Three Questions to Chris Miller: Navigating the Geopolitics of Semiconductors in a New Trump Era

While President Trump may be unpredictable in some respects, the broader US political system offers greater predictability. Several of the trends visible in the early days of a second Trump administration were already emerging during Biden’s term, and many are anchored in deeper bipartisan shifts. Considering these broader political dynamics is key to anticipating US technology policy.

One particularly enduring concern in Washington is China’s ambition to expand its share of the global chip market - a worry that cuts across party lines and administrations. The Biden teams had launched a Section 301 investigation into unfair trade practices, focusing on Chinese subsidies in foundational semiconductors. The report is due in late 2025. The Trump team has launched a Section 232 Investigations on Pharmaceuticals and Semiconductors. It targets global chip trade, linking it to national security. Both are expected to result in new tariffs.

But while the Trump team may still contemplate broad-based tariffs, a more realistic path in the medium term is a phased, China-specific approach. There is growing bipartisan support for a component-based tariff regime targeting Chinese semiconductor imports. While such measures could significantly disrupt global trade, they are viewed in Washington as both politically and economically viable. That said, US tariffs on chip-making equipment remain unlikely at this stage.

Further tightening of export controls is also expected. Several current officials are on the record having criticized the Biden administration for leaving key loopholes open, including those that allowed China to stockpile chips after leaked policy drafts. Under Trump, we should expect more unilateral action, particularly targeting Chinese chips in civilian infrastructure (such as data centers or connected vehicles) and in consumer devices sold in the US - areas where bipartisan support for restrictions is emerging rapidly.

Despite delays, CHIPS Act subsidies are likely to be disbursed. Allocated funds are unlikely to go unused. Where onshoring is feasible without significantly raising costs - as in server assembly - the US is expected to pursue it. But smartphone assembly is unlikely to return to the US anytime soon.

Meanwhile, China is reshaping the industry with long-term industrial policies. Its strategy to increase domestic chip production and enforce "buy local" compliance is already producing results. Chinese firms are rapidly expanding capacity in low- and mid-range segments, leading to declining market shares for Western competitors and deterring investment elsewhere - for example, investors have pressured lagging edge firms to reduce capex in response to China's momentum. However, clear limitations remain as China seeks to manufacture advanced chips, particularly those reliant on EUV lithography.

Three interlocking challenges are emerging for Europe, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan: US tariffs, US export controls, and access to the Chinese market.

There is shared concern across these geographies - and including in the US - over the long-term risks posed by China's foundational chip subsidies. A de facto coalition between the US, Japan, and Taiwan is already forming around this issue. Europe has the option to join this effort by implementing its own trade measures, but its intentions remain unclear. The ball is in Europe’s court.

Europe faces specific vulnerabilities. Unlike the US, which no longer exports many manufactured goods to China beyond semiconductors, Europe’s industrial base - particularly automotive and machinery sectors - still depends heavily on the Chinese market. These sectors caution that retaliation could be costly. At the same time, Chinese subsidies already distort competition, hurting key segments of Europe’s economy. Structural changes in China’s market and declining EU exports suggest that Europe may be forced to act independently in the near future, especially if coordination remains limited.

In addition, Europe’s relative weakness in AI is emerging as a strategic liability. While the US and China are actively linking AI advances with domestic semiconductor development, Europe lags behind. This reflects a broader gap in Europe’s tech ecosystem and should prompt EU policymakers to focus on building the next generation of technology on European soil - as a path to economic prosperity and geopolitical influence.

Europe’s ongoing debate on strategic autonomy echoes conversations in the US and Japan, albeit with different terminology. In the US, the emphasis is on "onshoring," while in Europe the term of choice is "resilience." In practice, no country is fully autonomous. Dependencies are inevitable and widely acknowledged. The key question is: what types of risks are worth mitigating, and at what cost?

The Trump administration is likely to exert greater pressure on allies, especially when it comes to export controls. And unlike Biden, Trump will be less concerned with making these measures appear multilateral. While there remains broad support in Washington for framing tariffs as part of a global trade rebalancing effort - and interest in coalition-building still exists among some key figures in the Trump team - there is also growing skepticism about multilateral diplomacy, particularly in the realm of export controls.

Leaks during Biden-era negotiations allowed China to stockpile chips in advance of new restrictions. This has fueled a belief in some corners of Washington that multilateralism slows progress and may even be counterproductive. There is now an emerging view that if the US can achieve results through unilateral action, coordination may not be worth the delay.

In practice, one can anticipate that companies subject to US export restrictions are likely to comply - compliance remains the safest route, and the Trump team is aware of that leverage. More threats of unilateral action - and more use of those tools - should be expected.

That said, targeted coordination could still emerge, especially around shared concerns like Chinese overcapacity in legacy chips. The EU and US have already begun crafting distinct but directionally aligned policies. Even without formal coordination, this kind of parallel policy movement could deliver significant combined impacts in terms of correcting trade imbalances.

Ultimately, foundational chipmakers losing market share under unfair conditions is a shared concern for the EU, Japan, Taiwan, and the US - offering potential ground for greater transatlantic and transpacific alignment.

Copyright image : USTIN SULLIVAN / GETTY IMAGES NORTH AMERICA / Getty Images via AFP
A container in Oakland, California, on April 9th.

Interview by Mathieu Duchâtel and Claire Lemoine.