[Africa: Strategic Rivalries] - In Moscow’s Sights: Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, and the DRC

In May 2024, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov toured several African countries. He visited Guinea (Conakry), Burkina Faso, the Republic of Congo (Brazzaville), and Chad. This would have been a routine diplomatic visit to the region were it not for the fact that these countries have been the scene of severe tensions since 2021.

Since the gradual "takeover" of the Central African Republic by Russian military and political advisers in 2018, the vigorous intervention in Libya by the same forces in support of Marshal Haftar in 2019, and, above all, the political and military support given to the three Sahelian juntas resulting from coups in Mali (2020), Burkina Faso (2022), and Niger (2023), rivalries between Russia and the Western powers on the African continent have become acute.

In this context, either on its own initiative or at the request of the African players, Russia is pursuing a strategy of destabilizing the diplomatic, economic, and military positions of France, Europe, and the United States in the region. Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC, Kinshasa) are now in Russia’s sights.

Chad, a Domino that has Already Fallen?

A geographic perspective is useful for understanding the situation in Chad.

Chad is bordered to the north by Libya, whose border is partially controlled by the forces of Marshal Haftar, a Russian ally. This territory serves not just as a logistic platform for Russian military advisers, whose presence locally has recently increased, but also as a sanctuary for forces opposed to the Déby clan’s regime, notably the FACT, which was responsible for several raids against N’djamena, the last of which killed former president Idriss Déby in April 2021.

Chad is bordered to the west by Niger, now under the control of General Tchiani’s military junta and its Russian allies. French and American forces were recently driven out of the country. Civil society is under lock and key. Russian military advisers have recently arrived.

Chad is bordered to the east by Sudan, which is currently in the grip of a civil war, with a disastrous humanitarian situation. General Hemedti’s forces are supported by Russian military advisers. Hemedti is well established in the Darfur region, which borders on Chad to the east, and thus controls Sudan’s border with Chad. Chad is bordered to the southeast by the Central African Republic, which is currently under total Russian control via President Touadéra and his entourage. Furthermore, Russia has a significant military presence there.

Only Chad’s south/southwest borders-that is, its borders with Nigeria and Cameroon-are not under the control of a Russian ally. They are, however, under pressure from the jihadists of Boko Haram and the Islamic State (ISWAP).

The geographic encirclement of Chad by opposing forces is a reality. Chad is a territory linking at least four areas where Russian forces are present. It is home to the French Forces Command in N’djamena and is a symbolic ally of France, Europe, and the United States, even if the latter has recently increased its distance. Indeed, while the transitional president, Mahamat Déby, promised in 2021 to organize a national dialogue and ultimately to step down, under pressure from his clan (Zaghawa) and for his own personal interests, he chose to run in the presidential election, which he won on May 6, 2024.

Although Russia remains cautious, this blackmail is starting to work in its favor. In January 2024, President Déby visited Russia, where he reportedly sought greater support from Moscow. The Russian authorities, however, remained hesitant due to President Déby’s supposed popularity deficit. Other leaders of the Zaghawa clan, notably historical opponents such as the pro-Russian Erdimi brothers, could have been more serious alternatives. One thing is certain: Mahamat Déby won the May election with a comfortable lead, which may have eased Russian concerns. Indeed, Russian political advisers were reportedly in N’djamena on election day, although the reasons for their presence could not be clarified. There has also been some easing of tension at the Chad-Central African Republic border, which could herald a calming of relations with Bangui. And now, with the arrival of Minister Lavrov… a new wind is blowing in N’djamena that could quickly turn in Moscow’s favor.

Côte d’Ivoire, the Colossus with Feet of Clay

In West Africa, the second target of Russia’s offensive interference is Côte d’Ivoire, the region’s largest or second-largest economy-before or after Nigeria, depending on which criteria you use. This giant is considered an ally of the West but has enough political flaws for Russia to exploit to attempt a destabilization maneuver, particularly with a view to the 2025 presidential elections. At this stage, this strategy seems to be based on three axes: first, a policy of confrontation led by the leaders of the Alliance of Sahel States; second, indirect support for the political opponent Guillaume Soro; and third, a disinformation campaign against President Alassane Ouattara.

