[Africa: Strategic Rivalries] - France in Limbo on the African Continent

On August 15, 2024, the French authorities celebrated the eightieth anniversary of the Provence landings, paying tribute to the African soldiers who fought to liberate Nazi-occupied France. "Africa’s contribution to France is a legacy that we cannot ignore", said the president of the French Republic, accompanied by Cameroonian President Paul Biya. "France had forgotten us, but they’re making up for lost time", Oumar Diémé, a former Senegalese rifleman, told AFP.

This celebration encapsulated France’s changing position: making political and commemorative efforts to improve and reshape France’s image on the African continent while remaining constrained by certain realities, such as the "exceptional" longevity of Cameroon’s president, who has been in power since 1975 and has served as president since 1982. The French authorities seem to have understood several of the lessons of the strategic upheavals that emerged after 2020, but many traps remain for a country sunk in an old policy and reluctant to part with it completely. Of course, not everything depends on France’s goodwill, and it seems necessary to act with the necessary realities in mind, but old reflexes persist. The "reset" has begun but is not yet complete. It is a process.

A Difficult Process of Updating...

Today, France has become rather discreet in its approach to the continent, which seems to be a very positive development. West Africa is a region in turmoil, so we have to wait for the tension to ease and to work behind the scenes. This seems to be the path chosen by France’s political leaders, who are less vocal, more defensive, and less inclined to blame others without engaging in self-reflection first. The president of the Republic is publicly involved in other issues, more European and more Asian, while continuing to receive African leaders (Senegal, Central African Republic, Republic of Côte d’Ivoire...). High-level visits are continuing, which is a good thing for cooperation, without political pressure from all sides. The mission of the French president’s special envoy, Jean-Marie Bockel, is continuing, and consultations are underway. The National Assembly and the Senate are working to understand the issues at stake in France’s African policy, to listen to constructive criticism, and to identify ways of renewing broken ties and developing new ones. Awareness has been raised at all levels, leading to in-depth work. This is essential, even though it is by no means a guarantee against falling back into old patterns.

What does it wish to do about the expansion of Russian influence in the region? What do its military and security partners in African nations want? These are all questions that have yet to be resolved, caught between path dependence, the will to act and maintain leadership, and the difficulty of accepting new realities, however negative they may be. Yet, even if in several countries, it is essential to understand that political leaders and their new partners are sovereign, that the people must hold them solely responsible for the continuing deterioration, and that France has no higher responsibility to act.

Similarly, whether rational or ideological, relevant or irrelevant, several political debates regarding French resources continue to exist and must be taken into account:
1) The CFA franc is likely to be fully rejected by the Alliance of Sahel States (ASS) or other countries that seem to want to take up the issue (Senegal), even if the latter seem aware of the macroeconomic risks involved in an outright rejection of this currency. Transitional mechanisms are already in place to enable full governance by the countries of the region, without the oversight or interference of France, but other mechanisms must surely be devised, notably to harmonize the monetary policies of these countries. As long as the CFA remains at fixed parity with the euro, it will be denounced locally as a neocolonial currency, but as soon as it becomes floating against the euro, it risks a major devaluation. The latter could also easily no longer accept or guarantee the CFA’s foreign exchange reserves. The consequence of such a rupture would be an inflationary spiral with repercussions for foreign traders and investors such as France, but in terms of commercial realities, this would not constitute an economic tragedy for Paris. On the other hand, as most of these countries are major importers, particularly of food, they would immediately suffer an economic and food crisis. The dilemma is right there-economic, short term, and with no direct link to France. Avoiding such a crash will take time, especially given the hyperinflationary political and security situation in the region. In the meantime, a change of name would be a further symbolic step, and the transfer of CFA reserves to an African central bank would be likely to sever the link with France.

2) Military bases in Senegal, RCI, and Gabon are still questioned in public debate, and without a specific strategy to explain their role or usefulness, they are likely to end up being denounced. Reducing the volume of French forces is a good thing, as is sharing bases with African partners. However, the symbolism is persistent and can easily be used as leverage against France and the powers that be by France’s adversaries in the region. Only African bases, possibly with French training partners, are likely to minimize misunderstandings. The authorities of the countries concerned also seem to have a key role to play in raising awareness and explaining the need (or otherwise) for these military partnerships, so that the military presence is in line with local sovereignty and not perceived as a territorial and logistic support for a diffuse but overhanging French presence on the continent.

