Palestine - Macron’s 2003 Moment

How can one not see Emmanuel Macron having his "2003 moment", this September 22nd, in New York, at the heart of the United Nations, in declaring that the "time had come" to recognise the State of Palestine.

The main parallel is immediately apparent. In 2003, Jacques Chirac and Dominique de Villepin’s France was leading the opposition to the American invasion of Iraq. In 2025, in the days prior to the UNGA, France was the first member of both the permanent Security Council and G7 to announce its intention to recognise the State of Palestine. In both cases, defying the United States-and this time, exposing itself to backlash from the Israeli government. In both contexts, France has succeeded in prompting other powers to follow suit; Germany, Russia and China in 2003; Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia and Portugal this year-that is without mentioning Saudi Arabia, France’s co-President of the New York conference, and the Arab States that Paris has skilfully managed to involve in the undertaking.

In the Iraq affair, Chancellor Schröder imposed his line on both the German political class and Diplomatic Service, the latter frankly terrorised by his audacity in doing so. Whereas today, it is rather the Labour Party grassroots-and Liberal Democrats-that are pushing Sir Keir Starmer to "follow Macron" (and even, in the official announcement, to precede him, since the United Kingdom formally recognized the State of Palestine on the 21st, along with Canada and Australia-Commonwealth obligations). Yet, perhaps, this is not the main point. If London, Ottawa, Canberra, Lisbon and Brussels and other capitals have come to the same conclusions as Paris, albeit starting from slightly different premises than those of France, is this not evidence that President Macron and French diplomacy have grasped, in their own way, a sense of history?

A Personal Reading

The author of these lines, a career diplomat, was present in the Security Council chamber when, on February 14, 2003, Villepin delivered France’s position-with a force still resonating today. He invites the reader to indulge a somewhat personal interpretation of these great moments in diplomacy. Most striking of all, is the ability of our "old country"-France, however economically, politically, socially, and even geopolitically (with the threat of Russia breathing down our necks as the American protector withdraws) weakened it may be, to express or crystallize the overwhelming sentiment of the community of nations at a given moment. In our eyes, this is where the parallel with the events of 2003 is most justified and, of course, most surprising.

Let us not give in to complacency. In today’s world, one sometimes has the sense that people have become more cynical. There is reasonable doubt that France’s gesture will bring about the same public enthusiasm as its opposition to the United States did back in 2003. Indeed, at the time, Chirac and Villepin incarnated a national quasi-unanimity; this is far from being the case with Macron’s decision on Palestine, notably because, in France’s political class, parties and leaders aligned with Gaullist ideals are now more sympathetic to Israel’s arguments than to those of the Arabic world.

Additionally, even more so than in 2003, critics will denounce France’s "grandiloquent" stance; the arrogance of a President quick to "lecture" to the world despite facing a political crisis at home. The step from Gaulle’s "grandeur" to mere "grandiloquence", it would seem, is short. Yet, must we succumb to the other temptation-that is, discrediting national authorities-when it is hard to deny the success, or even the diplomatic feat that the Franco-Saudi initiative leading to the recognition of a Palestinian State represents?

In 2003, American neo-conservatives were already spreading similar accusations against France. Putting an end to the smear campaign took a brave letter from France’s Ambassador in Washington, Jean-David Levitte, addressed to Commentary in response to an article the review had published, which he signed "as a French Ambassador, as a diplomat and as a Jewish Frenchman".

Other critiques warrant greater attention. Should we not have waited, even if only for the sake of the Israelis, for the hostages to be released? For a ceasefire to have been achieved? Such conditions risked confronting an aporia: condemning our stance to be held hostage by the extremes on both sides. One may fear that Hamas sees its only chance of survival in prolonging the conflict, short of Israel conceding its rule over Gaza. And a glance at the Israeli press-and the indignation of the hostages’ families-is enough to cast doubt on whether their release holds any real importance for Mr. Netanyahu’s government.

Let us admit here, too, our personal sentiment. Of course, if French diplomacy was capable of achieving the release of the hostages and stopping the massacre in Gaza, this would be the most important, most urgent diplomatic gesture concerning a Palestinian State. But, given the little leverage at France’s disposal to change the immediate course of action of both Hamas and Jerusalem’s coalition government, it seems only right to use the tools at our disposal to defend the reasonable prospect of a two-State solution. It is only right that we try everything possible to alter the course of events.

Some say these diplomatic manoeuvres exist in a world parallel to that of the real one. We disagree with that assessment. French diplomacy is not wrong in emphasizing that by their initiative for a two-State solution, France and Saudi-Arabia have already produced results: promises of reforms and general elections within a year on the side of the Palestinian Authority, a blanket ban on Hamas by the Arab States, a stated willingness to rebuild Gaza when the time comes, and further measures contained in United Nations resolutions. However, how can we ensure that the commitments made by all parties are actually translated into action? The approach taken by countries that recognize a Palestinian state undoubtedly involves a gamble, one that sets in motion a dynamic leading ultimately to a genuine settlement of the conflict.

The Limitations of the Recognition Wager

This brings us to the real limitation that the Franco-Saudi initiative is likely to encounter: what guarantee do we have that such momentum can be generated if we cannot influence the parties directly involved in the conflict on the ground? Our answer? Again a personal one, that featured in an op-ed piece for the newspaper Le Monde: if there is no ceasefire in Gaza, and if Israel does not eventually adopt a more open attitude, the step forward that Paris and the other countries who have supported the Franco-Saudi initiative have made will come to a grinding halt. Pushing this reasoning further: the fact is that, in the context of the current tragedy in Palestine, only President Trump seems capable of changing Israel's course, as he has shown in the not so distant past (in January by imposing an initial ceasefire, in June by striking Iranian nuclear facilities though immediately halting the Israel-Iran conflict). It remains to be seen whether Donald Trump can rise to the occasion

The American President wishes to normalise relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel, within the framework of the "Abraham Accords", the great diplomatic success of his first term in office. Perhaps the United States’ President may yet be convinced of the obvious: for the Saudis and other regional forces to recognise the State of Israel, they need public opinion and substantial gestures to be directed towards the Palestinians. Approached from this perspective, the Franco-Saudi initiative, as with all those that favor peace in the region, is in reality complementary to the "Abraham Accords".

Copyright image : SPENCER PLATT / GETTY IMAGES NORTH AMERICA / Getty Images via AFP
On September 22, at the United Nations General Assembly in New York, Emmanuel Macron shakes hands with Saudi Arabia's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Faisal bin Farhan Al-Saud, after delivering a speech in which he recognizes Palestine.