample presented is far too restricted (cf. the four "profiles" in episodes 3, Australia and Indonesia, and 4, Saudi Arabia and Kazakhstan)! And chosen arbitrarily." Let’s admit, of course, that it would be necessary to extend the investigation beyond the cases studied. But let’s refute the criticism of arbitrariness. The choice of Australia, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, and Kazakhstan stems from a conversation we had in the spring with Professor Özel. Senior Fellow at the Institut Montaigne, Soli Özel is a Turkish strategic thinker known to everyone in East Coast universities and good think tanks in America, Europe, and the Middle East. He pointed out to us that traveling from Australia or Vietnam to Europe (and its traditional middle powers), one encounters Indonesia, India, Kazakhstan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Turkey. We have thus painted four portraits of the "corridor of middle powers" that links the new world of Asia-now the lungs of global growth-to the old continent, the cradle of the historical middle powers.

We have thus painted four portraits of the "corridor of middle powers" that links the new world of Asia-now the lungs of global growth-to the old continent, the cradle of the historical middle powers.

Shouldn’t India have been included in this "corridor"? It seemed to us that at this stage, other lesser-known and, above all, more characteristic cases should be studied: India today has many of the traits of a great power; it is no longer a middle power, except in a sort of residual capacity. It should be noted that India now plays the role of "lighthouse of the middle powers"-or at any rate of the "swing states"-having provided the model for "multi-alignment" (whereby a country chooses sides according to issues, circumstances, and, ultimately, its interests). It would be interesting to see how sustainable this model really is. After all, isn’t India itself moving ever closer to the West in strategic terms?

In any case, we agree that a more complete cartography should fill in the gaps in the "central corridor" and add the middle powers outside the corridor, i.e., Brazil and Canada of course, and perhaps one or two African countries (South Africa? Nigeria?), without excluding Morocco or Kenya for the reasons we indicated in the second episode.

First Lessons

Soli Özel was involved in the interviews we conducted for our four case studies. We asked him what lessons he drew from them. They are twofold. First, we can’t help but be struck by the diversity of the cases studied, which in no way correspond to a standard model. There are huge differences, notes our interlocutor, between Australia’s pro-Western orientation, Indonesia’s nonaligned DNA, Saudi Arabia’s transactional capacity, and the situation of a Kazakhstan caught between its neighbors, the Russian and Chinese giants. If there’s one thing they all have in common, it’s that they are "incomplete powers," unable to claim true autonomy-another way of expressing the point made by Ghassan Salamé in the second episode ("unaccomplished powers"). The paradox, according to Özel, is that in our case study, Australia is the country that combines most of the traits of a "complete power," yet it is the one that does not aspire to any strategic autonomy-since it wishes to deepen its integration into the alliance with the Anglo-Saxons not just for security reasons but perhaps also for reasons of identity

Özel’s second lesson is that it is doubtful whether the middle powers we have examined can play much of a stabilizing role, at least on an autonomous basis, precisely because of their "incompleteness," which can lead only to a form of neutrality or dependence on a major power.

However, we think it wise to reserve judgment on the latter point. First, because of the narrowness of the sample selected, and second, because we have mainly used geopolitical brushes to paint the profiles we have mentioned. It would be important to broaden not only the spectrum of states studied but also the thematic scope of the survey: We are thinking in particular of global issues (climate, development, new technologies), on which there may be-subject to examination-a convergence of interests between established and rising middle powers, from North and South. Examples of this are beginning to appear, mainly within the G7 framework.

There are huge differences, notes our interlocutor, between Australia’s pro-Western orientation, Indonesia’s nonaligned DNA, Saudi Arabia’s transactional capacity, and the situation of a Kazakhstan caught between its neighbors, the Russian and Chinese giants.

Wouldn’t cooperation in these areas between middle powers of all stripes-or at least between a certain number of them-in itself have an effect on world stability? In any case, it seems to us that the subject deserves to be explored in greater depth.

Can geopolitics be completely separated from global issues or even from geo-economics? Of course not. Özel quotes a phrase coined by Mr. Erdoğan-"the world is bigger than five"-to denounce the composition, perceived in the Global South as archaic, of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). There is certainly much to be said to nuance the criticism of the UNSC as it stands. There is little doubt, however, that the current situation is an obstacle to a clear-cut convergence between the middle powers of the South and the North: the former feel excluded from the direction of the world order, or, to borrow a phrase from our interlocutor, they feel that "the latter have abused the privileges of history."

Elements of Context

Shouldn’t a comprehensive study of our subject include the BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)? Özel believes that "the new powers that are emerging are organizing themselves as alternatives to the traditional powers through these two groupings with an economic vocation but a marked political identity." Have the two "formats," to borrow a term from diplomats, produced much in the way of results? That’s debatable, of course, but each in its own way offers a sketch of a counter-organization of the world parallel to the Bretton Woods institutions and removed from Western domination. What is striking, however, is their appeal to the middle powers of the South: Turkey is a "dialogue partner" of the SCO, and some forty states are lining up to join the BRICS. The BRICS, originally formed by Moscow, Brazil, Russia, India, and China (and then South Africa), expanded last summer under Beijing’s influence to include Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia, Iran, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates. The Russians’ clever diplomatic move was to exploit an acronym coined by a Goldman Sachs analyst to refer to the economic performance of the countries concerned. It has to be said that the G7-the cartel of Northern powers-has not been able to launch a takeover bid for the rising powers, a feat that Russia and China have successfully achieved through the BRICS and the SCO.

