2025: Seven Strategic Challenges for France

Salle des fêtes de l'Elysée, January 6, 2025: while waiting for President Macron to deliver his speech at the annual ambassadors' conference, a group of colleagues are exchanging thoughts. "It's in the last four or five years", one of them sums up, "that the world has really turned upside down".

Four or five years? Perhaps it really was the abrupt withdrawal of the United States from Afghanistan at the end of August 2020 that marked the beginning of a chain of events: the Russian invasion of Ukraine, unprecedented pressure from China on Taiwan, the Hamas attack on Israel and the chain of actions and reactions that followed. In parallel, the once-familiar East-West relationship has hardened, major emerging powers like India, Brazil, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia have grown, Europe’s weight in the world has weakened, the role of international governance bodies such as the UNSC and the World Trade Organisation has eroded, more generally international law is constantly challenged. This has all been crowned by Trump's return to the White House, which a senior British diplomat privately described as a source of major "distraction and disruption".

He was right to do so. With the hindsight and modesty of a simple observer, we offer an assessment of seven strategic challenges for France in 2025, in order of decreasing importance: Ukraine, Trump's America, Europe, the Middle East, the Global South, multilateralism and the Maghreb. In conclusion, we would like to mention a few other priorities that we did not include in our list of "strategic challenges", while acknowledging that our selection is obviously open to debate.

Challenge n°1: War and (Eventually) Peace in Ukraine

Russia set out to conquer Ukraine in February 2022, betting that the country would quickly collapse. This did not happen. The Ukrainians' heroic resistance against their aggressor more or less forced the West to come to their aid. Were the arms transfers and allied support to Ukraine adequate and timely? Historians will debate this. For the time being - in fact, for several weeks now - Russia has been making progress on the front line, albeit not decisively, while Ukraine suffers, notably as a result of incessant bombing of its infrastructure. Ukraine is holding firm, but its leaders cannot rule out the possibility that sooner or later, a whole section of the frontline will collapse.

Donald Trump has repeatedly boasted that he could resolve the conflict in 24 hours. Since his election however, he's been a little more cautious, talking now of a resolution within a few months. President Zelenski has adjusted his stance in advance: he now declares himself ready to consider territorial concessions in exchange for NATO membership or equivalent security guarantees. Deep down, the Ukrainian leaders probably prefer Trump’s approach to Biden’s: with the latter, support that was never decisive or timely enough left them grappling with the risk of an endless conflict - one that simple demographics and a "strategic depth" in no way comparable to Russia condemned them to lose. With Trump, however, the risk is that he will agree to a "bad deal" in order to just get it over with.

It is unclear to what extent London and Paris, and other European capitals - until Berlin has regained a stable government - are ready to engage in a close and coordinated discussion with Washington on Ukraine.

In any case, the Europeans can only hope to influence the course of events if they are able to significantly contribute to the "security guarantees" needed to bring the Ukrainians to an agreement. In practice, everything suggests that such security guarantees imply some level of troop deployment by European states on Ukrainian soil, with American support. What's more, there's nothing to suggest that Putin's Russia will be as eager as President Trump to reach a deal. This raises the issue of maintaining and even increasing European assistance to Ukraine, both militarily and economically and financially.

Challenge no. 2: the Trump/Musk parameter

It's hard to say whether the challenge of Trump’s return comes before or after the Ukrainian issue. The two are linked, as we have just seen. Moreover, Trump's reappearance in the White House - a Trump even more uninhibited than before - has a structuring - or rather destructuring - impact on the entire international scene.

In the weeks following the Republican candidate's re-election, European capitals tried to reassure themselves: after all, "we've been here before". Another argument, especially in Paris, was that "the man is a transactionalist, you just have to find the right ‘deal’ with him". If he now demands that his allies spend 5% of their GDP on defense, we would only have to launch negotiations. For the European Union, the expected shock on the trade front was anticipated, and this is an area in which Commission committees are in principle well prepared. In recent days, however, the tone has changed once again, and a certain feverishness has taken hold of European decision-makers. Far from having calmed down, the president-elect is claiming Greenland and wants to annex Canada and the Panama Canal.

