Latin America at a Crossroads: a Turn to the Right?

Latin America had already generated much discussion in 2025, but 2026 opened with the extraordinary kidnapping of the Venezuelan president and his wife by American special forces. The continent, ignored by the United States since the end of the Cold War and rarely making headlines in Europe, suddenly found itself under the spotlight as Trump officially reappropriated the Monroe Doctrine, under which, in the 19th century, the United States declared opposition to the colonial ambitions of foreign powers on the continent. With the kidnapping of Maduro, Trump demonstrated that he was very serious about considering Latin America as a US preserve and an unscrupulous return to Cold War methods.

Conversely, are these reversals announcing a return to the torments in a new Cold War?

This two-part analysis of Latin America at a crossroads takes stock of the situation of a continent that has once again become central in global geopolitics. The first part examines the internal challenges facing the region: economic, security, and political. The second part looks at the consequences of the return of rivalries between major powers on the continent.

Latin America faces two major challenges: recovering the strong growth that one expects for middle-income countries and reducing the level of violence, which makes it the region with the highest homicide rate in the world. These two aspects are, moreover, not independent of each other: the level of violence significantly reduces growth potential. Voters, who are aware of this, have clearly shifted to the right since 2024, without this meaning, contrary to what is often quickly announced by the press, that the entire continent is veering to the far right.

Sluggish Economic Growth that Generates Little Income

Between 2014 and 2023, growth stagnated in Latin America at around 1.3% per year on average, while global growth was recorded at approximately 3%: the region is caught in what Anglo-Saxon economists describe as the "middle-income trap", a vicious circle that hampers growth and prevents middle-income countries from moving to the developed economy stage. In fact, the convergence of the region with developed countries, observed since 1950, has faded, and the gap today seems almost impossible to close. Since the 21st century, the continent has been the least performing of all emerging country groups. However, this hides a great diversity of economic performance, and since 2023, there has been a small glimmer of hope: growth, estimated at 2.4% in 2025, seems to have regained some momentum, although still below global growth, estimated at 3.3%.

In Venezuela, Chavez[1999-2013] wanted to correct the very high inequalities undermining the country with redistribution and easy money policies which proved completely ineffective and literally ruined the economy, plunging the country into hyperinflation. This resulted in a dramatic expansion of poverty. Under Cristina Kirchner[2007-2015], Argentina also saw the country's situation rapidly deteriorate after the implementation of populist policies financed by a budget deficit, itself fueled by monetary creation. Her presidency and that of the last Peronist government were marked by very high inflation and a dramatic increase in poverty. Bolivia is also in a very worrying economic situation. While in his early years the government of Evo Morales contributed to reducing inequalities and allowing a notable improvement in the situation of indigenous populations, his inability to manage macroeconomic balances and contain corruption gradually plunged the country into a very serious economic and political crisis. Nicaragua, for its part, is stagnating under the control of the dictator Daniel Ortega, which maintains its unenviable status as the poorest country on the continent (after Haiti). Finally, in a stagnant Cuba, the population no longer even has enough to eat.

Generally speaking, the continent has experienced significant deindustrialization which has not been compensated for by equivalent growth in the service sector. The region is increasingly dependent on its exports of raw materials and agricultural products, with the exception of Mexico which, thanks to its proximity to the United States, has been able to protect its industrial sector. Despite a relatively well-educated population for the income level of these countries, the productivity of their economies remains low. The size of the informal sector is significant and is increasing rather than decreasing. Left-wing or center-left governments in the 2000s strove to reduce inequalities and achieved partial success, especially in improving the situation of indigenous populations, a crying issue in many countries. But they were unable to revive growth, with the exception of Lula's second term in Brazil, which pursued very centrist and liberal policies. However, the continent is incredibly rich in raw materials, many of which are essential for the global energy transition, such as lithium. The region also has extremely dynamic and innovative companies: the Argentinian Mercado Libre in the Southern Cone region of Austral South America, the Brazilian energy giant Petrobraz, or the Mexican telecommunications monster FEMSA. However, they remain the exception, especially when comparing their position with companies in East Asia.

The result is significant discontent among the populations regarding the economic situation and the slow erosion of the middle class, which gives rise to weariness with left-wing policies deemed ineffective and pushes voters towards ousting incumbents, known in French as dégagisme (clear off-ism).

