Industrial Sovereignty: Reuse, a Decisive Lever for Europe

Europe must face the obvious: it is dependent on external sources for its supply of critical raw materials and strategic components. As a result, its industrial value chains are vulnerable, as recent crises have shown, from the Covid-19 pandemic to the war in Ukraine. The energy transition, although vital, is exacerbating this pressure: batteries, semiconductors, digital equipment... all rely on materials that we do not control in terms of volume or origin.

Faced with this situation, responses are being organized, but according to an incomplete "software." Public policies and industrial strategies favor two reflexes: the relocation of new production and the recycling of materials. Very little, if anything, is said about the primary levers of action in the circular economy: prevention and reuse. These strategies, which are nevertheless a priority in the hierarchy of "R" and now recognized by the ISO 59004:2024 standard, remain largely underutilized. Yet they are essential for building a post-fossil fuel economy that is sober and resilient.

Public policies and industrial strategies favor two reflexes: the relocation of new production and the recycling of materials.

His vision is relevant, but suffers from a blind spot shared by many decision-makers: reuse is not included in the range of industrial solutions. Recycling, commonly associated with circular policies, is systematically cited. Reuse, on the other hand, remains invisible. However, if the aim is to "develop exploitation on our soil," why not include the exploitation of the resources we already have? Reuse means extracting without digging.

In the major European legislation seeking to reduce Europe's strategic dependence (Green Deal, Critical Raw Materials Act, European Chips Act), reuse appears only marginally, if at all, and then only in a symbolic capacity. Public investment also remains focused primarily on disruptive innovation and new production technologies or recycling, leaving little room for the emergence of a genuine economic sector for reuse.

The Reuse Economy represents a strategic opportunity for Europe

It makes it possible to reduce the footprint of materials and critical dependencies, relocate added value, and decarbonize our industrial base without waiting until 2040. It is based on skills and know-how that already exist, are developing, and can be activated quickly. In short, it is a concrete operational lever for building sustainable European sovereignty. This "Reuse Economy" approach is particularly well suited to batteries and semiconductors.

Reuse Economy: Defining an Industrial Strategy for Sustainability

The Reuse Economy encompasses all activities, infrastructure, and value chains that aim to maximize the lifespan of products and materials by promoting their multiple use rather than single use, their reuse rather than their immediate destruction or recycling.

This model is based on a three-pronged operational approach:

• design for multiple use (ease of disassembly, modularity, standardization, etc.),
• efficient logistics and collection services (return, recharging, pooling, etc.),
• and refurbishment operations (cleaning, repair, reassignment, reconditioning, remanufacturing, etc.).

The Reuse Economy is part of the 9R approach and the resource management recommendations defined by the ISO 59004:2024 standard on the circular economy, which distinguishes several levels of action: refuse, rethink, reduce, repair, reuse, refurbish, etc. Within the framework of the 9R theory, the Reuse Economy primarily brings together strategies for smarter use of resources and extending the life of products, corresponding to actions R1 to R7: rethink, reuse, repair, recondition, remanufacture, etc. These are concrete levers, often overlooked, that make it possible to avoid extraction or new production while preserving a high level of functional value. Whereas recycling simply keeps materials in the system, reuse preserves the performance, use, and embedded intelligence of components, thereby extending their direct contribution to economic activity.

The "Reuse Economy" is not a model that needs to be created from scratch: it already exists in many industrial and logistics sectors - from wooden pallets to returnable glass bottles, pharmaceutical shuttle crates, reusable industrial packaging, and reconditioned electronic equipment. But it remains marginal, scattered, and often invisible, as it is fragmented into a plurality of technical terms that we have just listed: reuse, repurposing, reconditioning, remanufacturing, reallocation, etc.

In a context of growing tensions in supply chains, the Reuse Economy is an immediately available lever for strengthening the industrial sovereignty of France and Europe. It makes it possible to:

• reduce pressure on critical resources,
• decarbonize production by avoiding unnecessary extraction and remanufacturing,
• relocate industrial jobs,
• generate economic activity in regions, often non-relocatable.

Whereas recycling simply keeps materials in the system, reuse preserves the performance, use, and embedded intelligence of components, thereby extending their direct contribution to economic activity.

Batteries: a Lever for Energy and Functional Sovereignty

The battery sector perfectly illustrates the strategic potential of reuse as conceived in this way.

