Israel-Hezbollah: an Inevitable War?

Since the beginning of June, the escalation between Israel and the Lebanese Hezbollah has reached a new level, with increasingly frequent and massive attacks. On July 4, Hezbollah fired over 200 rockets into the north of the Hebrew state in response to the assassination of one of its military commanders the day before. After several months of unsuccessful French and American diplomatic attempts, a sense of fatalism permeates the discourse of officials on both sides of the border. To many Israelis and Lebanese, the question is no longer whether a new confrontation will take place, but when.

A few days after the Hamas attacks last October, Defense Minister Yoav Gallant considered a preemptive strike against Hezbollah. Yoav Gallant argued that, in the face of the tragic failure of the IDF to deter a large-scale attack by Hamas, Israel could no longer risk believing in a status quo with Hezbollah. In other words, if Hamas could commit the atrocities of October 7, what could guarantee that Hezbollah would not be tempted to follow suit? The preemptive option was then rejected, seemingly largely by the two centrists (and former generals) members of the war cabinet, Benny Gantz and Gadi Eizenkot, as well as the Biden administration. Nevertheless, it has not disappeared and clearly permeates the debates in Israeli military circles.

For the new French government that now needs to be formed following the legislative elections, the possibility of a new war between Israel and Hezbollah could be one of the first major international crises it will have to manage.

A continuous escalation since October 7, 2023

To understand the cycle from which Israel and Hezbollah seem unable to escape today, we must return to the situation that prevailed before the Hamas attacks on October 7, 2023. Since the 2006 war, the "blue line" demarcating the Israeli-Lebanese border remained relatively calm. Hezbollah had significantly rearmed, but from 2011 onwards, its fighters were mainly engaged in the Syrian theater to support Bashar Al-Assad's regime against the rebels. On the other hand, the Israeli army has focused on the Gaza Strip, where operations against Hamas have shaped the last two decades.

This status quo did not mean that the two parties had resolved their differences. In reality, it was the logic of mutual deterrence that prevented a new explosion: Israeli leaders, like those of Hezbollah, did not wish to relive the 2006 war, and were aware that a new confrontation would be worse than the previous one.

Year in, year out, this balance held until October 7, 2023. However, the attacks perpetrated by Hamas and the war in Gaza have shaken the certainties on both sides. Not without hesitation, Hezbollah felt compelled to express its solidarity with the Palestinian fighters, and began firing rockets at Israel. At first, these attacks were symbolic, landing only in uninhabited areas. In his first speech on November 3, the movement's Secretary General, Hassan Nasrallah, showed great caution: essentially, he stated that Hezbollah supported the Palestinian cause but would not drag Lebanon into the spiral of a regional conflict.

Despite Hezbollah's assertion that it does not want another war with Israel, it now presents a profound security dilemma for the Hebrew state. The increasing rocket attacks on northern Israel have not only led to an intensification of Tsahal strikes on Hezbollah positions in southern Lebanon, but they have also primarily resulted in an exodus of the population. About 90,000 Lebanese and 70,000 Israelis have abandoned their homes and are living temporarily in hotels or with relatives. De facto, the clashes have created a battlefield stretching for almost 20 kilometers on both sides of the border, where civilians can no longer live.

Meanwhile, the United States and France have intensified diplomatic efforts to bring an end to the escalation. These efforts aim to redeploy Hezbollah forces north of the Litani River, in accordance with UN Resolution 1701, which brought an end to the 2006 war. On paper, the objective is realistic. However, the Lebanese government, the default interlocutor for Western diplomacy, is incapable of imposing such measures on Hezbollah. Moreover, Hezbollah argues that the prerequisite for any negotiations is a ceasefire in Gaza - something the Israelis refuse to consider as a negotiating element on the Lebanese front.

In the face of the failure of Western diplomacy, Israeli rhetoric has become much harsher, and Tsahal has shown that it is prepared to launch an operation on Lebanon, at any moment.

An unprecedented war scenario

If it were to happen, a confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah would be certainly different from what we have seen so far in Gaza. In the eyes of the Israeli military, Hezbollah remains the most formidable Arab force it has faced. Since the 2006 war, the Party of God has equipped itself with an arsenal of rockets (over 150,000 according to Israeli and American intelligence services), as well as short-range ballistic missiles and drones, unmatched by any non-state actor. These capabilities are more numerous and more precise than those operated by Hamas.

Hezbollah is not only better equipped than Hamas, but also better trained. In fact, the Palestinian movement drew heavily on Hezbollah's elite troops, the Radwan units, to train those who carried out the attacks on October 7. Moreover, Hezbollah's forces benefit from significant combat experience in Syria: over the past decade, its fighters have conducted a genuine counter-insurgency campaign to support Bashar al-Assad's Syrian regime. In doing so, they have learned to fight alongside Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards as well as the Russian air force deployed in Syria after Moscow's decision to rescue the Syrian dictator in 2015.

All this is well-known to the Israeli military hierarchy and intelligence services, who have always made Hezbollah one of their priorities, unlike Hamas, which has (incorrectly) been considered a secondary irritant rather than a serious threat.