Violence that is Stabilizing but Spreading Geographically

Following the disappointing results of a stunted economy, the spreading of violence is the second major concern of Latin American populations in a region that accounts for 8% of the global population and around 30% of reported homicides worldwide. Of course, not all countries are affected in the same way, but there is no doubt that violence is spreading geographically. Organized crime, particularly drug trafficking, is responsible for most of the violence. The region has not only seen record cocaine production in recent years, but also the very rapid development of synthetic drugs produced mainly in Mexico: a real drug consumption epidemic in the United States of America combined with rising use in Europe and, increasingly, in the Latin American region itself, creating a context conducive to the expansion of drug trafficking.

Although violence has stabilized in many countries since 2014, the year it reached an unprecedented peak, it remains at very high levels, the impacts of which are very significant on populations, especially the poorest. Colombia, for example, has seen the violence and power of the cartels seriously decrease since the years of Pablo Escobar, but new cartels are appearing, fragmented but virulent, such as the "Clan del Golfo", which operate through transnational networks with Mexican or Brazilian cartels. Recent years have also seen a slight decrease in violence in Mexico.

Despite stabilizing levels of violence, the number of countries impacted by high levels of violence and regions affected within them is constantly increasing. New cartels have formed and solidified in Ecuador, Peru, and Brazil. In the latter country, the Primeiro Comando da Capital cartel, little known outside its borders just three years ago, is now active in Colombia, Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Bolivia. Venezuelan cartels have also extended their activities, particularly in Chile and Colombia. Cartels now also operate in partnership with European mafias: an Albanian cartel is heavily involved in Ecuador, where it is said to have significant investments.

Cartels are also expanding their activities into all sorts of areas including racketeering, human trafficking, and real estate. In Mexico, drug traffickers have even become involved in controlling avocado production. In some cases, governments are involved, as was the case in Honduras and as is still the case in Venezuela. Countries still marginally affected by cartel violence, such as Uruguay, Chile, Costa Rica, and even the Rosario region in Argentina, are now being hit hard. An IMF study estimates that drug-trafficking-related violence costs the region 3% of its GDP.

Nayib Bukele's policy essentially consists of locking up all those suspected of belonging to a gang, closely or remotely, in mega-prisons without trial. This approach, which is legally very questionable as well as in terms of human rights, has made Bukele immensely popular in his country. In the last presidential elections in 2024, he achieved 84.65% of the votes. The dangers for democracy are obvious. Before the elections, Bukele led a change to the constitution to be able to run again and also removed the limits on the number of times a president can be re-elected. Since then, "the Bukele method" has made its mark, and all governments, left and right, that have attacked gangs have recognized a certain validity in his model. This goes to show how desperate politicians and populations are in the face of the situation.

The Great Shift to the Right

It is in this context that since 2024, right-wing parties have been racking up victory after victory. The most recent, in November 2025, is the victory of José Antonio Kast, who led a far-right, anti-migrant campaign highly focused on security and the inefficiencies of the Chilean economy. His praise for Augusto Pinochet, the dictator who ruled the country from 1973 to 1990 and is known for widespread human rights violations and a bloody repression of dissent, proved embarrassing but did not prevent him from winning the election in the second round. He even managed a comfortable victory of 58% against Jeannette Jara, from the Communist Party and heir to the outgoing president Gabriel Boric, unable to stand for re-election. Boric disappointed many and, during the last years of his mandate, his popularity rating reached its lowest point. He had a great deal of difficulty implementing his program due to opposition to his reforms in Parliament, and insecurity had progressed rapidly in the country during his time in power.

In the presidential elections of August 2025, Bolivia ended 20 years of MAS domination (Movimiento al Socialismo), a party created by Evo Morales. He’s an emblematic figure of the Latin American left, who, during his first term as president, had become very popular as a result of his efforts to further include the indigenous population, from which he himself comes, in the Bolivian economy and institutions. These efforts were met with some success, but subsequently the regime took an authoritarian turn, with repeated corruption scandals and internal divisions causing the MAS to fall apart, and a serious economic crisis ending its popular support. The new center-right president, Rodrigo Paz, wants to mark the break with MAS but is faced with a very difficult macroeconomic situation.

In Argentina, the legislative elections in October considerably strengthened the position of the party of Javier Milei, the self-proclaimed ultraliberal "anarcho-capitalist" president. He is now in a position to attempt to pass the structural reforms essential for the second phase of his program for stabilizing and reviving the Argentine economy. In Venezuela, had the elections not been rigged, Nicolas Maduro would have largely lost against the center-right candidate Edmundo Gonzales, who replaced the Nobel Peace Prize winner Maria Corina Machado, banned from running in the elections by the Maduro government. In Honduras, the outgoing left-wing party painfully obtained 19% of the votes, and the two right-wing candidates each obtained 40% of the votes, a massive rejection for the outgoing president. Ecuador comfortably re-elected its right-wing president and friend of Donald Trump, Daniel Noboa. Finally, in Costa Rica, where presidential elections are scheduled for 2026, the center-right candidate is currently in the lead. As for Colombia, where the first phase of the presidential elections is scheduled for May 31, 2026, it is currently too early to make a prediction. However, given the unpopularity of the outgoing president Gustavo Petro, who belongs to the left-wing group "el Pacto Historico" but cannot stand for re-election according to the Colombian constitution, the left will have great difficulty staying in power.

