Taiwan: Rhetorical Battles and Military Tensions

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Resident Senior Fellow and Director of International Studies

People’s Liberation Army’s air and naval activities surrounding Taiwan have been constant in the Strait since 2020. Some observers argue that each peak of activity leads the two sides closer to a major clash, while other argue that China is using military power to create the conditions for a Taiwanese surrender without a fight. The January presidential election, which saw the victory of Lai Ching-te, did not lead so far to the sharp increase in Chinese military pressure that some had feared. However, PLA military activity remains high and could increase after the U.S. elections in November.

Even though Lai’s party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), lost its majority in parliament and despite the polarization of Taiwan’s democracy, Lai governs based on an internal consensus with the opposition on the reality of Taiwan’s sovereignty. His October 10 speech, celebrating the 113th National Day of the Republic of China in Taiwan, was relatively well-received in the ranks of the opposition, as it was seen as a search for internal consensus on cross-strait relations and national identity. However, China’s policy is detached from the internal realities of Taiwan’s domestic politics, and intimidation has become part of a "new normal" in the Taiwan Strait, echoing a term frequently used by Xi Jinping. Current maneuvers are less intense though than during the summer of 2022, when large scale exercises followed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and were justified by Beijing as retaliation against U.S. Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan.

Joint Sword 2024-B

The October 14 exercises reflect two aspects of the use of coercion in China’s Taiwan policy.
First, military coercion was always an element of China’s Taiwan policy, but it has significantly grown in relative importance since 2020. Chinese naval and air forces operate around Taiwan without entering its airspace or territorial waters. The goal is political (maintaining pressure on Taiwan’s political and military authorities), military (preparing for potential attack), and psychological (convincing Taiwan and the international community that China is willing to bear the cost of a war). These operations also serve a domestic purpose, given the importance of patriotic mobilization for regime security in the People’s Republic of China.

First, military coercion was always an element of China’s Taiwan policy, but it has significantly grown in relative importance since 2020.

Second, Joint Sword 2024-B follows Joint Sword 2024-A, conducted in May after Lai’s inauguration. The exercise signals a response to President Lai’s National Day Address, which celebrates the 113th anniversary of the founding of the Republic of China in 1911, after the fall of the Qing dynasty.

Lai predictably reaffirmed Taiwan’s sovereignty and sought internal consensus by acknowledging that Taiwanese society supports sovereignty regardless of their language preferences -"Taiwan," "The Republic of China," or "The Republic of China, Taiwan". Although Lai’s embrace of the Republic of China terminology could have been seen as conciliatory, Beijing instead chose to interpret it as a provocation and responded, albeit with limited force. China's strategy is clear - any mention of Taiwan's sovereignty, regardless of the choice of words, is treated as a destabilizing provocation or even as evidence that the Taiwanese government has a hidden pro-independence agenda. This time, Beijing has refused to see Lai’s unusual and heavy emphasis on the history of the Republic of China as an attempt to manage security in the Taiwan Strait responsibly and create some space for cross-strait common ground, based on a reinforced internal consensus in Taiwan. Notably, China overlooks the political history of the DPP: recognizing the legitimacy of the Republic of China’s constitution was a significant shift for a party that initially viewed it as a post-colonial imposition on Taiwanese society.

The fact that the exercise lasted only 13 hours suggests that its primary purpose was political signaling rather than war preparation or operational learning. Taiwanese military analysts noted however the importance of "cold start" this time - initiating an exercise without preparatory deployments signaling to the US and Taiwan’s detection capabilities what China was preparing. While Chinese air activity in Taiwan’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ) has reached a one-day peak during Joint Sword 2024-B, and cyberattacks also increased in intensity by comparison with previous exercises, Beijing has refrained from conducting ballistic missile tests this time. Chinese naval vessels have also stayed outside Taiwan's contiguous zone (within 24 nautical miles of its coastline). However, China’s use of Coast Guard vessels is concerning. One Coast Guard ship was spotted 30 nautical miles of Taichung port, while another was 35 nautical miles of Kaohsiung port - way too far to threaten port activity, but close enough to signal threatening intentions. By deploying the Coast Guards instead of naval forces, China seeks to frame these operations as legitimate police actions within Chinese territory rather than military coercion. This pattern is consistent with China's behavior over the past decade in the South China Sea and around the Senkaku Islands, disputed with Japan.

US-China relations and security in the Taiwan Strait: China’s "co-management" dream

In January 2024, Institut Montaigne’s policy paper on scenarios of Chinese coercion in the Taiwan Strait in 2024-2028 highlighted China’s preference for coercive strategies against Taiwan. The two scenarios presented in the report are unfolding before our eyes. China is probing ways to erode Taiwan’s effective sovereignty while increasingly turning to "lawfare" as a strategic tool. China appears to be testing Taiwan’s response to Coast Guard operations. Off the coast of Fujian Province, in the restricted waters of Kinmen (where Taipei has not declared territorial waters but only a security perimeter for economic activities, as this maritime space is too close to the Chinese coast), the frequent deployment of Coast Guards since the beginning of 2024 maintains constant pressure on the Taiwanese authorities and creates risks of collision. On the lawfare front, Taiwanese activist Yang Chih-yuan was arrested for "separatism" and sentenced to nine years in prison in September, shortly after the Supreme People’s Court, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, the Ministry of Public Security, the Ministry of State Security, and the Ministry of Justice jointly issued the "Opinions on Lawfully Punishing Stubborn ‘Taiwan Independence’ Separatists and Inciting Separatist Crimes" in June 2024 - calling for harsh penalties, up to the death penalty.

