Transforming Military Service in the EU: France Is Not an Isolated Case

President Emmanuel Macron’s recent announcement of a new voluntary military-service scheme represents a substantial shift in France’s defence posture and the most significant change to its manpower system since the suspension of conscription in 1997. Although the reform has generated considerable debate domestically, it should be understood within a broader European trend.

Macron’s announcement is not an isolated development but part of a wider recalibration of defence policies across Europe. Across the EU, questions of mobilisation, reserves, and societal preparedness have returned to the centre of defence planning. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, its recent direct threats against EU member states and intensified hybrid activities on their territory, combined with the U.S. shift toward conditional and interest-based commitments have reshaped the European security environment. For many governments, the rapid mobilisation needs have challenged the assumption that small, professional, volunteer-based armies are sufficient to meet contemporary needs.

Strategic Drivers of Change

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 is the core factor that has forced EU member states to reassess the foundations of their defence planning. Modern high-intensity warfare has shown that advanced equipment is insufficient without substantial manpower depth, robust reserves, and societal readiness. Across Europe, professional armies are struggling with recruitment shortages, ageing or insufficient reserves, and limited capacity for scalable mobilisation. As a result, several EU member states are revisiting conscription, adopting hybrid or selective service models, expanding reserve frameworks, or introducing new voluntary training schemes. Despite their differences, these reforms share a common objective: to rebuild strategic depth, strengthen mobilisation capacity, and restore societal resilience in a rapidly deteriorating security environment.

This shift has been reinforced by a series of Russian hybrid operations directly affecting EU member states this year. In November 2025, a surge was recorded in drone incursions, airspace violations, sabotage attempts, and hybrid pressure across Europe, stressing out national and NATO air defences. Reportedly, over twenty drones entered Polish airspace in a single day, alongside the first Russian fighter-jet violation of Estonian airspace since 2022. Reportedly, Russia’s hybrid tactics also threatened to undermine Europe’s energy security and critical infrastructure during the winter season. Together, these incidents have made it clear that even countries geographically distant from the battlefield are exposed to Russian coercion and intimidation.

Most recently, President Vladimir Putin escalated his rhetoric further, warning that Russia is prepared for a direct confrontation with Europe if "red lines" are crossed - a declaration widely interpreted as a threat of war against EU member states. At the same time, according to a recent survey, over two-thirds of Europeans do not believe their country could withstand a Russian military attack. There is a growing recognition in Europe, including in the United Kingdom that Europe must get ready for war with Russia. For defence planners, this has reinforced the need for stronger air defences, larger reserves, and improved homeland-resilience capacities. It has also renewed the importance of manpower - long neglected in the era of professionalisation - as a strategic priority.

His widely reported remarks - suggesting that countries failing to meet this threshold might not be protected - have compelled European leaders to reconsider their structural dependence and reliance on U.S. security umbrella and to accelerate efforts to strengthen national and collective defence capacities. The new U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) reinforces this shift by placing clear limits on the scope and conditions of U.S. alliance commitments and by prioritising domestic resilience and great-power competition. For Europe, the NSS indicates that future U.S. engagement in NATO may be more selective and contingent on burden-sharing, making it necessary for European states to assume a substantially greater share of responsibility for their own defence. The strategy consistently refers to "Europe" rather than the European Union, a deliberate rhetorical choice that signals a critical attitude toward supranational institutions and a preference for viewing the continent through the sovereignty and agency of individual nation-states.

EU’s Strategic Autonomy and the French Perspective

The notion of European Strategic Autonomy predates the recent debates triggered by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and has been part of EU-level thinking for over a decade. The concept appears in early policy documents, including the 2013 Council Conclusions on the Common Security and Defence Policy, and is articulated in the 2016 EU Global Strategy, which calls for a stronger and more capable Europe able to act in its neighbourhood and beyond. The 2022 Strategic Compass for Security and Defence set out concrete targets for rapid deployment capacity, resilience, and strengthened industrial production and further anchored the concept in EU policymaking. It reinforced the view that Europe must strengthen both its capability base and its societal resilience.