His business partner, the world's richest man, Elon Musk, threatens the British Prime Minister, and flirts with the German far-right and other reactionary parties in Europe. Other high-tech tycoons - the Californian clan - have also pledged their allegiance, the most emblematic case being that of Marc Zuckerberg. Read the letter he published announcing the restriction of fact-checking on the social networks he controls: it contains some incredibly aggressive wordings against the European Union and its taste for regulation. All in all, one wonders whether America isn't waging a form of hybrid war against Europe, at least in terms of trade, economics and culture, in addition to the wars being waged in other forms by Russia and even China. If the "Musk-Zuckerberg line" were to prevail, the distortion of the conditions of debate in our democracies - shaped by the conditions of social networks - could jeopardize the very possibility of "free will", which serves as a cornerstone of our democratic systems.

Taking stock of his international action over the past 7 years, President Macron cannot fail to observe that his international credentials peaked between 2017 and 2021, when he appeared as the substitute leader of the international liberal order, in the absence of U.S. leadership. However, Mr. Trump's second term is likely to come as a much bigger shock. Every day, Trump makes it clearer that he recognizes only China, Russia and even India as peers with whom it might be worth negotiating. How can French strategy adapt to this challenge, and with which partners?

Challenge no. 3: a Persistent Bad Patch for Europe?

The almost reflex French response to the above question is to prioritise the European project. There's no doubt that the EU is our country's first line of defense in the face of global turbulence.

In the cutting-edge technologies that now make all the difference, Europeans seem unable to compete in the unbridled race between the United States and China. Europe's considerable savings flow to the United States, depriving Europeans of their ability to invest at home. This observation needs to be put into perspective, by noting, for example, that a colossal proportion of the sums devoted by the United States to investment in cutting-edge sectors is, by construction, lost. It is also likely that the shock treatment that Trump is going to apply to the US economy (already overheating and close to full employment) will have inflationary effects and lead the Federal Reserve to maintain high rates.

We are struck, however, by a certain stagnation in the European debate, whether we are talking about the remedies proposed by Emmanuel Macron, or similar, more recent solutions put forward in reports by Enrico Letta and Mario Draghi. One explanation may lie in the insidious nature of Europe's crisis of languor. Unemployment remains low in the eurozone, and even growth, however weak, has not yet plummeted. Germany, however, is experiencing a real growth crisis, and perhaps it is from Germany that the European Union will get a fresh start.

After the general election at the end of February, Scholtz is expected to hand over the Chancellorship to Frederic Merz, leader of the CDU. It will then take four to six weeks for a coalition cabinet - possibly CDU-Green - to be formed. If this is the case, there is a serious chance that Paris and Berlin will once again be able to cooperate, something that was virtually impossible during the Scholtz years. Read Joseph de Weck's profile of Merz for Le Grand Continent. This excellent observer does not deny that there may be something orthodox in the CDU leader's economic project. But Merz - Wolfgang Schauble's favorite disciple - has a strong sense of the European ideal. His stance on Ukraine stands in stark contrast to Scholz's frugality.

Merz seems determined to give unprecedented impetus and substance to European defense cooperation. This, of course, requires agreement with France, the UK and Poland. Can such a new impetus be conceived without a boost to the economy as well? Joseph de Weck suggests that here, too, the future Chancellor - if election forecasts come true - could demonstrate a capacity for innovation. And thus join certain French proposals (borrowing capacity at EU level, for example). Needless to say, it would be vital for France, despite its uncertain domestic situation, to be able to follow suit.

Challenge no. 4: the new geopolitical map of the Middle East

On October 7 last year, Israel was shaken by the unexpected and uncommonly ferocious blows of Hamas. Since then, the Jewish state has reacted with great force in several stages, and in concentric circles: the Gaza Strip, treated with unprecedented and interminably prolonged brutality; its enemies in the region, including Iran, bombed twice; and finally Hezbollah in its stronghold in Lebanon. So much so, in fact, that one wonders whether the Hebrew State has not adopted a strategy aimed first and foremost at re-establishing its deterrent capacity vis-à-vis the Palestinians, and then evolving to bring about a far-reaching change in the geopolitical map of the region. The main result being the weakening of Iran, which is now deprived of a large part of its" proxies " in the region and vulnerable to massive strikes on its nuclear installations. And as by-products of this overall maneuver: regime change in Syria, a relative rise of power by Turkey, whose protégés have settled in Damascus, and lastly, the election of a president in Lebanon and the appointment of a new prime minister - which has been impossible for the last two years.

