[Middle Powers] - From Origins to Crisis?

In the relatively recent past, geopolitical analysts used to distinguish between the general state of the world and crisis situations. Occasionally, some crises-such as the collapse of the USSR or the war in Iraq-would have systemic consequences for the state of the world. For the most part, however, geopolitics tended not to intrude on the domain of the corporate boardroom and did not factor greatly into business leaders’ discussions.

The situation today is very different. One crisis follows another, while still others loom on the horizon. Each time, shockwaves from the latest crisis have a global impact: the COVID-19 pandemic, Ukraine, Gaza, and threats in Southeast Asia and elsewhere. When looking at the upheavals in the world, it is becoming increasingly difficult to find a common thread. Is there or is there not a new Cold War? Is the Global South at the center of the game, or not? Are we witnessing the decline of some and the rise of others? Or is this a "war of the worlds," as Bruno Tertrais once wrote? Statesmen and business leaders are increasingly noting the cracks in globalization, with a trend toward fragmentation and rising tensions. This trend is especially noticeable with respect to the relationship between China and the United States, the two superpowers of today.

Ukraine, Revealing the New Balance of Power

Ivan Krastev is a brilliant Bulgarian political scientist affiliated with several institutions who heads the Center for Liberal Strategies in Sofia. In November 2022, he published a seminal article in the Financial Times, "Middle Powers Are Reshaping Geopolitics." Krastev’s starting point is that in the Ukrainian conflict, America’s close allies are siding with it against Russia and against China’s tacit support for Moscow, in a revival of Cold War dynamics. However, other powers, especially in the Global South, are not following suit. This is true, for example, of Saudi Arabia and India, which are otherwise friends of America. In general, countries in the Global South do not tend to think of the Russian aggression as a neo-colonial operation, as their own postcolonial identity leads them to reject this notion. At the same time, Russia’s ex-colonies-such as Kazakhstan-are also not fully aligned with Moscow.

According to Krastev, the middle powers-"a group of strange bedfellows"-are beginning to make their presence felt. These include South Africa, India, South Korea, Germany, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Israel, to name but a few. In spite of their many differences, they all have one thing in common: they want to be at the table, not on the menu.

At the January 2024 summit, the World Economic Forum presented a similar analysis. The WEF participants gathered in Davos to consider a report titled "Shaping Cooperation in a Fragmenting World." This report considers the great powers to be those states with a permanent seat on the Security Council, while other powers exert influence on global politics through their diplomatic, economic, multilateral, and, in some cases, military power. Such countries belong to both the "Global North," such as Australia, South Korea, and Canada, and the Global South, such as Argentina, Brazil, and Indonesia. Some of them, such as India, are becoming more than "middle powers." The WEF report suggests establishing a contact group of major and middle powers, with countries from both the West and the "non-West," such as Brazil, India, South Africa, and the United Arab Emirates.

Time for Swing States?

Cliff Kupchan, president of the consulting firm Eurasia Group and a keen geopolitical analyst, presented a sharp in June 2023.

In his view, there are two superpowers: China and the United States. In addition, according to Kupchan, there are a series of middle powers in the Global North, including France, Germany, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and others, that are generally aligned with the United States, with the obvious exception of Russia. As a result, these states do not contribute to the recalibration of the global balance of power. Then, according to Kupchan, we need to take into account the six middle powers of the Global South, which he describes as swing states, that is, those whose alignment varies according to the issue at stake: Brazil, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Turkey. These six countries are members of the G20 and are also "good barometers of the Global South." It is worth noting that the World Economic Forum report also talks about swing states.

Furthermore, the last two decades have seen a form of "deglobalization": the regionalization of the world gives added weight to regional powers that are often medium-sized, as in the case of India with respect to the reconfiguration of supply chains or of Saudi Arabia as a financial hub. These six countries have no ideological affinities with each other, and their lack of ideological orientation reinforces the transactional impulse that conditions their policies. The climate crisis has also given them a strategic role-Brazil and Indonesia regarding deforestation, and India and Indonesia concerning decarbonization, for example. The six play a major role in limiting the impact of sanctions on Russia. Finally, these swing states may face difficulties-they are not as well positioned as the Global North to benefit from artificial intelligence, for example-but they should retain important geopolitical leverage.

A Detour Through History ... and Current Events

Let’s consider our subject in a long-term context. When the Charter of the United Nations was negotiated at the end of the Second World War, two states explicitly claimed to be "middle powers" (just below the great powers). These were Canada and Australia, who suggested the creation of a category within the Security Council for their particular case that would serve as a middle ground between the permanent members (the great powers) and the non-permanent members (the small powers). Then, in the 1980s and 1990s, the notion was applied to more countries to designate the behavior of internationalist, multilateralist, and "good citizen" states. In a 2023 article in International Theory, Jeffrey Robertson and Andrew Carr present six case studies: Australia, Canada, Indonesia, Mexico, South Korea, and Turkey. They deduce from this examination that these six "middle powers" departed from the classical model at a certain point: Indonesia became introverted, and Turkey began aspiring to regional hegemony. Even Canada moved away from its initial ethos, not to mention Australia. Similarly, according to these authors, South Korea and Indonesia have stopped relying on multilateralism (does one not become a "power" when one feels capable of disregarding international law?). In other words, the middle powers are no longer inherently constructive.

In fact, to continue this analysis, many of the middle powers have been behaving in an uninhibited and/or transactional way for some time. Counting on them to build a more stable world thus appears to be something of a pipe dream.

Europe’s middle powers certainly have a major role to play, particularly in correcting the erratic nature of Washington’s policies through their support for Ukraine, but they can only do so in partnership with their great ally on the other side of the Atlantic. In the Middle East, it is fascinating to observe that the United States is virtually alone in trying to put an end to the Gaza conflict despite its limited ability to influence the course of events.

To Be Continued

Therefore, is the idea of the middle powers as a new paradigm for global power relations already outdated? Was it just a passing fad? We do not think so because it is a fact that in today’s world, economic power-and in some cases, military, demographic, or political weight-is far more widely distributed than was the case in the past. This is bound to have geopolitical consequences. What is true is that there is a need to deepen, clarify, and add nuance to the diagnosis before any operational conclusions can be drawn. This is the aim of the inquiry we are offering our readers, with the help of some eminent specialists.

The author of this series warmly thanks Hortense Miginiac and Anthéa Ennequin for their essential contribution to the realization of this project.

Copyright image : Alan-Ducarre