Institutionally, the EU began constructing the pillars of a more coherent defence posture well before 2022. The European Defence Fund - formally established in 2017 - funds joint defence research, development, and procurement projects, and now operates through its full 2021-2027 multiannual cycle to strengthen Europe’s industrial and technological base. The Coordinated Annual Review on Defence, which completed its first full cycle in 2020, serves as a structured assessment mechanism that identifies capability gaps, monitors national plans, and encourages member states to align defence investment and planning. These tools work alongside Permanent Structured Cooperation, launched in 2017 as a framework enabling participating member states to jointly develop capabilities, improve interoperability, and commit to more ambitious defence cooperation projects. In parallel, the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations - ranging from military training to advisory and stability missions - provide the operational framework through which the Union deploys forces abroad and tests its crisis-management ambitions. Completing this architecture, the European Peace Facility - established in 2021 as an off-budget instrument - enables the EU to finance military assistance, supply equipment, and support partner countries’ armed forces, with Ukraine becoming its largest beneficiary. Taken together, they laid the institutional foundation for a more structured, coordinated, and operationally credible European defence effort.

President Emmanuel Macron’s consistent advocacy for European sovereignty and a stronger European defence pillar must be read as part of a longer-term European trajectory. In his 2017 Sorbonne speech, Macron called for a "sovereign, united, democratic Europe," implicitly challenging the continent’s long-standing overreliance on external security guarantees. He reaffirmed this vision at the 2023 GlobSec Summit in Bratislava, emphasising the importance of European strategic autonomy and strategic sovereignty, and noting that the adoption of a European defence doctrine reflects the consolidation of this approach.

At the time of the Sorbonne speech, however, Macron’s ideas found limited acceptance among several EU member states, many of which considered strategic autonomy unrealistic, premature, or politically sensitive. France’s long-standing call for autonomy finally found broader European consensus in light of the later developments. The combination of Russia’s recent explicit threats against European states and the priorities outlined in the new U.S. NSS has, in the past week, made this reality undeniable, accelerating consensus that Europe must strengthen its own capacity for deterrence and defence.

While the term "strategic autonomy" remains contested - with different member states emphasising industrial, operational, political, or civil dimensions - its core logic has gained broader resonance: Europe must possess the industrial, political, and crucially, human capacity to defend itself, especially in a scenario where U.S. engagement becomes unreliable. 

In numerical terms, most EU member states have fewer than 50,000 active personnel. By contrast, France (200,000), Germany (182,000), Poland (202,000) and Italy (165,500) have the largest active armed forces in the Union. Some experts are arguing that Europe needs to reconsider a united European army.

Comparative Models of Military Service in EU

Europe today operates through four broad models of military service, each reflecting different strategic cultures, geographies, and security perceptions. While distinct in design, these models have all come under renewed pressure since 2022, pushing them gradually toward deeper reserves, broader mobilisation frameworks, and stronger societal engagement in defence.

Full Conscription Systems

A number of EU member states maintain comprehensive conscription, where compulsory service forms the core of national defence. Conscription is re-emerging in defence expert debates as an element that could strengthen the EU’s overall preparedness and mobilisation capacity.

In Greece, conscription has been in place since 1949 and is justified by enduring tensions with Türkiye in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean, and the need for sizeable, quickly mobilisable land and air forces. Cyprus has preserved conscription since 1964; after the 1974 Turkish intervention and the island’s division, mandatory service became central to countering the structural asymmetry created by the presence of Turkish forces in the north. Austria retained conscription after the 1955 State Treaty restored its sovereignty on the condition of permanent neutrality, using it as a cost-effective way to sustain territorial defence and civil-protection capacities outside NATO. In Finland, universal male conscription has continued uninterrupted since the Second World War and is designed to offset Russia’s numerical and geographic advantages by generating one of Europe’s largest trained reserves. Estonia reinstated conscription in 1991 after regaining independence, viewing a mass-based reserve as essential to deterring renewed pressure from Russia. Lithuania reintroduced conscription in 2015, reversing its 2008 suspension after Russia’s annexation of Crimea exposed the vulnerability of a purely professional force. Latvia, which ended conscription in 2007, restored a selective draft in 2023 in response to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the need to rebuild mobilisation capacity.

