[Middle Powers] - Australia and Indonesia

Let’s begin our profiles of middle powers with two countries at opposite ends of the spectrum from France, one belonging to the "North" in the geopolitical sense of the term, Australia, and the other to the "South," Indonesia. These two cases suffice to illustrate the difficulty of establishing an all-purpose "model" of what a middle power is.

Australia: Between Overconfidence and Insecurity  

Australia is unquestionably a middle power in the economic sense of the term; it is the world’s thirteenth-largest economy in terms of GDP. It also ranks thirteenth in terms of defense spending. How can we characterize its geostrategic orientation?

In fact, according to Rory Medcalf, this is a common characteristic of middle powers: They cannot assert their interests unilaterally. They must integrate their actions-economic, geopolitical, military, etc.-into a coalition. They can defend their own interests but cannot claim to affect the world order through their own initiatives. Some practice nonalignment or "multi-alignment": this is not the case for Australia, which is an ally of the United States. The temptation of maintaining equidistance between Washington and Beijing does not exist in Canberra, even though China remains the country’s leading trading partner.

In our interviewee’s view, Australian foreign policy has been based on three pillars for the past century, the respective importance of which varies according to the situation: 1\ Alliance with friendly great powers, first the United Kingdom in the first half of the twentieth century, then the United States. 2\ Regional involvement, with priority given to a greater or lesser extent to the Asia-Pacific and Indo-Pacific regions. For the past fifteen years, the Indo-Pacific has been the focus of Australian strategy. 3\ Multilateral commitment: Labor governments have been particularly active in multilateral forums, making Australia a major player at the UN.

The trade-offs between these three pillars stem from different motivations: In the face of China and other potential adversaries, the sponsorship of a major power is necessary; regional involvement stems not only from security concerns but also from an identity issue; finally, prosperity and trade depend on respect for international law and democratic values and, therefore, on multilateralism. Among the factors influencing Canberra’s choices are the international situation and the political leanings of the government in power; there is a consensual basis, but the right and the left have different traditions. For example, the Conservatives favor alliances with the United States and Western countries (the United Kingdom, Europe, and NATO), while Labor places greater emphasis on partnerships in Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific region. The absence of Prime Minister Anthony Albanese (Labour) from the seventy-fifth anniversary NATO summit in Washington from July 9 to 11, 2024, on the grounds that he should "concentrate on domestic politics," was much commented upon (Australia was represented by Richard Marles, deputy prime minister and minister for Defense).

The Chinese Challenge, as Seen From Canberra

Rory Medcalf points out that until about fifteen years ago, Australia was convinced that it didn’t have to choose between the United States and China and that the former provided security and the latter prosperity. Today, mistrust of China is on the rise. The word "threat" is not used publicly, but a future confrontation with China is seen as plausible. Canberra is, therefore, trying to encourage stability in the region without seeking confrontation with Beijing, given its economic dependence. Despite the government’s efforts to diversify toward India, Indonesia, and Europe, notably in the wake of the COVID-19 crisis, the bulk of industrial exports still go to China, with no obvious alternative.

To free itself from this dependency, Australia would need to change its entire economic structure. However, the necessity of such an effort is not obvious at present. Relations with China are good, and Australians are full of a kind of deceptive self-assurance. Medcalf believes that without a shock to the senses, no diversification will be successfully achieved. A blockade in Taiwan, a conflict in the South China Sea, or intrusions into territorial waters could trigger a change in policy. But where exactly does Canberra draw its red line?

Australia is a producer of critical materials that could find new markets, but the process of identifying such is not really underway. The government has only provided incentives for companies to diversify. The new industrial sectors will not generate profits for several years; they have yet to be built, and the Australian government is not traditionally a huge investor in infrastructure. However, foreign investment is becoming more diversified-the United States, Japan, and Europe are investing in Australia.

The center left now back in power is very attached to climate objectives and the energy transition, and renewed emphasis is being placed on the rules of the multilateral order. One limit to Australia’s role alongside other middle powers is the fact that, according to our interviewee, the country is too little involved with Europe or Canada, even if the dynamic is better with Japan or Korea. In Australia, no single political figure can act as a champion of relations with Europe. The left remains focused on Asia, the right on the United Kingdom and the United States.

