Ukraine Cannot Wait

As had been widely expected, the European Council gave with one hand and held back with the other in its decision regarding Ukraine on 14 and 15 December.

Hungary’s prime minister, Viktor Orbán, stepped out of the room to allow his colleagues to green-light the opening of EU membership negotiations with Kyiv. While that decision was certainly a boost for the citizens of the war-torn country, the process will be lengthy with innumerable further stages to complete. Nor was the news from Brussels all good. The very next day the Hungarian leader vetoed a deal to release the €50 billion four-year assistance package for Ukraine agreed in the EU budget.

What is the way forward?

There are several opposing views being aired in the debate (mostly between experts) about what comes next for Ukraine. Before we consider the options, let us leave aside the view that Kyiv should quickly enter into negotiations with Russia, a process that would ultimately involve Ukraine bending to Moscow’s will.  Another more sophisticated strategy would be for Ukraine to refocus the war effort on purely defensive objectives, renounce the aim of retaking lost territory and, once again, ultimately sit down at the negotiating table with Russia. While not a surrender, such a strategy would involve pivoting to a defensive posture and narrowing Kyiv’s aims to holding onto the territory it currently controls. In any negotiations, Ukraine would in effect be conceding the areas under Russian military control.

This policy should be firmly and forcefully rejected by Europe, whose security, it is increasingly clear, depends on the outcome of the war in Ukraine. And if a reminder were needed, President Putin’s confidence was clear to see in his press conference on 14 December.

If we adopt a policy of only throwing Ukraine a lifeline to avoid further losses, we will encourage Russia to wait it out. To wait until patience flags in the West and, in the latter stages of the conflict, until goals are moderated. How often have we heard that Putin is waiting for Trump’s return to the White House? Even if this hope is dashed, the chances of America continuing to back Ukraine in a drawn-out and inconclusive war are uncertain at best.

So, at least from a European viewpoint, we need a third policy option, one that would continue to support the Ukrainian military in an offensive strategy. But what would such an offensive posture look like? Or, to be more precise, what would the new priorities be?

The crucial aim must be to deal major blows to Russian positions in sectors that are strategically and politically sensitive for the Kremlin. This means Crimea.

Two recent articles, one in Foreign Affairs and one in Foreign Policy, discuss Crimea as Putin’s biggest weakness. To break the deadlock, Ukraine’s backers should aim to send the powerful weapons systems the country needs, first to inflict enough damage to cripple the Kerch bridge, severing the link between Crimea and the Russian mainland, and second to attack Russian bases and arms depots in the peninsula. US experts highlight the need for Washington to increase the flow of Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) weapons (mid-range cruise missiles), provided they have warheads powerful enough to at least partially demolish the Kerch bridge. The current US-supplied ATACMS carry fragmentation warheads. These work well for other missions, but they do not have the power to take out a bridge’s supporting columns.

German-made Taurus missiles are another heavyweight weapon capable of successfully carrying out the mission. However, as we all know, Berlin has no plans to send any such weapons to Ukraine.The UK Storm Shadow and French Scalp missiles manufactured by Franco-British group MBDA are also comparable in their destructive power – and have been put to good use by Ukraine’s forces. But again, Kyiv does not have enough of them to strike the big blow it needs in Crimea.

Potential for objections

Of course, people will object that this strategy could create potential for Russia to escalate the war.But when has the Kremlin followed through on its many threats against the West? The feared escalation has yet to materialize, despite Putin’s thundering. Each time Ukraine’s allies have intensified their support, or Ukraine has notched up significant wins, including in Crimea and its strike against the Russian fleet in the Black Sea, Russian rhetoric ramps up, but without escalation occurring.

On the other hand, unless the West steps up its support for Ukraine moves to a more determined offensive posture, Russia, which has moved its economy on to a war footing, will remain free to pursue the war and amplify its offensives and strikes aimed at destroying Ukraine’s infrastructure.

Yet another objection to the proposed strategy of intensified military pressure against Russian assets in Crimea posits that it would not achieve its goals. It is self-evident that Ukraine’s armed forces must continue to commit sufficient resources to blunt the advance of the Russian army. To do this it needs to strengthen the air-defense systems protecting Ukrainian cities and infrastructure. Ukraine should be provided with sufficient capacity to target the military bases in Russia from which attacks are launched, the Russian army’s logistics hubs, and the supply routes for weapons coming from North Korea and Iran.

Instead, the recent drop in newly committed aid has been dramatic.

This brings us to a second proposal.

One way to ensure long-term funding for Ukraine would be to establish a special EU fund for credit facility to finance that country’s arms purchases over a period of several years. This structure would take over from the European Peace Loan, which is running low. Josep Borrell, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and Estonian President Kaja Kalas have already tabled proposals in this vein. In France, Nathalie Loiseau and Benjamin Haddad have put forward the idea of a European fund similar to the €200 million facility set up by the French government in 2022 to streamline Ukraine’s arms purchases.

What form would such a loan take?
The loan could be presented as focusing on building up Europe’s defense industry. For starters, and now that a new pro-European government has been elected in Warsaw, the initiative could be launched by a group spearheaded by the “Weimar triangle” countries  (France, Germany and Poland).  It is true that Germany had  insisted that the Covid-19 loan should not set a precedent; however, nobody foresaw a war in Europe at the time, least of all Berlin. To get around the fiscal rules, the European Council could endorse the German idea of excluding military expenditure from the ceiling on budget deficits of 3% of GDP. Other countries with a large defense industry, such as Italy, Spain, Sweden, and the Netherlands, could be involved in this program . If opposed by countries like Hungary, the funding could be arranged according to a “variable geometry” model (the idea that not every country need take part).

Finally, we come to the question of the United Kingdom, one of the largest donors to Ukraine’s defense.

Copyright image : Odd ANDERSEN / AFP