The sanctions imposed by ECOWAS (the Economic Community of West African States) against the Sahelian juntas and the resulting increased tensions have heightened rivalries between the military juntas of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) and countries such as Nigeria, Benin, and Côte d’Ivoire. The latter is now in the sights of Mali and Burkina Faso. In 2022, for example, the Malian authorities arbitrarily arrested forty-nine Ivorian soldiers, triggering a long diplomatic crisis. Political and economic tensions often reappear over various issues, notably the supply of electricity to Mali by Côte d’Ivoire. Similarly, Burkina Faso has sharply increased tensions with its neighbor Côte d’Ivoire-intelligence officers have been dispatched to denounce the Africa Cup of Nations online; the two armies have clashed at the border; and Captain Traoré, head of the Burkinabé junta, has taken a strong stance against Côte d’Ivoire, which he accuses of hosting the Burkinabé opposition.

Since November 2023, GS has returned to settle in the Sahel with a view to returning to Côte d’Ivoire at a later date. An outspoken opponent of ADO, he intends to run in the 2025 presidential election. In this context, he has resumed a high level of activity on social networks, supported by a very active network of accounts, both identified and anonymous. However, GS’s entourage seems to be reverting to the same protest techniques used by the opposition that helped install the Sahelian juntas-in particular, attacking his cooperation with France.

Considering GS’s new positioning, which before 2020-22 had not yet taken a pro-Russian, anti-French direction, his return from exile heralds a period of destabilization to come in Côte d’Ivoire. Indeed, from November 2023 onwards, he began making appearances in Niger and Burkina Faso, where he met with the heads of the juntas. Shortly before this, he made several trips to Mali to meet the military authorities. This open alignment with the three pro-Russian, anti-French military juntas in the Sahel, which withdrew dramatically from ECOWAS, is an unmistakable statement. His alleged role in the case of the forty-nine arrested Ivorian soldiers and possible link with the former disinformation agent "Gauthier Pasquet" suggest a desire to overthrow ADO by any means necessary.

In January 2023, an animated video attributed to the Wagner Group, the former Russian mercenary group, targeted Côte d’Ivoire for the first time and called for its liberation by Russia-GS could be the politician capable of achieving this strategic objective. The convergence of interests is clear, even if GS claims to maintain his distance from Russia.

Detailed study of the online behavior of pro-Russian and pro-AES trolls and anonymous accounts reveals that the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire (RCI) is a Russian target. A fairly substantial volume of not just criticism but also disinformation is pushed against the Ivorian authorities by relays of influence and disinformation agents known to actively support Russia or the Sahelian juntas online (and silence opposition and criticism), as well as by anonymous accounts supporting GS. There is no indication that GS or his entourage are in control of their activities, but it is likely that Russian or Sahelian troll farms have chosen to support GS and his return to media, digital, and political life.

The narratives employed by such actors against Côte d’Ivoire seek to exploit the major political rifts in the subregion as follows:

Les récits mis en œuvre sont ceux qui constituent actuellement une rente politique importante dans la sous-région :

• Attacking French influence through systematic and coordinated condemnation of France’s actions in the region;
• Denouncing the links between France and Côte d’Ivoire, which will eventually involve the French military presence (FFCI), French companies, and political-security cooperation;
• Exploiting the deteriorating security situation in the north of the country against the Ivorian government in the event of renewed terrorist attacks;
• Using the codes of Pan-Africanism to mobilize not only young people but also supporters of Laurent Gbagbo (LG), who could opportunistically play the nationalist, Pan-African, pro-Russian, or anti-French cards from within the country. A rapprochement between GS and LG cannot be ruled out, the latter having recently denounced GS’s exile and the treatment of his supporters in the country on several occasions;
• Expressing solidarity with other regional causes, notably in Senegal and the DRC, as certain influential relays have already begun to do;
• Questioning democratic institutions.

The DRC, a Giant Grappling with a Deeply Troubled Security Situation

From a methodological point of view, monitoring the online activity of pro-Russian trolls in West Africa provides a good indication of Moscow’s objectives. In one way or another, such activity reflects orders issued by the Russian power organs. Indeed, since the beginning of 2024, one topic-with associated hashtags such as #freecongo, #alleyesoncongo, and #rwandaiskilling-has been appearing more frequently: the situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the alleged genocide being carried out in the east of the country by Rwanda. The situation on the ground is considerably more complex and nuanced, but these faint signals show that Russia’s political interference apparatus will gradually seize upon the situation in the DRC to advance its interests.

