[Trump’s World] - Russia: "This universalistic liberal world order has ended"

INSTITUT MONTAIGNE - How would you describe Trump II’s approach of foreign affairs? How is it different from Trump I? How do you analyse its impact on global balances, on European affairs, on other regional theaters?

FIODOR LOUKIANOV - Trump's goals and worldview have not changed at all compared to his first period in office. What has changed is how others perceive him. Back then, he seemed like some kind of terrible aberration, which would fade soon; now, Trumpism is the leitmotif of world politics, and this is recognized by everyone. Trump's return and the lack of serious opposition to his policies are a symptom of the fact that the liberal world order has exhausted itself, that period of international relations is over. And Trump feels in harmony with the passage of time.

For Trump, the world is the interaction of specific states, and the results of this interaction depend on the balance of power between them, each pair. He does not recognize institutions, does not consider them necessary, rather, they hinder him and distort the picture

The main difference between Trump and his predecessors is that he and his associates do not consider it important to influence the world as a whole, to care about any guidelines of its structure. The world should be such that the United States has the opportunity to achieve all its specific goals, which can be expressed in money. This is the defining principle. The rest does not play a big role. There is also the factor of personal ego and vanity, but this only reinforces the general conceptual approach.

IM - More specifically, does Trump II want all-out competition with other big powers? Is he interested in a world of spheres of influence? 

FL - I don't think he thinks in such categories: "I want great power competition". In his understanding, there is one country that has the right and the opportunity to extract maximum dividends. This is the United States. From the point of view of Trumpists, all the intellectual inventions of the 20th century, starting with Woodrow Wilson, prevented America from doing this, now the United States is returning to the right roots. This, of course, is not isolationism, which is impossible in the modern world, but a mercantilization of relations with other countries to the extent that this option is available. Regarding spheres of influence - Trump understands and, perhaps, is close to this concept, first of all, in relation to the United States itself. 

This does not have only a geographical dimension. On the one hand, Trump, of course, is inclined to consider the Western Hemisphere as a space where the United States has special rights. And this extends not only to the south, but also to the north. At the same time, Trump considers the sphere of American influence to include allied countries, those who are connected to America by obligations and to whom America has obligations. He does not directly refuse these obligations, but considers them a huge privilege for partner countries. And they must pay for these privileges in full, all the benefits must be on the side of the United States.

This does not mean that Trump recognizes the spheres of influence of other countries, he tries to benefit from everything. But for him it is normal that each country has an idea of ​​its special interests, which it defends if it can. Trump is spoiled by relations with allies, who almost all do what he says and are afraid to object to ‘daddy’ using the word of Mark Rutte. And he is surprised when other large states do not meet him halfway, it angers him, but he has a certain respect for them.

Donald Trump would be very surprised to hear it, but in fact he is a typical representative of the multipolar world, the advent of which has been much talked about. In a multipolar world there are no universal rules and ideology, everything is decided on the basis of specific agreements between countries or groups of countries, and the result of the agreements in each case depends on the balance of power and specificity of political cultures. The United States, is still the most powerful country in the world, has a good chance of achieving its goals in a multipolar world.

IM - What’s Russia’s analysis, priorities and strategy in the context of a Trump II world? 

FL - From a Russian perspective, the main thing that distinguishes Trump from other US presidents after the Cold War is the absence of an ideological predeterminism that defines everything else. Pragmatism, devoid of the desire to impose any value or ideological norms. This opens up opportunities for agreements. Including the Ukrainian issue. There are no special results yet, but the main change: Trump and the United States emphasize that they are not on anyone's side, they are playing the role of a mediator. It turns out that this is a conflict between Russia and Ukraine/Europe, in which the United States is trying to reconcile the parties. This was unimaginable a year ago.

Another important change for Russia is the NATO crisis. Moscow has long said that the North Atlantic Alliance belongs to the previous era of the Cold War, it has become an anachronism that could not adapt to change. In 2022, NATO began to talk about finding a new meaning and role. And it seemed that this was the case. However, the US turnaround calls into question the entire structure of NATO. At the very least, it must change and be rebuilt. NATO, which saw itself as a system of European security after the Cold War, in fact no longer exists. And what it will be like in a world where Europe is experiencing marginalization is still unclear.

I don't think Russia has high expectations for its future relations with the US. However, the brink of direct confrontation that we approached after 2022 has now moved further away.

IM - No doubt that Trump is not the only game changer actually; maybe the real turning point in world affairs came before Trump’s era. What room for manœuvre middle powers have in the new world? How do you assess their options, for instance in terms of coalition building?

For middle powers, in fact, little has changed. They have always had to look for ways to achieve their results and strengthen their capabilities. Together with someone or independently. Now too. But the emphasis on independence, the general trend - everyone relies primarily on themselves. And this allows for flexibility.

Russia is ready for this in this sense, in its history coalitions are exceptions that were tried only in very critical international times. But basically these are different forms of self-sufficiency and cooperation with other countries for their own development.

IM - What is your assessment of the Alaska summit meeting and the meeting in the White House with Zelenski and the Europeans? Is Trump decisively in Putin’s camp or are things more complicated than that?

FL - The Alaska summit and then the meeting in Washington essentially did not produce anything new. Everyone stuck to their opinions. The painful process continues, in which the military component still plays the main role. Everything will depend on it.

IM - You say that most of the countries assembled in the Brics format or at the meetings in China are not anti-western. You can’t deny that in Putin’s and Xi’s speeches there were strong anti US and (regarding Putin) anti European rhetoric? 

FL - There is no doubt that the international arena is now a space for an acute conflict. Its roots are partly subjective in nature - the lack of mutual understanding between the largest players, their inability to find ways to painlessly resolve contradictions.

Therefore, tough statements are heard in all directions. You are talking about the anti-Western rhetoric of Putin and Xi. But don't Europe and the United States pronounce sharply anti-Chinese and anti-Russian formulas? Do they not take actions to put pressure on China and Russia by all possible means - from the economy and further down the list? A large-scale change in the world paradigm is underway. Thank God that so far we are mostly limited to words, military manifestations are relatively limited, but will extend themselves, if not taken seriously.

IM - ⁠ One of our interlocutors opined that in the Trump administration’s world view independent of the President’s agnosticism as you see it, "there is a civilizational nationalism, defined by the ambition to rebuild the West around Christianity and "whiteness." It is an a-historical nationalism-one "without history"-in the sense that it is not tied to any specific people or territory." One can argue that this civilizational dimension is also a factor that ties the American right to Vladimir Putin who also sees himself as a protector of Christian values and defines Russian nationalism in Christian civilizational terms. Modi in India or Xi in China also speak the language of civilizational nationalism when they define or project their national interest.

IM - Are we then in a civilizational struggle as well? How does this fit in with multipolarity? How will Europe fit in? If struggle is defined in civilizational terms, how can one have cooperation based on both common and national interests that necessitates dispassionate approaches to conflicts and global problems?

FL - Here you can come up with many very interesting formulas to describe the policies of certain states. Civilizational nationalism - you can call it that, or create something else. The main process, in my opinion, is the following. This liberal world order, which in its essence was universalistic, that is, based on the idea that there is some common normative base for everyone, and its source is the West, has ended. It is being replaced by some other system, which we do not yet know exactly what to call. There will be no universal norms in it, at least for a long time.

Copyright Image : Alan Ducarre