Russia’s National Security Strategy 2021: the Era of "Information Confrontation"

Meanwhile, environmental concerns appear for the first time in a Russian strategic document. Climate change is not only depicted as a new threat that must be battled but also as one of the rare topics that calls for international cooperation.

There is another significant innovation in the 2021 version: an emphasis on defending "traditional Russian values." These have been described at length: dignity, human rights, patriotism, a strong family, a sense of responsibility, the primacy of the spiritual over the material, a "collective" spirit and so on. All of this is threatened by "a foreign propaganda of selfishness, permissiveness and lack of responsibility" that has been propagated by the US government, NGOs and new forms of social media. The "falsification of history" also plays a part. What is at stake is an attempt to "Westernize" Russia, which is presented as being now underway. 

Yet another innovation is the central importance given to "information security." The text states that new information technologies are increasingly being used to interfere in Russian internal affairs (sic). With large platforms contributing to "the spread of false information," Russian sovereignty in this area is under threat. The 2021 strategy, therefore, provides for a whole series of measures that include creating a sovereign segment of the Internet, strengthening safeguards against cyberattacks, systematically developing national technologies and, more generally, establishing the "forces and means of information confrontation." 

As one reads the document, it is tempting to find commonalities with debates going on in the West but reinterpreted through the Russian system. Of particular note in this context are the reduction of critical dependencies, the necessary investment in advanced technologies and the importance of ecological change (the British "Integrated Review," for example). Where Western analysts speak of a "de-Westernization of the world," the authors of the Russian strategy fear a "Westernization" of Russia. It is hard not to see the irony of this back-and-forth. In terms of "information confrontation," the 2021 strategy signed by Putin has its own way of formalizing a kind of action in which Russia has been a pioneer and which it was the first to practice abroad. The "national security strategy" can thus be read as a justification for a tactic that Russia has been using for years, whether meddling in elections in the West or backing up its actions in Syria or Africa.

What this means for policymakers

This all being said, we must evaluate how important the July 2 document is for deciphering Russian policy. To what extent will it really serve as a "roadmap" for decision-makers in the coming years? 

First of all, it’s worth noting that any text of this kind is, by design, hybrid in nature. It has a considerable bureaucratic aspect, as various departments of the state apparatus have contributed to it. Indeed, a series of "checkboxes" can be found from one strategy to the next. In that sense, the "strategic" content of the document should not be exaggerated. However, it also appears to reflect the mindset of the Russian leadership, both implicitly and explicitly. 

Thus, when the document mentions Russia’s foreign partners, it talks about a foremost inner circle, with the structures uniting former USSR territories such as the Eurasian Economic Union, among others. Then there is the second inner circle, composed of "China and India." Unlike the 2015 strategy, India is now consistently placed on the same footing as China. Although this obviously does not reflect reality, it likely indicates apprehension regarding the Russia-China relations. For Dmitri Trenin, the emphasis put on the risks of technological dependence in the text undoubtedly refers to the relationship with China, which cannot be named in this context for diplomatic reasons. It’s also worth noting that the European Union has been left out of the 2021 strategy text altogether - unlike the 2015 version - even if only as a potential partner.

Let’s use another, perhaps more complex, example: the relationship with the United States. If the Russian "national security strategy" of 2021 is taken literally, the Kremlin no longer expects anything from Washington. Nevertheless, Putin was obviously up for meeting in Geneva with President Biden as soon as he made the offer. And unlike the Obama administration - and perhaps the Europeans, too - the current administration seems to understand what makes Russian power tick, including the field of "information confrontation." In fact, Biden’s reaction to Russian cyberattacks has been a well-mixed cocktail of threats, sanctions, retaliation and an offer for dialog. European countries are well behind the curve in this key matter, which creates the risk of a "new transatlantic decoupling" (the same problem arises with China of course). 

Rather depressingly, one area where the next phase of Russian politics is likely to coincide with the policy stated in the "national strategy" is the repression of any domestic protest movement. In the text signed by Putin on July 2, there are no more opponents, only "foreign agents" serving a strategy of the "Westernization of Russia." 

Copyright: Alexey NIKOLSKY / SPUTNIK / AFP