Demand for batteries is growing exponentially in Europe, driven mainly by the electrification of transport. By 2025, sales of battery-powered electric cars are expected to grow by 40 to 67%, according to estimates. This industrial momentum is accelerating pressure on the supply chains for critical metals-lithium, nickel, cobalt, manganese-which are essential for the manufacture of lithium-ion batteries.

European supply remains insufficient to meet this demand. In 2023, the European Union imported €27 billion worth of batteries, exceeding its domestic production (€24 billion). Around 90% of imports come from three Asian partners, with China alone accounting for 87% of European imports: such geographical concentration creates a major strategic dependency, which is all the more problematic given that the majority of the active materials needed to produce batteries also come from China.

The risks identified are manifold: vulnerability to geopolitical tensions, instability of raw material prices, difficulty in guaranteeing a secure and sustainable supply, and finally, a high carbon footprint linked to the transport and production of components abroad.

To mitigate these risks, the European Union has adopted a series of industrial and legislative measures, including the Net Zero Industry Act (NZIA), which states in particular that " the aim would be (...) to ensure that nearly 90% of the Union's annual demand for batteries is met by Union manufacturers by 2030, or support for Projects of Common European Interest (PIIEC) for the construction of mega-factories for battery production, and the Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA), which sets targets for diversifying and securing supplies, and whose Article 26 of Chapter 5 explicitly recognizes the importance of reuse: Member States are called upon to adopt national measures promoting the repair and reuse of products containing critical raw materials. It even paves the way for the introduction of financial incentives-discounts, bonuses, deposit systems-to encourage the collection, reuse, and repurposing of these products.

Yet all of these texts, however ambitious they may be, will only have an impact in the medium to long term. Without delay, Europe can-and must-activate an immediate lever of industrial resilience: the reuse of batteries, thanks to already established players, existing technologies, and industrial uses.

Battery reuse involves collecting used batteries, testing and reconditioning their cells, then reallocating them for the same use or integrating them into new, adapted systems. This practice saves critical materials, limits the carbon footprint of new battery production, and creates local industrial activity with high added value.

Around 90% of imports come from three Asian partners, with China alone accounting for 87% of European imports: such geographical concentration creates a major strategic dependency.

French companies such as Re-Lion Factory recondition lithium-ion cells for various applications, ranging from consumer electronics to industrial solutions. In addition to avoiding the importation of new cells, their solutions are less expensive than new ones. Renault's Advanced Battery Storage program assembles second-life batteries to create installations capable of storing electricity on a large scale and restoring it as needed, thus contributing to grid balancing.

However, these applications face a number of technical, economic, and regulatory challenges that must be addressed in order to realize their full potential: the lack of standardization of battery and BMS (Battery Management Systems) technologies, which poses compatibility issues; the non-linear aging of batteries, which creates uncertainty about the actual available supply; and the business model. These very real obstacles call for structural responses, but they should not obscure the potential for rapid growth in this sector.

To this end, the industrial and portable battery segment is interesting to observe. Still relatively unknown, it accounts for the majority of batteries in France in terms of tonnage and covers a wide range of key equipment and applications: payment terminals, backup power supplies, micro-mobility, electric shutters, gardening tools, etc. This market is less competitive, easier to industrialize, and often more profitable, as in many cases the batteries are reused for constant use. This is precisely what the French company VoltR, founded in 2022, is developing, reconditioning and redeploying these batteries to the same market segments. This approach offers manufacturers a simple, immediate, and resilient solution to the vagaries of globalized supply chains. This segment, which is still relatively unexplored, could become a major industrial relay for securing key uses and developing a sovereign battery supply.

Semiconductors: Europe's Digital Achilles Heel

From cars to satellites, drones to smartphones, data centers to artificial intelligence applications, semiconductors have become the foundation of all modern technologies. Their consumption is skyrocketing, driven by the accelerated digitization of our societies, industrial automation, and the energy transition. In 2021 alone, more than 1,150 billion electronic chips were produced worldwide-a figure that is expected to grow by another 30% by 2030. Despite this phenomenon, Europe remains extremely dependent on imports for its semiconductor supply. It accounts for only 10% of global production and depends on Asian countries for more than 90% of its most advanced chips. This dependence concerns not only manufacturing, which is mainly located in Taiwan and South Korea, but also the upstream part of the chain: the extraction and processing of raw materials (silicon, rare earths, gallium, germanium), in which China holds a dominant share.