In Uruguay, Yamandu Orsi, a center-left candidate, was elected without great difficulty to succeed a center-right government in 2024. Finally, in Brazil, where presidential elections are scheduled for 2026, Lula is currently largely ahead in voting intentions. It is true that Brazil has managed to generate average growth of 3% over the last three years, which is a very good result for this country. During his last presidential term, Luiz Inácio Lula, who represents the Workers' Party, pursued a very centrist and fiscally responsible policy.

This shift to the right is not ideological in nature. While cultural issues and moral conservatism have always played a role in elections on the continent, this time, it is above all frustrations concerning the economy and insecurity that have mattered. The continent therefore no longer seems to believe in left-wing populism, having been disappointed by the experiences of Venezuela, but also of Argentina under Cristina Kirchner, Bolivia, and Ecuador during the period of President Correa. Voters seem to be considering more liberal policies to boost the economy, and they clearly trust the right more to respond to security challenges.

Even if this shift is not ideological, it leads to a certain number of observations:

Firstly, a taboo seems to have been lifted on the way politicians can talk about the military dictatorships of the Cold War period. Until relatively recently, it was taboo to rehabilitate the memory of the military dictators who raged everywhere in the 1980s. Today, this seems accepted. Bolsonaro, during the elections that brought him to the presidency in Brazil, had already praised the Brazilian military dictatorship. Javier Milei constantly recalls that the military dictatorship and its supporters also suffered and maintains that Kast was elected by praising the merits of Pinochet's dictatorship. This is relatively new in Latin America and is not so different from what we see in the United States or Europe.

Secondly, in countries where evangelical churches have a significant amount of power, such as in Brazil or in Central American countries, moral issues and cultural wars remain important and influence elections in favor of conservative parties. Evangelical churches, however, are expanding across the continent, so moral issues are unlikely to disappear from the political landscape.

Fourthly, the press tends to shine the spotlight on the populist right, which has largely supplanted the populist left in the field of information and buzz. Brian Winter, one of the most prominent Latin America specialists and editor of the magazine American Quarterly, published a long article in the latest issue of Foreign Policy with an interesting observation: between 1959, when he took power in Havana, until his death in 2015, Fidel Castro was by far the most iconic personality in Latin America. He was the figure who made the front page of magazines, the reference for the strong, charismatic man. Today, the two leaders making the headlines are Javier Milei and Nayib Bukele, two extremely popular leaders located on the far right of the political spectrum. This is not to say, however, that the majority of the Latin American population supports extremism.

Finally, some analysts have seen the hand of the United States behind this shift to the right. The American government indeed supported Javier Milei during the mid-term elections by coming to the rescue of the peso, which risked collapsing on the eve of the legislative election. Trump also verbally supported his favorite candidate, Nasry Asfura, in the presidential elections in Honduras, threatening the country with cutting US support if he was not elected. However, the shift to the right on the continent is essentially endogenous, and the position of Donald Trump, who is far from popular on the continent, does not seem to have played a role.

An important fact to emphasize: the elections in 2024 and 2025 went well, with the exception of Venezuela, and democratic institutions seem to manage these different transitions with relatively little violence and protest. Even Kast, the far-right president elected in Chile, congratulated his electoral opponent in his victory speech, even though she belongs to the Communist Party, and recalled the importance of democracy and the rule of law, indicating a maturity of the region's democratic institutions. Despite Trump's threats, Bolsonaro's insurrection trial did take place in Brazil. In Argentina, former president Cristina Kirchner was convicted of mass corruption. The same cannot be said of their great neighbor to the north, the United States.

Milei seems to have understood this and has been seeking compromises since the last legislative elections, while Kast gave a very moderate victory speech. The arrival of market-friendly governments that seek to revive growth and are fiscally responsible (which is also the case for left-wing governments like Lula's in Brazil) gives hope that the continent can finally find a path toward more solid and sustainable growth.

Copyright image : Eitan ABRAMOVICH / AFP
Jose Antonio Kast in Santiago, Chile, on 14 December 2025.