Since 2022, France and the United States have facilitated negotiations between Presidents Tshisekedi and Kagame to reduce tensions and achieve a ceasefire. The context of racism and repression of the Rwandan-speaking populations of the DRC by the authorities, the skirmishes between the Congolese and Rwandan armies at the border, the illegal control of mining resources by the M23, the presence of the heirs of the Rwandan genocide led by Hutus within the FLDR, the Franco-Rwandan rapprochement despite the Franco-Congolese proximity, and the presence of former president Joseph Kabila (who was behind the 2013 ceasefire) in the Congolese opposition are all factors explaining the current crisis and the difficulties in resolving it.

Against this complicated backdrop, part of the Congolese army is stepping up pressure on President Tshisekedi to align himself with Moscow and thus receive significant military aid to push back the M23. This demand is all the more urgent given that the most anti-Rwandophone military and political cadres consider Paris and Washington to be aligned with Rwanda and believe this is why they are having the UN uphold a resolution embargoing arms sales to the DRC for unconventional forces. There is, therefore, an opportunity for Moscow to increase its influence and presence in Central Africa’s largest country, its richest in resources (timber, minerals, rare earths), and an ally of Western democracies despite a predatory and undemocratic political class. The presence of the Central African Republic (CAR) on the northern border is an additional advantage for the Russian forces.

Recently, against the backdrop of MONUSCO’s gradual withdrawal, Moscow made a strategic statement by declaring its readiness to sign military cooperation agreements with Kinshasa, which in reality have not been validated by Congolese institutions. The latter were forced to issue a press release to quell rumors of a rapprochement. Moscow’s diplomatic outburst comes at a moment when Russian trolls are calling for an end to the alleged genocide of the Congolese people. Without excusing any crimes committed by the M23, an extremely violent and poorly controlled rebel movement, this deliberately provocative characterization-which seeks to turn the Rwandans’ stigma against them-is a classic Russian active measures tactic. It is a good way of generating support for the Congolese authorities and armed forces, who are used to committing crimes in the field.

A Russian Method of Interference Currently Undergoing Refinement

The trap of this new Cold War is now closing in N’djamena and attacking the RCI and the DRC: African political forces in power or wishing to gain access to power can now use Russian strategic leverage against the reserves of democracies. The tectonic plates are moving fast, and the West’s lack of strategies, pressure tactics, or counter-levers makes it an easy strategic target. As Russia is not a boogeyman for African populations facing other daily challenges (terrorism, underdevelopment, global warming), Western democracies are temporarily delegitimized and caught in a dilemma: they can either criticize authoritarian excesses, thus pushing their allies toward Russia, or support dictatorial regimes by minimizing criticism so as not to lose them, thereby granting these regimes new leeway that ultimately turns against the democracies. This is currently a lose-lose proposition, requiring a complete overhaul of the strategic framework.

The strategic thread running through Russia’s actions can be summarized as follows:

• Setting up political and logistic bridgeheads from which to conduct campaigns of political interference and influence in third countries;
• Responding with strategic assurance (political and military) to political forces likely to seize power against the West and its allies, or identifying and supporting opposition leaders to help them seize power;
• Deploying military advisers as soon as an alignment is accepted to secure the new allies and, at a later stage, possibly responding to their security challenges without limits but with economic conditions;
• Deploying political advisers to support the development of the new authorities (through advertising campaigns, political campaigns, online propaganda and disinformation, constitutional change, connections between regional players).
• Continuing this expansion with propaganda, disinformation, and strategic signaling campaigns aimed at new targets of opportunity (expulsion of Westerners; economic interests; strategic positions).

This process will continue as long as Western democracies have not identified their own innovative strategies, or as long as African political forces, particularly democratic ones, are unable to put up effective barriers against Russian interference.

Copyright image : Mikhail METZEL / POOL / AFP
On January 24, 2024, Chadian President Mahamat Idriss Déby met Vladimir Putin in Moscow.