The Covid-19 pandemic has highlighted this vulnerability, which is further exacerbated by growing geopolitical tensions. The slightest logistical incident, regional conflict, or export restriction can lead to supply disruptions affecting entire sectors: automotive, defense, healthcare, and telecommunications. In a war context, this fragility becomes a strategic security issue. The case of kamikaze drones, which are used extensively in Ukraine-more than 4 million per year-is a striking illustration of this: each device contains a microcomputer, often imported, whose massive loss creates a continuous need for expensive and vulnerable equipment.

To address these challenges, in 2022 the European Union launched the European Chips Act, which aims to double Europe's share of global semiconductor production by 2030. This text of legislation mobilizes billions of euros in public and private investment, supports the establishment of new factories (such as those of Intel and STMicroelectronics), and aims to secure value chains. It mentions the need to improve the reliability and sustainability of components-in particular through the certification of "trusted chips"-but makes no reference to reuse as an industrial strategy, even though this is essential to complement this approach.

The effects of this policy will only be visible in the medium term, and we must preserve our sovereignty over the most critical technologies today: cybersecurity, defense, space, and quantum computing. As with batteries, another complementary strategy can be activated: the reuse of electronic components. In 2022, nearly 80% of waste electrical and electronic equipment was discarded worldwide-computers, phones, vehicles, drones, etc. Yet they contain components that are still fully functional: processors, memory, motherboards.

Reuse in semiconductors is still in its infancy: there is no structured industry yet, and use cases are more experimental than industrialized. Electronic components are not designed to be disassembled, requalified, or reused individually, which greatly limits their potential for reuse.

From cars to satellites, drones to smartphones, data centers to artificial intelligence applications, semiconductors have become the foundation of all modern technologies.

The prototype achieves a circularity rate of 70% by reusing motherboards, processors, and memory from discarded electronic products.

Although still marginal, this type of approach opens up a range of possibilities for certain less critical uses or in wartime contexts, such as military drones.

This development imposes a twofold requirement. In the short term, eco-design work must be undertaken to enable the dismantling of components on motherboards for reuse. In the medium term, it is essential to structure dedicated industrial R&D so that components are designed to be eligible for reuse from the outset.

This industrial engineering work paves the way for a complementary approach: it is not a question of replacing all new production, but of recognizing that the reuse of motherboards today-and components tomorrow-can become a major pillar of our industrial resilience strategy.

Making the Reuse Economy a Fully-Fledged Industrial Policy

Neither a single solution nor a panacea, the Reuse Economy is now emerging as a strategic, concrete, and immediately actionable lever that needs to be strengthened. It enables us to build industrial autonomy based on usage, extending the life of products and components, and the rational use of what we already have.

In a context where new production remains slow to activate and costly, and where recycling involves heavy processing that only recovers part of the material, reuse offers a third way: faster, more economical, and more resilient. It makes it possible to preserve the industrial and functional value of components or products, reduce critical dependencies, relocate activity, and create skilled jobs.

This approach is already in use in several sectors, such as batteries and electronic components, but it remains marginal. Thousands of parts, products, and skills lie dormant on our soil. The real waste today would be not to mobilize them.

It is time to fully recognize the Reuse Economy as a pillar of our economic and industrial sovereignty strategy. This requires a systemic transformation at the European level: a regulatory framework that sets clear reuse targets; investment plans on a par with those devoted to innovation or recycling. Reuse must therefore be fully integrated into initiatives such as France 2030, which are still too focused on new production or recycling.

It is also essential to enshrine this ambition in future policies, particularly in the national circularity plan that Member States must draw up in accordance with Article 26 of the Critical Raw Materials Act-a project currently underway in France, where it will be essential to ensure a structural focus on reuse. The revision of the European Chip Regulation scheduled for mid-2026 also represents a major opportunity to include reuse, which is currently absent from this strategic text.

In addition to this, work must be done on design and standardization to facilitate disassembly and reparability, targeted investments, exemplary public procurement, structured and coordinated sectors, etc.

It is time to fully recognize the Reuse Economy as a pillar of our economic and industrial sovereignty strategy. This requires a systemic transformation at the European level.

We must affirm that a resilient economy will not be built solely with new products, but with what we already have in our hands-and that we must learn to make it last, rather than sending it prematurely for recycling or shredding.

Copyright image : Sameer Al-DOUMY / AFP
A CO2 capture site in Haut-Lieu.