Should France Recognize the State of Palestine?

On April 9, after returning from Egypt, President Macron declared his intention to "probably" recognize a Palestinian State in June-coinciding with an international conference in New York, co-chaired by France and Saudi Arabia, to promote the two-state solution. A few days later, he clarified that the move was intended to "trigger a series of other recognitions… including the recognition of Israel by states that do not currently do so."

These statements immediately sparked national debate-alongside a strong backlash from the Israeli government. In France, some political figures argue that recognizing Palestine as a state now would "reward Hamas." The Palestinian terrorist organization welcomed the announcement as a "first step" taken by France. Conversely, politicians sympathetic to the Palestinian cause criticized the gesture as too little, too late: half of the EU member states and 147 countries worldwide-about 75% of the UN-have already recognized Palestine, though none from the G7. They suspect that, after floating the idea, Macron might ultimately hesitate to follow through.

That said, while Macron’s move does not express sympathy for Hamas, it likely reflects growing disapproval of Netanyahu’s government. To consider recognizing a Palestinian State now is also a way of signaling disapproval of the Israeli military operations in the West Bank and the breaking of the ceasefire, which has led to catastrophic humanitarian conditions in Gaza and, once again, the death of hundreds.

It should also be recalled that France had already taken preliminary steps in this direction by voting in favor of two UN resolutions-on April 18, 2025, at the Security Council, and on May 10 in the General Assembly-calling for Palestine’s full membership at the UN (though the Security Council vote was blocked by a U.S. veto).Does this mean President Macron will follow through with full recognition in June? By stating that France intends to be part of a broader dynamic of mutual recognition, is he not leaving himself the option of holding back, if no broader momentum emerges by then? Let’s take a step further: given the current stance of the Israeli government, is there any realistic chance that an Arab or Muslim state-such as Indonesia-would recognize Israel now?

To understand the full picture, it may be helpful to briefly recall the genesis of France’s doctrinal position. According to international law, as interpreted in France, statehood requires a defined territory, a permanent population, and an effective governing authority. These criteria are arguably not met under the current conditions in Palestine. To "recognize a Palestinian state" under these conditions is therefore to acknowledge a virtual entity-a paradoxical reality, one might say. Politically, French diplomacy had long held that the most meaningful recognition of a Palestinian state would be from Israel itself. A viable Palestinian state-one that poses no threat to Israeli security-should emerge from direct negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians.

We now reach a third set of considerations-one of political opportunity, which in international affairs often remains the ultima ratio. Israeli public opinion remains divided, but support for the "two-state solution" has nearly vanished. For external actors like France, the question is whether recognizing Palestine now would be a form of pressure on Israel, a signal to the international community (which already leans heavily in favor of recognition), or simply a symbolic gesture with no real impact.

To avoid such a dilemma, the Élysée may have at one point considered that an optimal scenario would be a joint recognition alongside other G7 nations-such as the UK, Italy, Japan, and Canada. That scenario now seems increasingly unlikely, at least regarding the first three, under the consideration of the "Trump II administration" factor in the U.S. and its inherent unpredictability. While Donald Trump has at times distanced himself from Netanyahu (as seen with Iran), his ultimate position remains difficult to predict. Another line of action for Macron is to emphasize a number of conditions-though it remains unclear whether these are prerequisites for recognition, or part of a broader diplomatic framework, inclusive of a mutual recognition between Israel and Palestine. These include: the release of all Israeli hostages, the removal of Hamas from Gaza governance, reform of the Palestinian Authority, and security guarantees for Israel.

These issues are precisely what the June conference aims to address. In the best-case scenario, it will provide concrete answers to these pressing questions. Still, the positions of the United States and Israel will remain decisive.

Ultimately, the stakes for France go beyond the Israeli-Palestinian conflict-they involve its broader ability to act as a bridge between the West and the Global South-whether or not one chooses to use that terminology. But other considerations will be taken into account by Paris: as a matter of logic, if you want to convince others to rally a position of "double recognition" (both Palestine and Israel), it makes sense to implement the same position yourself; and, in concrete terms, Saudi Arabia and other Arab states will probably expect France, at this stage, to do it.

As Raymond Aron might have said: recognition is difficult, non-recognition is improbable-if not impossible.

Copyright image : Ludovic MARIN / POOL / AFP
Emmanuel Macron in Cairo, 7 April 2025.