Latin America at a Crossroads – at the Heart of the New Global Geopolitics

The United States is Reclaiming its Backyard

The abduction of Nicolas Maduro and his wife Cilia Flores in the middle of the night in Caracas by American special forces created a geopolitical tsunami. The United States' preparations were easy enough to spot, but many thought Trump wouldn’t follow through on his threats - even though the president has been loudly announcing his intention to wield the full might of American power over the country's future. As is often the case, this complex and risky operation was decided on without any plan worked out for the day after, leaving Venezuela facing a major muddle, that is part of Trump’s modus operandi. 

After announcing the United States would now manage the country - while leaving the Chavista regime intact and strengthening its repression - Marco Rubio, the U.S. Secretary of State, backpedaled. He explained the United States would strengthen the economic and especially oil embargo on the country, and extract concessions from the Venezuelan government, threatened with paralysis. The Chavista regime, now led by Delcy Rodriguez, is a master in the art of appearing to make concessions while ensuring the regime's survival at any cost. Donald Trump is learning this to his detriment.

The United States' relationship with Latin America under Donald Trump's second term is being redefined or, more accurately, will never be precisely defined. Trump dislikes strategies or action plans that constrain his actions and reduce his room for maneuver. As an adept of improvisation, he likes to catch his interlocutors off guard and relies largely on his intuition of the moment. He does so all the more since, when explains his decisions, he primarily addresses his political base poorly informed and little aware of how the international system works. As a result, in the American imagination, he appears as a cowboy vigilante from the Wild West little concerned with rules and propriety, one of the country's great founding myths.

However, in the absence of strategies, certain directions are emerging in the relationship between the Trump team and Latin America, which are very different, if not opposed, to those announced during his presidential campaign. Upon Donald Trump's arrival in power, one might have thought that his approach to the continent would be focused on the immediate interests of the United States. This means stopping migratory flows from the south by making deals with neighboring countries to take back their emigrants, preventing the Chinese from threatening vital US interests such as control of the Panama Canal, and pursuing a more active policy to protect the country from drug import. The prevailing idea, among his voters and the rest of the world, was that Trump would not go much further, since he – like the rest of his team – considered external military episodes a waste of money and energy and relentlessly criticized his predecessors for their interventionism.

One therefore observes a long shift in the American position on the Latin American continent since Donald Trump came to power, undoubtedly attributable to the struggles for influence within his cabinet and between his official and informal advisors. Marco Rubio, the Cuban-born Secretary of State, who held clearneo-conservative positions when he sat in the Senate in favor of an imperialist policy, seems to have played an important role.

Trump began by threatening Panama with a new American military occupation and to take control of the canal in case a curb was not immediately put on Chinese influence and  American ships were not exempted from transit fees. The Panamanian government promised to review the contracts with Hutchison Port Holdings, whose parent company CK Hutchison Holdings is based in Hong Kong, and on which the Panama Ports Authority depends. It manages two of the main ports serving the canal. Panama therefore refused to make the canal passage free for American ships, explaining that the Canal management authority was independent of the Panamanian government according to the very terms of the 1999 agreement with the United States. The White House seems to have been satisfied with the President's announcements, which it presented to Americans as important concessions obtained from Panama, and Trump has moved on for the moment.

A last-minute stabilization, successful thanks to an unusual currency swap system for an amount of $20 billion and the promise of massive support from the private sector, helped Javier Milei win the legislative elections by a large margin. Such an intervention undoubtedly rewarded the unfailing support and admiration the Argentinian president has always shown for Donald Trump - when Argentina, at the other end of the continent, is far from representing a vital interest for the United States.

Trump also took a stand in the Honduran elections by openly supporting Nasry Asfura, his favorite among the two right-wing candidates, who narrowly won the presidential election. Trump also pardoned a former Honduran president from the same party, imprisoned on American soil and convicted of covering up a major drug trafficking operation destined for the United States when he was leading the country. Finally, Trump did not hesitate to interfere in Brazil's internal politics by imposing absurdly high customs duties on the country, under the pretext that former President Bolsonaro was unfairly tried for an attempted coup after losing the elections. Since then, Trump has changed his tune, abandoning Bolsonaro to his fate and calling Lula a "good man". This is generally what happens with leaders who stand up to him.

Trump seems to have discovered that he could cultivate a network of admirers ranging from the Argentinian Javier Milei to the Chilean Jose Antonio Kast to Daniel Noboa Azin in Ecuador and now Nasry Asfura. Trump, increasingly presenting himself as the leader of a global revolution, strongly needs this, given his disastrous reputation outside his country.