The two scenarios presented in the report are unfolding before our eyes. China is probing ways to erode Taiwan’s effective sovereignty while increasingly turning to "lawfare" as a strategic tool.

China’s post-election strategy has two components. First, it seeks to delegitimize President Lai by portraying his statements as pro-independence, even though Lai is pro-status quo and cautious to strictly operate within the framework of the Republic of China’s constitution, without ever challenging it. Second, China’s focus is primarily on the United States, with its Taiwan policy best characterized as a pre-U.S. election strategy. For now, a fragile understanding exists between the two countries. During their November 2023 meeting in San Francisco, Xi Jinping was successfully reassured by the Biden administration of the US’s intention vis-à-vis Taiwan - at the minimum, he was convinced that there was no US support for Taiwan independence. In return, China signaled that it has no intention of pursuing unification by force in 2024. This meeting visibly eased tensions in the Taiwan Strait.

However, this understanding may not hold beyond the November 5 U.S. election. China is likely to recalibrate its Taiwan policy based on the evolving dynamics of U.S.-China relations. A key element of Beijing’s strategy has long been to engage with the U.S. administration to erode its commitment to Taiwan and scale back the ever-deepening defense ties between Washington and Taipei. Beijing seems to aim to replicate what it achieved in 2004-2005 when President George W. Bush dialed back support for Taiwan’s then-president Chen Shui-bian, and adopted a clear anti-independence posture - a period which some Chinese experts refer to as US-China "co-management" of the Taiwan issue. Today, co-management is rejected by the Biden administration, both as a term and as a policy approach

In the United States, there appears to be a bipartisan consensus on the need for stable support for Taiwan. However, Beijing hopes that Donald Trump might be open to a "deal," or that Kamala Harris, overwhelmed by crises involving Russia, Iran, and North Korea, may adopt a more cautious stance to avoid another crisis, thereby sowing doubt among the Taiwanese about the reliability of American protection.

Toward Taiwan, China’s messaging portrays the U.S. as recklessly exposing Taiwan to unnecessary risks. A new propaganda narrative has emerged since 2022, aiming to convince Taiwan that, just as NATO’s eastward expansion allegedly triggered Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, increased U.S. military presence in the Indo-Pacific could lead to a similar outcome for Taiwan. This is the meaning of the "NATO-ization of the Asia-Pacific" that Chinese defense diplomacy has emphasized at the Shangri La dialogue in Singapore since 2023. While this propaganda has not significantly swayed public opinion on the island, it is not without impact in some circles-demoralizing Taiwan is precisely the intended objective.

Taiwan’s responses

Alongside its narrative aimed at the Taiwanese, Beijing is also waging a battle for international public opinion, with the goal of convincing both Taiwan and the global community that the new president is a dangerous separatist willing to destabilize the entire region. Additionally, Beijing argues that Resolution 2758 of the United Nations General Assembly (Restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations) has definitively resolved the issue of China's sovereignty over Taiwan under international law-despite the fact that the resolution does not even mention Taiwan.

No one expects the People’s Republic of China to acknowledge the existence of Republic of China, but instead of easing tensions, Beijing has chosen to remain rigid, opting systematically for inflexibility.

Taiwanese authorities are actively working to counter these narratives. The speech delivered on October 10 reflected this effort. While Lai’s emphasis on the Republic of China may be interpreted as a rhetorical shift from "One China, one Taiwan" back to "two Chinas", it also represents a step toward the middle ground. No one expects the People’s Republic of China to acknowledge the existence of Republic of China, but instead of easing tensions, Beijing has chosen to remain rigid, opting systematically for inflexibility.

In this context, the visit to Europe by former President Tsai Ing-wen and her speech on October 14 in Prague at the Forum 2000 - where she reaffirmed that democracy is a "non-negotiable part" of who the Taiwanese are - serves as a way for Taiwan to draw international attention to the importance of resisting Chinese narratives about the current sources of military tensions.

On the military front, Taiwan has made a first visible display of its road-mobile anti-ship and air-defense missiles. While it is well known that Taiwan possesses and now likely mass-produces such weapons, the public demonstration sends a clear message: even in the worst-case scenario of massive strikes on Taiwan’s Navy, Air Force and command centers, Taiwan will retain the capacity to target any Chinese amphibious or airborne invasion.

Copyright image : Walid BERRAZEG / AFP