Back to the Future? NATO after Madrid

Needs like these are precisely the reason why allies committed to spend the symbolic minimum of 2% of their gross domestic product on national defense, a threshold that major allies have already met or will soon reach.

Predictably, Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling over the last few months – serving more as a reminder of Russia’s capabilities than a real threat – underscored the importance of extended deterrence arrangements in Europe. Such arrangements include permanently stationing American weapons and allowing allies to access these, along with NATO’s SNOWCAT program, which enables allies to cooperate in nuclear raids. NATO is now aiming to integrate the new guided B61-12 nuclear bomb , which when carried on the F-35 stealth fighter, will lend new credibility to this “made in the USA” capability.

Understandably, the French are upset that Germany is purchasing F-35s and thus anchoring their air force in US defense for the long haul. However, any reasonable French official should be pleased that Berlin is hinting, at last, at a new commitment to participate in nuclear sharing arrangements, since this acquiring F-35s is the key to long-term German participation in a culture of nuclear deterrence in the country.

First, the ceremonial Statement by NATO Heads of State and Government which doesn’t just send political messages to Moscow but also updates NATO’s posture on deterrence and defense  in real time. Second, the “Strategic Concept”, a document defining NATO's strategy over the next several years. One can wonder if it was wise to do this in a full-blown war, but there is no denying that it was becoming a pressing matter as the last edition was published in 2010 (nobody dared touch it while Trump was in office).

But can we go as far as saying that NATO is reverting to its Cold War policies? After all, there have been some major changes.

• First, geographically speaking, NATO’s footprint doubled in terms of members over thirty years. “Enlargement” can be considered a burden as smaller countries like Montenegro contribute little to the defense of its allies. The “open door policy” can nevertheless be viewed as an advantage. When Finland and Sweden officially tie the knot with NATO, defending northeastern Europe and the Baltics becomes entirely different. While Russia carefully hid its annoyance – believing both countries were not a part of its sphere of influence and were already under a US one – the fact remains that enlargement of this scope is tantamount to shooting itself in the foot. A NATO country will now share a 1,300 kilometers border with Russia.

• Second, functionally speaking, while Article 5 is at the heart of NATO's founding treaty, it has become subject to broad interpretation, particularly for what constitutes an “armed attack” in the eyes of the law. Member states recently announced that cyber attacks and attacks in space could be treated, on a case-by-case basis, as constituting an armed attack.

• Last, strategically speaking, China is increasingly turning into a challenge. Beijing does not fall within the geographic scope of the Washington Treaty, and any conflict occurring in Asia would not immediately affect NATO. But due to US insistence – and under the watchful eye of France, which believes it is good for the Europeans to be sensibilized to global strategic issues – NATO now acknowledges that Beijing’s investments in European infrastructure and telecommunications, influence in cybersecurity and disinformation campaigns are a concern. Not to mention the possibility that Beijing threatens the territory of a NATO country if a conflict were to emerge with the United States. In short, China poses “systemic challenges”. And the presence of Australia, Japan and South Korea in Madrid was not unnoticed.

Erdogan obtained assurances from Helsinki and Stockholm that they would reverse their policies on Kurdish political groups, including the PKK, which the Turkish president views as a terrorist organization. Several countries, including France, offered Finland and Sweden interim security guarantees against any form of Russian aggression while the two Nordic countries wait to formally join NATO.

A final scenario can also be envisioned: one where a new crisis is triggered by Erdogan’s impulsive actions as 2023 elections loom, or by the return of a temperamental or pusillanimous president to the White House. It is now known that Trump was on the brink of shattering the transatlantic organization and that he might have pulled out of NATO had he been reelected. NATO bought some time but its long-term survival is still at stake. More tensions would likely arise if the United States suddenly chose to strengthen its presence in Asia at a time when Russia was still a threat.

What about France? True to itself, it has shown to be a loyal but demanding ally. The enhanced forward presence elements were deployed in Romania based on France’s recommendations. Paris was especially pleased with the new emphasis given to the role of deterrence (as it had repeatedly insisted that NATO define itself as a “nuclear alliance”). It also refused to group Russia and China, who are not allies in the military sense, as one common threat. While France garnered greater acceptance, with US support, on bolstering European defense capabilities as a complement to NATO, Paris is unlikely to make progress on this initiative under the current circumstances. In the eyes of some French allies, “strategic autonomy” in defense will become less relevant in an environment of increasing transatlantic cooperation. And as Finland and Sweden join NATO, not only will there be much less urgency to strengthen EU defense capabilities, but the notion of “European pillar of the Alliance” will gain in credibility. Additionally, Paris’s positions on Russia have had a dampening effect on the relationships of trust between France and its Central European allies.  

Copyright : PIERRE-PHILIPPE MARCOU / AFP