It is against this backdrop that Trump's advisors have officially relaunched the famous Monroe Doctrine, which the United States had not referred to since the end of the Cold War. The doctrine, formulated in 1823 by President Monroe, positioned the United States as the protector of the American continent against the interventionist ambitions of the former colonies, especially Spain and, to a lesser extent, France. Initially totally pacifist, the doctrine transformed into imperialist interventionism in 1898, during the Spanish-American War under the presidency of McKinley [1897-1901] and then Theodore Roosevelt [1901-1909]. With this doctrine, the United States inaugurated the idea of privileged zones of influence for the United States and seized territories like Puerto Rico. After a first mention of by Trump, it reappeared in the new American Security Strategy published in November 2025: "We will affirm and apply a 'Trump Corollary' to the Monroe Doctrine…" and further: "After years of neglect, the United States will reassert and enforce the Monroe Doctrine to restore American preeminence in the Western Hemisphere, and to protect our homeland and our access to key geographies throughout the region..." The strategy emphasizes the importance of securing the United States' backyard, which extends to the entire Western Hemisphere (of which Greenland is a part) in order to fight against immigration, crime and drug trafficking, without forgetting the threat that China poses to the vital interests of the United States.

This imperialist vision denies any responsibility of the United States in maintaining global stability and clearly states that the Western Hemisphere will become a privileged zone for the United States, particularly, for its supply of energy and strategic raw materials. The new American security strategy is quite vague on the details of its implementation but repeatedly mentions "pragmatism". It marks the end of the idea of American supremacy over the world and replaces it with the idea of spheres of influence for the great powers and the importance for the United States to position itself as best as possible in this great power competition.

The hard isolationism announced by Trump during his presidential campaign is gradually giving way to a doctrine of areas of influence where Latin America and, more broadly, the Western Hemisphere are the center of attention. Europe, considered as a decadent entity, no longer even has the status of a great power. The strategy nevertheless mentions many times the United States will work in partnership with the states of the region while recognizing that some countries will be more inclined to do so work than others. In the meantime, the case of Venezuela seems to be an implementation of the new American strategy and it even seems like certain sections of the strategy were written while preparing for the events in Venezuela.

The main question is whether Trump will have the necessary domestic support to continue on such a highly interventionist path, with Cuba probably being the next candidate to suffer American militarist pressure. In this regard, the MAGA base seems increasingly divided, both on US foreign and domestic policy. On January 8, the Senate voted to ban any new military intervention in Venezuela without Congress's authorization - a first since Trump took office, while his popularity is at an all-time low. Latin American leaders observe the course of events with a certain perplexity and while Milei has trumpeted his support for the American intervention in Venezuela while Lula clearly criticized it, most are keeping a low profile.

China Discreetly Changes its Approach

For the continent's leaders, the first question that arises is, of course, the relationship with China; some countries wonder whether they will have to choose between the two countries and, if so, whether an anchor with China would not be more advantageous. Countries like Brazil, where China is the main importer and invests heavily in the country, have more to gain from an alliance with Beijing rather than with Washington, for example. This is also true for Chile and Peru. Forcing Latin American countries to cut ties with China could backfire on the United States and they are well aware of this. With the exception of Panama, they hold back from demanding the countries they help to withdraw their agreements with China. Even Argentina did not have to abandon its very lucrative ties with China. But it remains unclear how the Monroe doctrine, or more precisely Donroe, as the American press calls it, will actually apply to the continent.

China, presented in the American security strategy as the most dangerous rival power to the United States, has exponentially expanded its presence in Latin America between 2005 and 2024. China's share of Latin American exports increased from 3% to 33%, while that of the United States fell from 50% to 44%. Between the 2000-2004 period and the 2020-2024 period, Chinese investment increased in the region by 1859% to reach $55.6 billion, but the United States remains the leading investor on the continent. China also financed huge infrastructure projects, of which the Chancay mega-port in Peru is the most visible symbol. Once fully completed, it will become the largest deep-water port on the west coast of South America. It is financed by a loan of nearly a billion dollars from five Chinese banks but also by a majority stake acquired by COSCO, the Chinese shipping giant, in the port management company. Finally, the project is accompanied by many other, smaller projects closely or indirectly linked to the port's activity. Less grandiose but much more numerous infrastructure projects have also been carried out, particularly in Brazil (port infrastructure, transport, and electricity generation) and Mexico (the Maya train).

China has also invested enormously in Venezuela, where it saw the potential to create an exemplary partnership. Collaboration began in 2008 in various fields: agriculture, infrastructure, and in particular a train project, mining sector development, but oil quickly became the engine of cooperation between the two countries. China and Venezuela set up a system of exchange of products and financial support against oil exports - the debt to China being essentially paid for in oil exports. Venezuela is today unable to fully repay due to its low production. China is estimated to have invested nearly $60 billion in Venezuela. Today, Venezuela's public debt to China is estimated at between $10 billion and $25.5 billion according to sources, and China has considerably reduced its collaboration, which is now negligible. China now depends on Venezuela for only 3% of its oil imports and is hardly winning its bet: well before the American military intervention, it had considerably reduced its presence, but after the United States' intervention, it risks seeing its claims go up in smoke.

