Responsibility vs Autonomy: the Strategic Rift between France and Germany under Merz

Succeeding Chancellor Scholz, whose tenure left its mark on Europe through hesitation and political balancing, Friedrich Merz has, since his election in early 2025, embraced a more assertive stance, particularly on defence. At the heart of his doctrine lies the concept of Verantwortung (responsibility). The strategic nuance vis-à-vis the French model of autonomy is crucial: while Paris welcomes the revival of strategic dialogue with Berlin, deep-seated misunderstandings persist and continue to weigh heavily on Europe’s capacity to scale up its power.

Between symbolism and deadlock: the difficult construction of Franco-German strategic dialogue

After four years of war in Ukraine, defence issues are more than ever at the top of European leaders’ agendas. For the Franco-German couple, this shift, implying closer strategic dialogue, forms part of a process initiated by the 1963 Élysée Treaty. During the Cold War, France and the Federal Republic of Germany steadily deepened their ties: first in education and culture, then progressively at administrative and even political levels, establishing exchanges between senior civil servants and formalising alignment ahead of major international summits.
 

Merz, or the illusion of Franco-German strategic alignment

Friedrich Merz’s arrival in 2025 marks a turning point in the Franco-German strategic dialogue. A former rival of Merkel from the conservative ranks of the CDU as well as a committed Atlanticist, Merz nevertheless struck a “Gaullist” tone shortly after taking office in a speech widely reported internationally. He described strengthening European defence as an “absolute priority” so that the continent might “gradually achieve independence from the United States”. He spoke of the need for “an autonomous European defence capability” as an alternative to “NATO in its current form”.

Many observers of Franco-German relations saw this as, finally, evidence of strategic alignment. For France, whose representatives in Brussels have long championed “European strategic autonomy”, this appeared to enshrine at the highest political level a vision hitherto promoted in relative isolation: Berlin would now share not only the diagnosis but also the long-term direction.

Since then, the two leaders have multiplied joint announcements, signalling their desire to move forward together towards a genuinely European defence. Yet behind this apparent consensus lie two distinct conceptions of European power.

German Verantwortung: a foreign policy under moral constraint

Since May 2025, Friedrich Merz has led a grand coalition (Große Koalition) between the CDU and the SPD. Their cooperation rests on a coalition agreement entitled Verantwortung für Deutschland, Responsibility for Germany. The choice of word is anything but incidental.

A historically charged concept

In today’s German political context, Verantwortung carries heavy semantic weight. In the immediate post-war period, it was closely associated with guilt over Nazism and the duty of remembrance. It retains this connotation, not least in light of the electoral successes of the far right.

In foreign policy, the term is also directly associated with Helmut Kohl. Chancellor from 1982 to 1998, Kohl developed the idea of Germany’s responsibility abroad. In 1983, he declared that the Federal Republic, as a “leading industrial nation”, was called upon to “assume significant responsibility” and to “work for its interests” while upholding human rights. Germany’s economic weight, in his view, entailed greater international engagement, albeit measured engagement. Responsibility was understood as responsibility towards others, not the capacity to act alone.

From restraint to active responsibility

In defence, the notion proved more ambiguous. Since 1945, Germany’s institutional architecture has been designed to avoid, at all costs, an offensive defence policy. This posture was tested after reunification, when the United States urged Germany to assume greater responsibility within the Atlantic Alliance. During the Gulf War, this meant in particular involving the Bundeswehr in “out-of-area” operations, something firmly opposed by German public opinion.

At the time, the United States accused Germany of lacking courage, gratitude and leadership. Ultimately, in 1994, a ruling by the Federal Constitutional Court clarified the legal framework, authorising German participation in out-of-area operations provided they took place within the Alliance. This judgment marked a fundamental step in the gradual normalisation of Germany’s military role within NATO.

Strategic autonomy: a French lens not easily transposed to Germany

Emmanuel Macron faces similar challenges in terms of political polarisation and fragmentation. Yet despite France’s protracted political crisis, the French president retains his domaine reservé: foreign policy. In European defence, Macron embodies a sovereignty-driven foreign policy rooted in a Gaullist conception of power. This implies both rejecting strategic dependencies and refocusing foreign policy on the nation-state.