Reading China’s White Paper on National Security in the New Era

"Be secure but never forget the existence of danger; survive but never forget the threat of death; govern but never forget the possibility of chaos" (安而不忘危，存而不忘亡，治而不忘乱). China’s newly released White Paper on National Security asserts that "5,000 years of continuous civilization have endowed the Chinese nation with a profound and rich strategic culture on national security." It frames Xi Jinping’s "comprehensive national security concept" as a natural continuation of these long-standing traditions.

Unlike the United States, China has never publicly released a National Security Strategy. While there is some unofficial information suggesting that a five-year national security strategy was adopted in 2021 and guided policymaking, no official document has confirmed its existence.

The document elaborates on four key elements familiar to China watchers:

1. The centrality of Xi’s comprehensive national security concept, introduced in April 2014 at the first plenary meeting of the Central National Security Commission. The concept is sweeping in scope—covering politics, military, territory, economy, finance, culture, society, science and technology, cyberspace, food, ecology, resources, nuclear issues, overseas interests, outer space, deep sea, polar regions, biology, AI, and data. The White Paper however emphasizes that the goal is not to “securitize everything”, but to “enhance the systemic, holistic, and coordinated nature of national security work and effectively wage a comprehensive national security campaign (打好国家安全总体战)."
2. The elevation of “political security” as the “lifeline of national security in the New Era”. This is centered on preserving the socialist system, CPC leadership, and the socialist constitutional order. Political security is said to have been integrated across all areas of governance, with mechanisms for early risk detection and containment that are not described precisely, but are likely to refer to the system of Party cells in all organizations. The White Paper also stresses ideological security, defined as upholding Marxist doctrine and maintaining control over public discourse and cyberspace.
    
3. The framing of national security policy as support for “Chinese-style modernization”, and understood as delivering tangible results to the Chinese population in the spirit of a government of services. At the risk of stretching the conceptual limits of national security, the White Paper emphasizes achievements across various policy domains, including:
   
   - An intentional homicide rate of 0.44 per 100,000 people, among the world’s lowest, and a figure that would make China the third safest country in the world according to 2023 UN data;
   - Just 9 major industrial accidents in 2024, the first time this number has fallen to single digits;
   - Substantial air quality improvements and reforestation progress, contributing to global greening;
   - The evacuation of 10,000 Chinese nationals from high-risk areas in 2024, a statistic that warrants further clarification given that the main operation conducted in 2024 concerned 200 citizens evacuated from Lebanon.
    
4. The search for balance between national security goals and development. The White Paper argues that “a higher level of security is now required to support higher-quality development.” It calls for risk-informed decision-making, ensuring development strategies are assessed for security implications. Four structural priorities are laid out:
   
   o A national security risk monitoring and early warning system;
   o A strategic material reserve system to strengthen self-reliance;
   o Resilient urban infrastructure and disaster response capabilities, in the context of climate change;
   o A stable macroeconomic environment to mitigate financial fragilities and systemic risks.

The paper concludes this section by stressing the importance of legal instruments to support national security, a signature element of Xi Jinping’s approach, and an issue Institut Montaigne has examined in its recent policy paper, China’s Extraterritoriality, a New Stage of Lawfare.

Three aspects of the White Paper merit particular attention given their relevance to current external security dynamics, especially in the context of U.S.–China strategic competition under the Trump presidency.

First is China’s effort to portray itself as a "source of stability and certainty" in a turbulent world, and as a "defender of globalization, but not unconditionally" - a term certainly meant to justify Chinese retaliation against US actions. Despite highlighting geopolitical risks, the White Paper’s tone remains overall upbeat. It describes an irreversible historical trend toward "peace, development, cooperation, and win-win outcomes", and views the rise of the Global South as a stabilizing force in international affairs. Here, the language of the White Paper is resolutely performative.

However, the 1971 resolution simply transferred China’s UN seat from the "representatives of Chiang Kai-shek" to the PRC and made no reference to Taiwan’s sovereignty.

That said, the paper’s tone clearly favors United Front tactics over military coercion. There is no indication that Beijing is losing patience. The language of the document even suggests that the Chinese leadership may currently see an opportunity to advance its unification agenda—capitalizing on Taiwan’s domestic political polarization and the possibility that the U.S. president could be conditioned by skillful Chinese diplomacy to consider rhetorical concessions on Taiwan, even against the view of his national security team.

Third is the clear emphasis on supply chain resilience as a strategic priority. The White Paper identifies grain self-sufficiency as a top concern and takes a self-congratulatory tone: while output has remained above 650 million tons for a decade, it surpassed 700 million tons in 2024. The document highlights continued investment in seed technology and food storage systems, underscoring the importance of agricultural self-reliance. It also affirms a policy of energy diversification, along with investments in strategic critical mineral reserves and clean technology development. Reducing exposure to foreign technological chokepoints, and more broadly, reducing dependence on foreign technology, is presented as a core pillar of China’s national security strategy. This, combined with China’s sustained investment in military power, though never explicitly mentioned in the document, serves as a reminder that China is positioning itself to acquire the capabilities needed to prevail in a great power war.
 
The White Paper reflects a clear quest for moral high ground. Notably, it grounds Xi Jinping’s security-first agenda in the long arc of Chinese history. The quote from the  Lost Book of Zhou, "内事文而和，外事武而义", translated as "domestic affairs are harmonious when governed with civilized virtue; external affairs should be handled with strength, and military power can only be used if it serves justice", has become a recurring reference in national security and defense documents. It conveys the leadership’s conviction that an overreliance on either military force or benevolent civil governance risks undermining China’s achievements, and that the core strategic challenge lies in maintaining a careful balance between the two.

While this quest for moral high ground is not new, it now unfolds in an international environment where the United States is no longer actively seeking to occupy that space. In this context, China can be expected to achieve some soft power gains, even though its actual behavior does not always align with its policy statements, and sometimes contradicts them.

The disconnect between narrative and policy remains a major weakness of China’s foreign policy, even though many countries are blind to it, for different reasons, such as anti-American ideology, whataboutism or lack of expertise on China.

In conclusion, beyond playing a performative role in China’s ongoing effort to control the narrative around international relations, the White Paper overall signals a posture of strategic confidence, despite the persistent anxieties over regime security that run through the text. The assertion that China is now "better equipped" not only to defend against national security threats, but also to shape its external security environment, perhaps best captures the mood of the document.

Copyright Nicolas ASFOURI / AFP