China is consequently adapting its strategy with Latin America. It favors less large projects, which are unpopular with local populations and place borrower countries in very difficult situations. It is also true that China is facing new internal growth constraints making it much less spendthrift abroad. It has more or less put its Road and Belt Initiative on hold in Latin America, even if the region remains essential for its needs in agricultural products - particularly soybeans -, its supply of minerals such as lithium (98% of China's lithium needs come from the region) and to a lesser extent its oil needs. Latin America therefore remains a very important market for Chinese products, which continues to grow but is also diversifying.

However, China is now looking for investment opportunities linked to technology, mining extraction, electric vehicles, and renewable energies, and even in the future of AI in synergy with the sectors it promotes in mainland China. Military and security cooperation remains important and could even increase given American aggressiveness. This will represent, in the coming years, an important change of long-term direction, much more attractive for the countries of the region.

Europe: a Stabilizing Role for the Region?

Europe, like the United States, is rapidly losing ground on the continent in the face of China's rise in terms of trade but also investment. Europe’s relations with Latin America are mainly bilateral with Spain and, to a lesser extent, Portugal. France, Germany, and Italy are also seeking to strengthen their relations. Global approaches remain weak or absent, with the exception of the Mercosur agreement.

We are therefore at a turning point: many opportunities are opening up with Europe, and Latin American leaders from both the right and the left would welcome the strengthening of the European presence. They know that the more allies they have, the less vulnerable they are to China and the United States.

While Europe mainly sees Latin America as an emerging market, many large Latin American countries also see Europe as an investment opportunity. The case of Spain is extremely illustrative. An active investor and important trading partner for Latin America, it is the main European investor with an estimated amount of 160 billion euros in 2022. This dynamic is two-way: Latin American investments in Spain have increased rapidly, particularly from Mexico, which has become the second largest investor outside the European Union in the country, behind the United States. It is estimated that more than 600 Latin American companies are investing in the country, many of which are start-ups. Immigrants from the region, often well-educated and well-received, contribute to the good results of the Spanish economy, today one of the most dynamic in Europe. The idea of two-way collaboration should be very attractive for European countries, especially for a region with significant growth potential.

Can Latin America Benefit from the New Geopolitics?

For the countries of the region, navigating the new global geopolitics is complex and risky. Cuba and, to a lesser extent, Nicaragua, are in an extremely difficult situation. More than half of Cuba's energy needs depended on its exports from Venezuela, and have now virtually stopped. Trump also strengthened financial sanctions on the island, put in place under the Clinton presidency in 1996, further compromising foreign investment in the island. The only good news for the continent is that this fragility significantly reduces the harmful potential of Russia and Iran and of destabilizing groups like Hezbollah, which is well established in Caracas.

Faced with the bipolarization of the word, a certain number of countries are attracted to the BRICS, which Lula seeks to strengthen in order to counterbalance the weight of the Western and especially American presence on the continent. However, the cooperation instruments of this movement are either under the control of China or without real financial scope, not to mention that the presence of international pariahs among its members such as Iran and Russia prevents it from establishing a dialogue with Western countries and serves as a repellent for many potential candidate countries. For the moment it is just a group trying to coordinate its political position toward the West and in particular Western sanctions, but without its own capacity outside of organizing annual meetings. The BRICS Bank remains a marginal financial institution on the international scene and can in no way provide concrete answers to the economic problems of its members. At the same time, the West no longer really exists on the international level, Trump having shattered the concept, as the United States now recognizes Europe as more decadent competitors.

While China is now an unavoidable partner, the question for many countries is how they can try to improve their relationship with the United States without giving up the opportunities offered by Beijing. The United States is aware that if they put too much pressure on the continent, some countries risk turning to Beijing, as is the case with Brazil, which now depends much more on China for its trade and even its investments. Lula made this clear to Trump during negotiations with the United States on customs duties. For this reason, the United States refrain from entering into an open and generalized war with China in Latin America, while trying to find a modus vivendi with this country on the international level.

Nor should geographical realities be overlooked, as they play a dominant role in the position of countries vis-à-vis the United States. The closer a country geographically is to the United States, the greater the American cultural and economic influence. Mexico, 83% of whose external trade relations are with the United States, has been obliged to increase customs duties on Chinese products to the same level as those imposed by the United States due to its dependence on the American economy. South American countries have much more freedom of action for the moment.

Today, more than ever, strengthening relations between Latin America and Europe is becoming vital for both regions. Latin American countries view the Sino-American confrontation on the continent with concern and are all seeking, from Lula to Milei to Claudia Sheinbaum, to strengthen their ties with Europe. But will Europe seize this opportunity?

Copyright ADALBERTO ROQUE / AFP
The Venezuelan flag is waved by Cubans, on January 3, 2026, in support of President Maduro.