A Geopolitical Summer, from Turnberry to Tianjin

The expanded summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) on August 30-31 in Tianjin, followed by the grand military parade in Beijing marking the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II in Asia, marked the conclusion of a very geopolitical summer. In the preceding weeks, there were major developments regarding Ukraine (the Anchorage and then Washington meetings) and Gaza (a French-Saudi initiative, and an imminent Israeli assault on Gaza City), not to mention the European Union’s capitulation to American tariffs during the July 27 meeting in Turnberry, on Donald Trump’s golf course in Scotland.

China in Majesty, Russia Reinforced, India Multi-Aligned

It’s the final part of this sequence-the recent Chinese summits-that deserves closer attention. What first struck observers was the "family photo" of Eurasian leaders gathered in Tianjin. Alongside Central Asian leaders-somewhat hostages to the format- and without forgetting Robert Fico, in the role of the traitor on duty, stood the great powers: Vladimir Putin (Russia), Xi Jinping (China), Narendra Modi (India), and Massoud Pezeshkian (Iran). We must also note the invited guests: Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Egypt’s Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, and Indonesia’s President Prabowo Subianto. The latter is especially noteworthy: he had initially planned not to attend, but changed his mind at the last minute, despite pressing domestic issues that could have justified his absence. Viktor Orbán, a key Chinese ally in Europe, would no doubt have liked to be there too, but feared provoking Donald Trump’s wrath. He nonetheless sent a ministerial representative.

Commentators rightly highlighted the anti-Western tone of the summit’s declarations-primarily from Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, who portrayed the Tianjin consortium as a potential alternative to the U.S.-dominated international order established in 1945, which they view as perpetuating the Cold War. But what does this alternative actually consist of? It’s not entirely clear. The summit’s official declarations were filled with platitudes on everything from development to AI and ecology, without offering any concrete or coherent alternative vision.

If one seeks something "tangible" from Tianjin, it lies in the supposed agreement-pending Chinese confirmation-between Beijing and Moscow to build a second pipeline from Russia to China, increasing Chinese access to Russian hydrocarbons - for more on this, see the piece by Joseph Delatte and Rosalie Klein on Montaigne’s website. This project had long been pushed by the Russians, while the Chinese had remained reluctant. Its realization would further deepen Russia’s economic dependency on China. Politically, after being seen around the world cheerfully chatting with Xi and Modi, and having been recently welcomed with honors by Trump in Alaska, Vladimir Putin can only be pleased with the symbolic rebuke this represents to Western attempts to isolate him. Another "tangible" concern: Iran’s leadership may feel emboldened to resist Western pressure to abandon its nuclear program.

As recently as July 2023, while holding the rotating SCO presidency, Modi opted for a virtual summit, avoiding displays of friendship. The Chinese didn’t take it well-Xi Jinping even boycotted the September 2023 G20 summit in New Delhi. Since then, Donald Trump has been re-elected to the White House. Xi visited both New Delhi and Modi’s hometown in September 2024, and Modi returned the visit to Beijing and Xi’s birthplace in May this year.

Why is India warming to China? The most immediate reason seems obvious: Trump’s 50% tariffs, his boast of brokering a truce between India and Pakistan (which Modi found humiliating), and the warming ties between Islamabad and Washington. But deeper reasons exist. For years, Christophe Jaffrelot, an expert affiliated with the Institut Montaigne, has argued that India’s economic dependence on China would likely force a détente. However, in early August, Indian analyst C. Raja Mohan still advocated for "strategic patience" toward the U.S., seen as India’s natural partner. Now, other Indian voices are striking a different tone: beyond tariffs, U.S.-India ties are expected to harden due to shifts in global value chains, declining U.S. investment in India, and tightening immigration rules. Furthermore, Modi cannot ignore the possibility of being sidelined in a Trump deal with Putin-or with Xi. Meanwhile, he has no intention of ceasing imports of Russian hydrocarbons, as Trump demands. India is doubling down on a strategy of "multi-alignment."

Shifting Global Equilibriums

How should we interpret the events in China? Many French commentators, skeptical of the BRICS’ cohesion, also doubt the impact of the Eurasian spectacle staged by the Chinese. No one denies that Trump’s strategy has, for now, driven India to flirt with the other side, distanced other natural U.S. partners (like Indonesia), and ultimately strengthened China. Yet the structural fissures remain: the India-China rivalry won’t disappear; Russia will eventually tire of its dependence on Beijing; and others will grow wary of Chinese hegemony. In short, Xi’s late-summer entourage does not make for a solid alliance. This is also the view of Cold War historian Sergey Radchenko, as published in Foreign Policy.

The BRICS-originally a Russian idea (first ministerial meeting in 2006 at the UN General Assembly)-may not have many concrete achievements, but they have proven crucial in breaking Russia’s isolation after the annexation of Crimea and even more so after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Without Chinese and Indian energy purchases, North Korean and Iranian military support, and general goodwill from the Global South, Putin wouldn’t be able to sustain the war in Ukraine year after year.

Second, the SCO summit gains further meaning when seen in conjunction with the September 2 military parade in Beijing. Modi had left the stage, but the Putin-Xi duo was joined by North Korea’s Kim Jong-Un. As analyzed by our colleague Mathieu Duchâtel in Expressions, the event makes clear that China is seriously preparing for a potential "special military operation" against Taiwan-even if it ultimately hopes to achieve its goals without actual military conflict. China may be creating the kind of political environment that, in a Taiwan or South China Sea crisis, would shield it from true isolation-perhaps a UN General Assembly condemnation, but with a slim majority due to China’s global clout. Like Russia, China could count on a broad base of friendly or neutral states.

The Trump Strategy Paradox

In the end, the Tianjin and Beijing show highlights a shift in global power dynamics to the detriment of Trumpian America-not exactly isolationist, but on a path to being more isolated than China, which formally has no allies.

But the true Trumpian paradox lies elsewhere: while weakening the U.S. in global balances, Trump is making his allies more dependent on his whims. As Alain Frachon noted in Le Monde (September 4), the EU’s acceptance of 15% tariffs largely stems from its dependence on the U.S. to avoid disaster in Ukraine. This encourages Washington to make further demands-such as regulating tech giants (GAFA) or boosting EU reliance on U.S. defense industries and its "protector/racketeer." For now, thanks to France and the UK, Europe has reentered the Ukraine discussion through its "security guarantees" initiative. But Ukraine’s fate-and European security-remain tied to an erratic American strategy. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s defenses, under heavy Russian assault, especially on Kyiv, urgently need reinforcement.

The Palestinian Authority pledged elections within a year, and key Arab states demanded Hamas’s departure from Gaza and its demilitarization. This renders Netanyahu’s accusation-that recognizing Palestine rewards Hamas-absurd.

What’s true, however, is that the initiative’s future depends on a ceasefire-and, immediately, the cancellation of Israel’s impending assault on Gaza City, which could have disastrous effects in humanitarian terms and crush hopes for peace. Only the Trump administration can rein in Netanyahu. And here we return to the Trump paradox once more.

Vladimir Putin at a press conference in Beijing, September 3, 2025.
Copyright Sergei BOBYLYOV / POOL / AFP.