It has to be said that the G7-the cartel of Northern powers-has not been able to launch a takeover bid for the rising powers, a feat that Russia and China have successfully achieved through the BRICS and the SCO.

As it currently stands, the BRICS team has a number of limitations: Some of its member states (notably India and Saudi Arabia) refuse to adopt an anti-Western orientation; more or less sharp dissensions divide some of the pairs in the "format": India-China, Saudi Arabia-Iran, Saudi Arabia-United Arab Emirates; Egypt-Ethiopia; China and Russia themselves are no longer as aligned as they were at the outset; some states have unclear status (Mohammed bin Salman didn’t’ attend Brics Summit hosted by Russia in Kazan in october) and it remains to be seen how the amalgamation between old and new members will work out.

Drawing on the rest of our conversation with Özel, we should add that, in order to pursue our study, we need to take into account three contextual elements. First, there is a politico-cultural current that runs through the entire community of states, including the middle powers: religious or civilizational nationalism. "Today, it is not the world’s Jewish diaspora that supports Mr. Netanyahu’s hegemonic project," points out Jean-Pierre Filiu in his latest book, Comment la Palestine fut perdue et pourquoi Israël n’a pas gagné. Histoire d’un conflit (XIXe-XXIe siècle) (How Palestine Was Lost and Why Israel Has Not Won: A History of a Conflict [19th-21st Century]), it is American evangelical nationalism, the same nationalism that could once again bring the "Christian nationalist" Donald Trump to power. Putin claims to embody an orthodox nationalism, Modi defends a Hindu nationalism, Xi practices a civilizational nationalism, Erdoğan mixes Turkish nationalism and Islamism, and Iran has invented a Shiite nationalism. It’s easy to see how the universalist, secular European model-contested, moreover, on the old continent itself (cf. Orbán’s Hungary, the Polish PiS)-now seems to be going against the tide.

The second factor is the return of the Trump presidency. We should then be entering the MAGA era for good, with the added risk of seeing Trumpism prolonged by a more articulate, more systematic, and even more isolationist successor to Trump in the person of J. D. Vance. What would this mean for the international order? We could imagine a much more fractured, even more anarchic world, with America turning in on itself, refusing to defend its allies, or only doing so very selectively, and losing interest in the international role of the dollar. Would we then see a depolarized world or, on the contrary, one in which, while some middle powers would succeed in becoming autonomous, most would be forced to rally to the nearest hegemon? What kind of rebalancing will we see in such a context, particularly in Asia and Europe?

The final factor, according to Özel, is the role of Europe. In our view, if the world were to reorganize itself, at least in part, around the middle powers, this would presuppose that Europe itself conceives of itself as a power of this type; indeed, it is at the level of their regional grouping that the European powers can hope to play on an equal footing with India and a few others. It’s worth noting that an embryo of such a concept can be found in the major international negotiations on global issues-climate, for example-where the European Union (which is not quite the same thing as Europe, admittedly) speaks with a single voice. We’re still a long way off the mark, however, especially at a time when European momentum seems to have stalled, when Europe’s economic dynamism relative to its major competitors is slipping back, when the Franco-German couple has lost its unity, and when the UK remains divorced from the EU.

What about France?

At this point, we can’t help but mention France. It’s hard for our country, a prisoner of its past glory, to think of itself as a middle power while at the same time admitting that it is above all through Europe that it can remain "great." Let’s not overstate the case. Let’s leave this line of thought open. But let’s not forget that it would be in the French nation’s interest to reconsider its vision of the world by focusing less on China, the United States, Russia, and even India, and more on the range of countries we have mentioned here-who are perhaps our real partners for the future. We must confess to our reader that this is what most encourages us to continue our reflection.

Finally, we might be tempted to use the middle-power/middle-class metaphor sketched out in the first episode: The established middle powers of the North are like the aristocracy of yesteryear, facing the middle powers of the South, who would be the equivalent in the international order of the rising bourgeoisie of the eighteenth century. We are all familiar with the two historical models: the British, which ensured the smooth integration of rising forces into the established order, albeit at the cost of the latter’s evolution; and the French, which involved revolution. Are the French and British of today not well placed to learn the lessons of history and show themselves to be the most committed to co-opting the rising powers.

The established middle powers of the North are like the aristocracy of yesteryear, facing the middle powers of the South, who would be the equivalent in the international order of the rising bourgeoisie of the eighteenth century.

The author of this series warmly thanks Hortense Miginiac and Anthéa Ennequin for their essential contributions to the realization of this project

Copyright image : Alan-Ducarre
From left to right: Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, Russian President Vladimir Putin, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and Chinese President Xi Jinping.