What role can France - and beyond that, Europe - play, given that neither of them can remain indifferent to the upheavals taking place on their doorstep? Firstly, contribution, albeit modestly, to the post-Israeli-Palestinian war equilibrium. President Macron made a point of proposing, with Saudi Arabia, a conference in New York in June to resolve the dilemma of whether or not to recognize a Palestinian state. However, it's in Syria and Lebanon that we, together with others, could play a leading role. As for Iran, in his address to ambassadors, President Macron described it as a "strategic and security challenge" on a par with Russia ("the other major security and strategic challenge"). The question now arises as to how Paris - along with London and others - can play a role in any negotiations between Washington and Tehran on the nuclear issue, especially given Trump's lack of consideration for his allies in such discussions.

Challenge 5: Global South and the Coalition of Middle Powers

In France, the notion of the "Global South" is met with skepticism - although fortunately the idea is gaining ground that it's clumsy to deny emerging countries the right to label themselves as they see fit. The BRICS club (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) - long treated with condescension by French observers, is now being taken more seriously. This shift began, perhaps, with its grand summit in Kazan in October 2024, or perhaps due to its growing appeal within the Global South, which forces us to acknowledge its influence. Alongside the Global South and the BRICS, another category of countries has emerged in recent years: the so-called "middle powers". However, this concept, too, has struggled to gain acceptance in Descartes' homeland. Our British neighbors, known to be more pragmatic than we are, set up a Foreign Office unit dedicated to "middle ground powers " several years ago.

Why do we insist that this is an avenue French diplomacy should explore without delay? Let's start with a fact we mentioned in our introduction: in today's world, the middle ground powers of the South - from India to Turkey, from Saudi Arabia to Indonesia, from Kazakhstan to Morocco and a number of others - have taken on an economic - and therefore political - weight that is no longer marginal. It is their refusal to isolate Russia economically and their rejection of sanctions (most of them), that has enabled Vladimir Putin to continue financing his war in Ukraine. Moreover, we should not underestimate the role of perceived "double standards" - amplified, alas, by the Israel-Palestine war - in these countries' estrangement from the West.

Secondly, it is hard to make up for lost time, in diplomacy as elsewhere: when the BRICS were taking off at the end of the 2000s, an offer of a privileged circle between major European countries and India, Brazil and South Africa (the IBAS) would undoubtedly have caught the attention of these large emerging countries. Trump's return could have the advantage of - temporarily - reshuffling the deck.

It's also possible that, worried by Trump's return, the major emerging countries are more interested than in the past in closer cooperation with the "middle powers" of the West. Will this openness last? Not necessarily, as nations like India, Saudi Arabia,Turkey and Indonesia feel much more confident than the Europeans when it comes to "deal making" with Trump's America. In today’s context, however, the big countries of the South may find it useful to have a kind of "counter-assurance". We should seize this opportunity, in a form to be defined (for example, a group made up of 3 major European nations and Canada on one side, India, Brazil and South Africa plus Indonesia on the other). In the long term, and whatever the ups and downs of the months and years to come, the creation of a club of medium-sized powers from the West (essentially Europe) and the global South would have the advantage of offering a potential anchor of stability in a world likely to remain shaken for many years to come by great power rivalry.

Challenge no. 6: Should We Despair of Multilateralism?

We have included multilateralism in this list of priorities for 2025, primarily because it has long been an area of excellence for French diplomacy - often unnoticed by public opinion but recognized abroad, at least in leading circles. To be specific, the last major truly global success of our country's diplomacy was the 2015 Paris climate agreement.