Across these countries, full conscription remains viable where historical experience, structural threat asymmetry or direct geographic exposure demand rapid mobilisation capacity and broad societal engagement in defence.

Selective Conscription and Hybrid Systems

The second group employs selective or limited conscription combined with a professional core, offering mobilisation depth without restoring universal service.

Denmark has long maintained conscription in law but applies it selectively through a lottery. In 2024, Copenhagen extended conscription to women and lengthened service to 11 months, entering into force in 2025, explicitly framed as a response to the deteriorating security situation in the Baltic and Arctic. Sweden, which abolished conscription in 2010, reinstated it in 2017 as a gender-neutral selective system. Since 2022, the intake has increased as Stockholm strengthens its "total defence" model and expands reserve capacity in parallel with NATO membership. The Netherlands retains a dormant conscription law-"suspended" but not abolished. Since 2018, all young citizens receive conscription letters, though no one is called up. The framework allows rapid activation in crisis, while the armed forces function as fully professional in peacetime. Croatia, after suspending conscription in 2008, voted in late 2025 to reintroduce compulsory basic training starting 2026. The new model consists of short, intensive training for men, with voluntary access for women, justified by heightened regional insecurity and the war in Ukraine.

Enhanced Voluntary National-Service and Reserve Schemes

The third group is expanding voluntary national service, strengthening reserves, or preparing mechanisms for rapid mobilisation-reflecting recruitment challenges, reserve shortages, and societal reluctance to return to mandatory service.

Germany has been undergoing significant transformation of its military service since 2024. After conscription was suspended in 2011, Berlin introduced a comprehensive reform in that moves the country toward a conditional, scalable mobilisation model. Beginning in 2026, all 18-year-olds will receive questionnaires assessing skills and willingness to serve, and an expanded one-year voluntary service will absorb volunteer recruits. Germany retains legal authority to reactivate compulsory service if security conditions worsen. In November 2025, Germany’s Chancellor Friedrich Merz pledged to build "Europe’s strongest army," which will include 260,000 active personnel and 200,000 reservists by 2035-marking a major shift after years of military underinvestment. It is introducing expansion of cyber-reserve programmes, strengthened regional mobilisation commands, and legislative changes enabling faster activation of reservists.

Belgium is introducing a voluntary service year from 2026, starting with several hundred participants and expanding gradually. Volunteers complete a year of structured military training before joining the reserve for ten years-part of a long-term effort to increase Belgian defence personnel. Poland introduced a voluntary basic military-service scheme in 2022 and aims to scale it to 100,000 volunteer trainees per year by 2027. This complements Poland’s large Territorial Defence Force and reflects Warsaw’s ambition to develop one of the EU’s most extensive reserve systems. Romania is developing a four-month paid voluntary service for citizens aged 18-35 to rejuvenate ageing reserves and reinforce mobilisation capacity. The government approved the draft law in 2025. Slovakia remains officially professional, but since 2023 it has expanded voluntary military-training programmes and created a National Defence Forces reserve concept. Political discussions continue about introducing short compulsory training, though no decision has been taken. Bulgaria maintains a professional army but is preparing legislation on mandatory military training for specific civilian professions if voluntary intake proves insufficient, signalling concern about reserve shortfalls. Hungary operates a Volunteer Military Service aimed particularly at young people, offering short-format training linked to fast-track enlistment or reserve roles. Slovenia runs a 13-week voluntary service that feeds into reserve structures; conscription remains suspended but could be reactivated in emergency.

These reforms show how voluntary systems are increasingly being used to ensure mobilisation when mandatory service is politically challenging.

Fully Professional Forces with Limited Reserves

A final group continues to rely on fully professional forces, supported by relatively small reserves, while acknowledging growing pressure to expand manpower models.