Germany’s initial stubbornness to hold on to Niger at all costs, which was eventually reversed, or Italy’s attempts to embark on a campaign of seduction, seem to ignore current realities. Once again, the nations of Europe are not demonstrating a high level of strategic analysis by seeking competing paths.

...While Positions are Fragile at this Political Juncture

Whether the French authorities like it or not, Pandora’s box was opened in 2020 on the initiative of France and Mali. From now on, the dynamic is political: Rightly or wrongly, Western democracies are being challenged by certain African partners, large sections of the African population, and opportunistic competitors. Even if this seems unfair or unjustified, given the efforts made by France and its allies on military, economic, and political fronts, it is imperative to move away from this vision in favor of a humble, agile, and determined stance.

Western democracies have faltered on the African continent because they represent the perfect scapegoats for a convenient diversion from the structural failings of the political authorities in several African countries (massive corruption, lack of political or economic inclusion, predation, and capture of the state...). However, if France has stumbled, it is because it has structural fragilities that are easy to exploit. By emerging from a form of denial or inaction on the following subjects, France will succeed in rebuilding a strong and attractive image for African political forces and peoples: visas; educational and university cooperation; attractiveness; work; toxicity of public and media speech...: all subjects that show France as a country closed to Africa and Africans (which is not, for example, the current image of the United States or the United Kingdom).

The degree of political and economic corruption of many African elites is not France’s responsibility, and respect for the rules of sovereignty means that French authorities have to deal with political systems that are not very democratic. This is a fact of international relations. The French authorities must defend and promote French interests, a mandate conferred by popular sovereignty, and the harsh reality of the world imposes itself. It’s all too easy to criticize France for been "too involved" or "not involved enough" with African leaders when it has only a relative influence on the course of events. This "colonial bias" is widely distributed across the French political spectrum.

The weight of its colonial history and the sins of "the Françafrique" oblige France to set a better example. This duty to high standards and excellence is also necessary to ensure consistency with the democratic and liberal values France defends throughout the world, a consistency that is not demanded of autocracies and dictatorships. This is a very important point, as it involves defending not only political models and values but also the rules-based international order. In this respect, we would point out that, despite their recent expansion, autocracies are relatively isolated on the international scene and have as their only allies certain powers in place in Africa that lack legitimacy among all or part of their populations.

Finally, the French position is all the more fragile for its lack of clarity on the security front. The question of military bases and the follow-up to Operation Barkhane is directly linked to France’s strategic analysis of the situation in West and Central Africa, as well as to the politico-military strategy that stems from it. The jihadist threat is spreading to the Sahel, which is in the throes of a triple civil war and is directly connected to the jihadist threat in Nigeria; interstate tensions in West Africa could hypothetically degenerate into conflict; and the indirect conflict between Russia and Western democracies may intermittently continue in Africa. These three factors are structural. Against this backdrop, what does France want to do? Does it wish to act against the regional jihadist threat, or only against those threats directly targeting its interests? Does it want to help one or more partners, and in what way (training alone is not enough)? Should it immediately mobilize regional, European and/or Anglo-Saxon partners to anticipate the rebirth of one or more jihadist emirates? Should it support local forces against Russia’s presence in Africa? Should it attack Russia’s presence in Africa directly? Should it characterize and document abuses by the Russians and their allies, or act to prevent them? These are all difficult questions, each requiring different approaches.

What Strategy for Africa?

Against this backdrop, what strategies could be proposed for France in order to pursue the design of a coherent, effective, and sustainable grand strategy in Africa? The ideas put forward here are not exhaustive of the many ideas already being considered, whether by the Institut Montaigne or other research centers, by members of parliament, or by the French executive. The aim here is to highlight priorities and try to think in the long term, which is not the main strength of the French political and administrative system.