To complete Rory Medcalf’s report, we recommend reading Allan Gyngell’s book The Fear of Abandonment: Australia in the World since 1942. The impression that emerges is one of a country dominated by a need for protection. But this does not rule out, according to other observers, Australia thinking of itself as a superpower in the Pacific while seeing the world through the prism of a former British colony. Is a form of schizophrenia between overconfidence and insecurity inseparable from middle-power status?

Indonesia: the Avatars of Nonalignment

Another giant of the Indo-Pacific, with complex relations with its Australian neighbor (see Timor Leste), Indonesia is still a developing country; it ranks only 114th in terms of GDP per capita, but its nominal GDP already ranks sixteenth in the world (Australia is thirteenth). With a population of 280.7 million, making it the fourth-most populous country in the world (Australia: 26.5 million), Indonesia is now considered the country of the future par excellence.

Indonesia’s leaders do not see their country as a middle power. They have set themselves the goal of making Indonesia a "developed country" by 2045. There is continuity in this objective between the administration still in office and President-Elect Prabowo Subianto. It is also this ambition that explains Jakarta’s decision to embark on a process of accession to the OECD (which implies far-reaching reforms); as a corollary, Indonesia’s leaders have ruled out, at least for the time being, the option of joining the BRICS-the club originally formed by Brazil, Russia, China, India, and South Africa-who are certainly courting them...

It should be remembered that the US played an important role in helping Indonesia gain its independence from Dutch colonial rule after the Second World War.

From the first decade of the twentieth century onwards, according to Allés, Indonesian leaders "turned their image as leaders of a moderate Muslim country into an opportunity. They reinterpreted traditional nonalignment through the prism of the clash of civilizations. Nonalignment between East and West is being transformed into mediation between the West and the Muslim world." The world’s most populous Muslim country, but in fact multifaith and committed to secularism, Indonesia does not recognize Israel. It is possible that its government could change this position if, for example, Saudi Arabia were to establish diplomatic relations with Jerusalem, but the population is fundamentally hostile to such a change. Its action focuses mainly on humanitarian aid to the Palestinians; it is not a significant player in the resolution of the conflict.

An important feature of Indonesia is that it remains committed to multilateralism. "It’s the great country in the South not to be ‘lost’ (from the Western point of view)," says Delphine Allés, "and one of the few to maintain a constructive, albeit critical, stance on the multilateral system in the context of China’s efforts to duplicate it through parallel structures within the BRICS framework." Today, Indonesia plays a role in ASEAN but is also in demand from all quarters; it is an essential partner for the Scandinavian countries, the US, Germany, France, etc. It enjoys excellent relations with South Korea and India and is seeking to multiply partnerships with the declared aim of having "a thousand friends and zero enemies." In this context, however, it should be remembered that relations with the EU are not at their best due to the dispute over access to the European market for palm oil from Indonesia.

New President, New Situation? 

With Prabowo Subianto in power, can we expect a change in Indonesia’s approach to international affairs?

We put this question to Lina Alexandra, director of the International Relations Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Jakarta. She gives a cautious answer: Unlike his predecessor, the new president takes a personal interest in international affairs; he may be tempted to take a more active role, following the precedent set by Mohamed bin Salman (MBS) in Saudi Arabia, but the substance of this role remains to be determined. Incidentally, as in the case of MBS, President Subianto’s priority should be his country’s economic performance.

Broadening the subject, our interlocutor believes that Indonesian influence in its regional sphere of action has rather declined in recent years ("there has been a loss of leadership")-precisely because Indonesia has concentrated on its domestic problems and development. For the same reason, it has not gone very far in its potential vocation as a mediator between the West and the Muslim world. Our interviewee notes that the Indonesian government may underestimate the scale of the reforms that will be needed to join the OECD and, beyond that, to become a developed country. She observes that whatever happens, economic dependence on China will remain strong. In her opinion, it will not be easy for Indonesia to navigate between the reforms to be carried out and the dependence to be reduced.

On the sensitive relationship with neighboring Australia, Alexandra points out that AUKUS has not been received well in Indonesia. The agreement between Canberra, London, and Washington on submarines (and other issues) is seen as a threat to regional security. For the time being, however, dialogue between the two countries remains fluid.

The author of this series warmly thanks Hortense Miginiac and Anthéa Ennequin for their essential contribution to the realization of this project.

Copyright Alan-Ducarre

Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and Indonesian President Joko Widodo.