Critics may argue that the implementation of this agreement leaves much to be desired, that the momentum has been lost (cf. the disappointing results of the latest summit in Baku), that one of the first decisions made by Trump II was to withdraw again from the agreement. All true. As a counterpoint, however, China has seen a spectacular slowdown in its fossil fuel consumption in recent months. Many experts believe that global oil consumption - and hence production - could peak by 2025, and begin to decline thereafter. Even without the United States, the process launched by the Paris Agreement would continue to provide a useful framework for international cooperation.

Beyond this central issue, in recent years, Paris has attempted to compensate for America's disaffection with multilateralism through so-called "minilateral" initiatives (in smaller circles). It is not certain that the One Planet Summit series will have a lasting effect. As for the flagship project of the "Paris Pact for the Planet and the People" - essentially a coalition for reforming international financial institutions like the World Bank and the IMF - the participation of over sixty countries is in itself a success for France. But there are limits: while these institutions have partially adapted to the developing new landscape, including the release of $100 billion for the poorest countries (as advocated by Paris), the transformative reform of capital quotas in the two Bretton Woods institutions remains blocked by the rigidity of the U.S. Congress. The risk of such rigidity is that China will set up its own alternative development financing system, as it has begun (albeit cautiously) to do with the BRICS Development Bank.

Challenge 7: Algeria and the Maghreb

Isn't it counterintuitive to include our relations with the Maghreb in a list of strategic challenges for 2025? Aren't relations with both Algeria and Morocco bound to have their ups and downs? In this early-year review, we shall refrain from putting forward specific proposals for dealing with the latest crisis between Algiers and Paris. More modestly, we would like to highlight two enduring points of significance.

Firstly, beyond the obvious impact on our domestic policy, we must clearly understand what our relations with our former colonies mean for our "global" international action. In our relations with Washington, for example, the fact that France "held" West Africa (to put things in these simplistic terms, as it was seen in the United States) was part of the credibility of French diplomacy. A certain disengagement from the Sahel was inevitable, but the conditions of this disengagement do not enhance our prestige. It would be a mistake to think that our relations with the Maghreb follow a completely different logic. They too are part of the lens through which France is observed abroad.

Secondly, if we acknowledge that our relations with these countries will remain marked, nolens volens, by a kind of unavoidable intimacy, the challenge for us is to find a stable, long-term relationship with them that can withstand the shocks of recurring crises. This is also true of Syria, where over the past decades, phases of enthusiastic engagement have alternated with phases of rupture. As for the current crisis with Algiers, it highlights a specific aspect of the relationship: the Algerians, as they themselves say, know us inside out. They know that economic retaliation is not perceived as dramatic by French public opinion. On the contrary, since Voltaire and Rousseau, attacking a writer touches the most sensitive nerve of French idiosyncrasy. The day will come, however, when we'll have to rebuild these ties.

Conclusion: the Dead Ends of our List of Priorities

Including Algeria among the seven priority geostrategic challenges for the coming year-rather than China, the Indo-Pacific, or Africa-is obviously a provocative choice.. But let's try to justify ourselves. China, unquestionably, represents a major challenge for French policy. Proof of this can be found in the fact that it plays a role in practically all the subjects we have discussed. This will be the case not only in 2025, but most probably for decades to come. The question is how our foreign policy should approach China: as a bilateral issue, or as a challenge that, because of its scale, falls within the remit of the European Union, or as part of our broader relations with America or other major players.

The Indo-Pacific? Why not indeed, but in our view, by 2025, a major issue for our external action is to reassess the capabilities we have in the world, particularly our military capabilities. Given the persistence of the Russian threat on the old continent in the medium term, isn't it time for France to reorder our priorities in favor of a stronger contribution to European security? As for Africa, it goes without saying that Africa will remain important for France. It's a fact that, as far as the Sahel and West Africa as a whole are concerned, we are in a phase of mourning, where discretion should be the order of the day. At least in political terms, because in fact our companies still have assets in this region, and no doubt so does our development agency (AFD). Can we bounce back by accentuating a line that President Macron himself established, namely to develop our relations with the rest of Africa, in particular by using multilateral action (directing international cooperation on global issues towards Africa)? It's possible, but it's a long-term undertaking.

Copyright image : Aurelien Morissard / POOL / AFP
Emmanuel Macron addressing ambassadors at the Élysée Palace, January 6, 2025.