The fundamental pillar is to regain strategic clarity by realigning France’s foreign policy in Africa with its democratic, liberal, and rights-based foundations. To achieve this, it is necessary to devise a grand strategy to support democratic forces on the continent, which requires a clear mapping of the political forces present in the various countries; the identification of forces defending democratic values, even if they are weak on their national chessboards; a strong stance against the long-term abuse of power; strong political, legal, financial, and diplomatic support for democratic forces; networking of these forces, notably through invitations to France and Europe, the organization of forums and annual meetings, and the provision of tools. France’s aim is not to become the godfather, uncle, or leader of African political forces but rather a facilitator for autonomous political forces wishing to organize and connect. Just as London was, in the middle of the twentieth century, a place where Pan-Africanism blossomed for African leaders seeking to organize themselves, Paris and the EU more generally could constitute a territory of welcome and facilitation, engaging in a showdown with the continent’s autocracies without delegitimizing forces that need to come together.

This need is all the greater given that media and digital ecosystems are now subject to strong campaigns of disinformation, propaganda, and obfuscation of reality. A certain level of conflict must be assumed with African autocracies, as with the great autocracies.

A third pillar must focus on confronting the denial of France’s colonial legacy by promoting highly ambitious political and scientific initiatives. This is a subject that is poisoning public debate at home and abroad, and we need to face up to it and succeed in a memorial project similar to that carried out for the Second World War. France was neither responsible for the slave trade as a whole nor for colonization as a whole. It was, however, a central player, and we need only observe the sensitivity of the subject of the Algerian war, sixty years after its end, to realize its importance in the collective psyche. If the accusations of neocolonialism used by pro-Russian influencers are taking shape, it is because the subject is so topical on the African continent. American and African scientists, as well as scientists of African descent more generally working on colonialism or decolonial studies are gradually transmitting their knowledge into the public and cultural sphere. American recognition of the crimes of slavery is recent and ongoing. The first Black American president is recent. The new British Foreign Secretary, David Lammy, has explicitly mentioned his pride in being in this position as a person of African descent. More topical still, Ghana and Benin now offer citizenship to people of African descent from the US, the Caribbean, and Europe (under certain conditions); this, along with the success of Pan-African discourse, confirms that for a majority of Africans, these issues of identity and heritage are topical. It’s not about the past. In this context, it is in the interests of the French authorities to open the doors wide by combining strong political gestures, reparations, cultural and memorial actions, and joint scientific work to facilitate the emergence of the historical truth necessary for reconciling narratives and achieving joint progress.

A fourth pillar, detailed at length in the report "Security in West Africa: Investing in the Agricultural Sector", consists of concentrating development aid and business support in the African agricultural sector and its co-dependent sectors (private finance, mechanization, land tenure, etc.). The dispersal of efforts and resources produces only limited results. The convergence of the current "political moment" and the emerging consensus on the limits of development aid argue in favor of a radical change of approach, made possible by the assumed contestation of the order that has prevailed until now by certain African political forces.

Finally, the fifth pillar is the construction of a posture of strategic patience. The French practice of power is to act, but the current situation on the African continent, the two-decade global fight against terrorism, and the challenge posed by the great powers of Russia and China mean that we need to understand before we act. The security dynamics are complex, deleterious, and intertwined, making the mosaic difficult to decipher and amplifying the risk of a "cocktail effect." Demographic, political, economic, and social changes in various African countries have been largely misunderstood by the Western strategic system. The results of the last two decades of foreign policy should inspire humility. For these reasons, it seems necessary to considerably strengthen the capacities for collecting and analyzing realities in the various African countries, by integrating strategic research into the circuits of analysis and decision-making, by financing and structuring it; by relieving the Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of the Armed Forces of a large part of the day-to-day commissioning, in order to build a denser and more robust system for collecting and analyzing open information in the relevant countries; by developing strategic analysis capabilities bringing together diplomats and intelligence analysts; by giving the new Africa Command the mission of monitoring the situation, gathering intelligence and assessing the military forces present in priority countries in order to anticipate future disruptions (collapse and lasting fragmentation in the Sahel; possible confrontation between African states; Russian, Chinese, and mercenary military systems), while building shared capabilities with Europeans and African partners. The number one objective should be to observe, understand, and structure-action should be taken only occasionally and then at a later stage.

Copyright image : Christophe SIMON / POOL / AFP

Togolese President Faure Gnassingbe, Comorian President Azali Assoumani, Cameroonian President Paul Biya, Emmanuel Macron, Prince Albert II of Monaco, Central African Republic President Faustin-Archange Touadera, Gabonese Transitional President Brice Oligui Nguema, Nicolas Sarkozy, and Moroccan Prime Minister Aziz Akhannouch at the eightieth anniversary of the Provence landings.