Italy, Spain, and Portugal abolished conscription between 1999 and 2004, reflecting the post-Cold War expectation that European militaries would focus on international peace operations. Since Russia’s in Ukraine, political debates about some form of national or civic-military service have resurfaced-especially in Italy and Spain-though no concrete reforms have been adopted. Czechia maintains a professional army alongside an expanding active reserve, and while conscription remains constitutionally possible in exceptional circumstances, no government has moved to reintroduce it. Ireland, Malta, and Luxembourg have always relied on compact professional forces tailored to niche capabilities. Their debates focus on increasing recruitment, strengthening reserves, and contributions to EU and NATO rather than mass mobilisation.

Across these countries, the professional model remains dominant, but the strategic environment is prompting more discussion about partial national service, larger reserves, or enhanced voluntary training.

France’s Introduction of a New Voluntary Military Service

France abolished compulsory military service in 1997 and transitioned to a fully voluntary professional force. Currently it is composed of around 200,000 professional military personnel and 47,000 reservists. The French model relies on career officers, non-commissioned officers, and a large number of contract soldiers serving in short- or medium-term engagements. The professionalisation was intended to produce a more deployable, agile and technologically advanced force-capable of overseas operations. However, this model has also produced vulnerabilities. France has faced chronic recruitment shortages, especially in specialised fields such as cyber-defence, intelligence, engineering and certain combat trades. Demographic decline and increased competition with civilian labour markets have strained the capacity to maintain force levels.

On 25 November 2025, President Emmanuel Macron announced a new model of voluntary national military service in his speech in Varces-Allières-et-Risset, inside the barracks of the 27th Mountain Infantry Brigade. France is creating a 10-month long civic-military service for 18-19-year-olds, starting with 4-week basic military instruction, and followed by civic-resilience training, and familiarisation with defence and civil-protection missions. The objective is not to recreate the universal conscription but to rebuild societal engagement with defence, strengthen national cohesion, and expand the pool of citizens acquainted with basic military skills.

The new service will begin with 3,000 volunteers in its first year, gradually increasing to 10,000 annually by 2030, with a target of 50,000 by 2035. The volunteer service will be limited to duties within France, whereas external or frontline deployments will remain the responsibility of the professional armed forces. The change will be incorporated into the next multi-year Military Programmation Law, giving it a stable legal and financial foundation within France’s broader defence modernisation effort. Remuneration is expected to be around €800-€950 per month, accompanied also with full coverage of accommodation, meals, transport, and equipment. This structure aims to make the programme socially accessible while ensuring credible military training standards. This marks a significant recalibration of France’s professional-army model complemented with the reserve to a hybrid three-tier service consisting of professional military, reservists and volunteers, aimed at the growing need to rebuild a broader societal foundation for national defence.

The reform was launched in a sensitive political climate. Public debate intensified after remarks by General Fabien Mandon, Chief of Defence Staff, who stated that France should be "prepared to lose children" in face of Russian threat. Comments were intended to underline the realities of national defence but were interpreted by some as implying potential deployments of young volunteers to Ukraine. Others supported the General’s position, arguing that Europe as a whole - and France in particular - can no longer disregard the imminent threat posed by Moscow. The government quickly clarified that participants in the voluntary service will not be deployed abroad and that the programme is dedicated exclusively to domestic preparedness and resilience.

France’s initiative thus illustrates a broader shift, as European states adapt their force structures to meet the demands of the new strategic environment.

The French reform reflects a continental recognition that credible defence now requires societal as well as military adaptation. As EU member states strengthen reserves, reconsider conscription, or introduce new voluntary schemes, a collective shift is underway toward more robust manpower models. Europe is entering a phase in which the resilience of its societies will be as decisive as the sophistication of its equipment.

Copyright image: Lionel BONAVENTURE / AFP
The 3rd Marine Infantry Parachute Regiment after a jump from a French military Airbus A400M aircraft as they take part in the military exercise 'Cathare 25', involving over 800 active and reserve military personnel, near Pamiers on June 26, 2025.