Consequently, in the face of such a battle order, what form might the confrontation take? Presumably, the Israeli army would focus on two objectives: reducing Hezbollah's arsenals and pushing its fighters north of the Litani River. In the first case, this would involve a vast air campaign extending far beyond southern Lebanon. It would include targets in Beirut and its suburbs, where Hezbollah's military and political hierarchy operates. As these targets would be amid civilian populations, the collateral damage would be considerable. It is highly likely that the Israeli air force would also target Lebanese civilian or government infrastructures, notably Beirut airport: this facility was struck in the early days of the 2006 conflict, and Hezbollah is suspected of storing part of its arsenal there.

In such a scenario, the great unknown is the role of the United States: it is difficult to determine to what extent the Biden administration would tolerate an air campaign that does not distinguish Hezbollah from the Lebanese government. In contrast to the situation in Gaza under Hamas control, Washington maintains relations with the government in Beirut and plays a direct role in the training of the Lebanese army. This led George W. Bush's administration in 2006 to pressure Israel to end its offensive at the time.

The second aim, forcing a redeployment of Hezbollah fighters north of the Litani River in order to reestablish the demilitarized buffer zone in southern Lebanon demanded by Resolution 1701, would be equally complex. It cannot be achieved without a ground engagement by Israeli troops. A ground operation of this kind recalls the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, which aimed to establish a "security zone" to protect the northern part of the country from attacks by Yasser Arafat's PLO at that time. The operation quickly became a quagmire, leading to the emergence of Hezbollah in 1985 as a reaction to the Israeli occupation, which only ended in 2000, following a unilateral withdrawal decision by Prime Minister Ehud Barak.

Such an operation would expose Israeli infantry to a difficult combat against Hezbollah soldiers, who would display a more fearsome resistance than Hamas militiamen. Furthermore, such a scenario would require a massive mobilization of Israeli reservists: an army of conscripts, Tsahal has depended on them since October 7, and to an unprecedented extent. In Gaza, the use of reservists for extended campaigns has already revealed its deleterious effects, including recurrent discipline problems among often inexperienced soldiers, as well as the suspension of economic activity for Israeli society. In reality, the use of the reserve, necessary for a small state like Israel, was designed under the assumption of short-lived conflicts such as the wars of 1967 or 1973. A new war, this time on the northern front, would thus put pressure on the Israeli army model that has already reached its limits after nine months of war in Gaza.

It is also necessary to consider Hezbollah’s response. In 2006, the movement was able to strike northern Israel with its rockets until the final days of the conflict. In the event of a new conflict, the movement's attacks would match the intensity of Israel's air campaign. For many years, Hezbollah has claimed to be capable of targeting not only Israel's major urban centers (Haifa, Jerusalem, Tel Aviv), but also its port infrastructure and electricity networks.

Such a quantity would quickly overwhelm the Iron Dome batteries. Moreover, the hundreds of drones and ballistic missiles operated by Hezbollah would be even more difficult to intercept. As a result, Israeli civilians are already preparing for the prospect of living in bomb shelters for several weeks.

Finally, beyond Hezbollah, the question of an Iranian intervention arises. The leaders in Tehran themselves cast doubt on the possibility of their intervention in support of their Hezbollah co-religionists. Such intervention would not be automatic. Iran has never directly intervened to support Hezbollah in previous wars. It is likely that such a conflict would see Teheran encouraging its non-state partners in Yemen, Iraq and Syria to launch joint attacks on Israeli soil. Nevertheless, the Iranian regime, which must contend with the inauguration of a new president, would most probably avoid entering into a direct conflict with Israel.

The modalities of a return to the status quo ante

It is clear that the human, economic and strategic consequences of a conflict between Israel and Hezbollah would be catastrophic. For now, this is the main reason why such a conflict has not yet occurred: both the Israeli government and Hezbollah are aware that such a war would not result in a decisive victory, but would instead generate unprecedented levels of destruction for both countries. Therefore, it can be asserted that the concept of deterrence - in other words, a balance of terror - between the two parties remains operative.

However, one cannot rely solely on faith in the stabilizing power of deterrence. Alongside the United States, France has more than ever a role to play in creating the conditions for a de-escalation and a return to the status quo prior to October 7, 2023. While Washington is Israel's key ally, France is the only country to maintain channels of communication with all involved actors - including Hezbollah.

Paris and Washington must therefore work together to revamp and strengthen the UN peacekeeping force in the region. In the years following the 2006 conflict, UNIFIL played an essential role as a mediator between the parties involved. Nevertheless, it suffers from a lack of manpower (approximately 10,000 soldiers instead of the 15,000 originally planned). Its ability to ensure the demilitarization of southern Lebanon has always been hampered by Hezbollah's ability to hide its arsenals in civilian homes and infrastructure. Given the urgency of the situation, it is necessary not only to return to the spirit of Resolution 1701, but also to expand UNIFIL's responsibilities and resources. Some of these modalities can be implemented without even changing the force's mandate from the Security Council.

In the longer term, the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah cannot be resolved without genuine reform of the Lebanese state, particularly its regular army. More than thirty years after the end of the civil war, Hezbollah remains the only non-state actor that has not disarmed and regularly drags the entire country into its military ventures. The Lebanese army is not incompetent: in 2017, at the peak of the Syrian civil war, it proved effective in border operations against jihadist groups. Nonetheless, it is time, however, for it to finally ensure the legitimate monopoly of violence for Lebanon.

Copyright image : Kawnat HAJU / AFP