The Never-Ending Iranian Nuclear Saga Is Nowhere Near Its Conclusion

Most worryingly, it began to enrich at a level of 60% without any credible rationale. Given that enrichment is practically an exponential process, this brings Tehran very close to the 90% level which is required for nuclear weapons. By May 2022 it had accumulated 3,809 kilos of enriched uranium in various forms. Most of it (3,491 kilos) was in gaseous form and would need to be converted to metal. This includes 43 kilos of uranium enriched to 60%. In addition, Tehran has resumed activities in the metallurgy of uranium as well as the production of heavy water beyond what was allowed by the JCPOA.

Meanwhile, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) encountered increasing verification problems. Since 2018, the Agency has discovered no less than four “undeclared facilities” including three, where traces of uranium of anthropogenic origin were found, with no credible explanation given. On the contrary, by 2021 Iran had discontinued the implementation of monitoring measures (including for instance access to cameras). And in July, Tehran turned off 27 cameras installed after the 2015 deal, promising to keep them off until a deal is achieved. All this does not imply Iran is building a bomb right this second. What it does mean, however, is the following:

First, the time required to build a nuclear bomb has been dramatically reduced since 2015. To make one “significant quantity” – the minimum needed for one device – would now only take weeks according to the IAEA (if not days according to independent estimates) and neither the IAEA nor Western intelligence agencies would be certain to detect such a gesture in time. To be sure, crossing the “weaponization” line would still take time. This purely military side of the program was disrupted by international pressure, including sabotage and targeted assassinations. Even Israel believes that it would still take some 18-24 months for Iran to make a nuclear weapon should it decide to do so. But this part of the program risks being undetected. Testing nuclear-capable missiles are more visible, but Iran now has such capability. After decades of denial, Iranian officials have begun talking openly about nuclear weapons. In late 2021, the former head of the Iranian Atomic Energy Agency candidly admitted that the famous Iranian scientist Mohsen Fakrizadeh – assassinated in 2020 – was running a team of nuclear weapons research. More recently, several current officials have referred to Iran’s “ability” to build such weapons. These are worrying developments.

EU mediators, who played a pivotal role in the negotiations, circulated a “final” proposal for salvaging the deal in early August. This new form of agreement is less ambitious in scope than the 2015 version. It is no longer seen – as was the case under the Obama administration – as the key to a new relationship with Iran.

Nevertheless, the conclusion of an agreement encountered three main problems. The first was the desire by the Islamic Republic for a formal treaty, which would make a future US withdrawal more difficult. This remains a real possibility considering the current state of US politics. The second was that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps – the famed Pasdaran, perhaps the backbone of the regime – be removed from the US foreign terrorist organization blacklist. While both issues no longer seem to be deal-breakers, a third one appears much thornier to solve. Iran wants to close the books on IAEA investigations into its undisclosed activities. Yet even if this was judged acceptable by all parties involved in the negotiation, the IAEA is an independent United Nations agency and would need to be directed by its Board of Governors to do so. At this point, Tehran insists that the agency’s probe is closed ahead of “Reimplementation Day” which according to the draft agreement, would happen 120 days after signature and trigger the lifting of all remaining sanctions.

Many believed Iran desperately needed a deal given its harsh economic situation and the emerging transformation of the Middle East through the Abraham Accords, which cemented a de facto political, economic and security alliance between Israel and several of its former Arab foes. The Iranian perception is probably different. The regime has survived the re-establishment of sanctions – notably through illegal oil sales to Asian countries – and since 2015 has gained ground in the Middle East (with a stronger foothold in Syria). It may see the United States and the West as weaker and preoccupied with other issues, from Ukraine to Taiwan. The absence of widespread condemnation when Iran breached the 60% enrichment threshold may have been an encouragement. The pragmatists in Tehran have lost ground, as testified by the victory of hardliner Ebrahim Raisi in the June 2021 presidential election. Not to mention the Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) announcement in September 2021, when two parties to the Iran negotiations – Washington and London – legitimized for the first time the transfer of highly enriched uranium (HEU)-run submarines to a non-nuclear country (Australia). This prompted Tehran to confirm its alleged interest in such HEU for (imaginary) submarines. Finally, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, a country that gave up nuclear weapons,  certainly confirmed the need for Tehran to build its own nuclear deterrent.

And in late August, US and Iranian forces clashed in Syria. Meanwhile, and largely in reaction to Iran’s stiffening stance, Washington appears to have hardened its own positions and has signaled that is not ready for “a deal at any price”. It sanctioned Iranian companies violating the sanctions. The vigilance of hard-line Republicans in Congress who stand ready to accuse the Biden administration of weakness may also have contributed.

All this does not bode well for the successful conclusion of the negotiations. Moreover, a new agreement would not solve the Iranian nuclear question “once and for all” more than the JCPOA did. Iranian hardliners might be even more tempted to cheat than was the case in 2015, counting on the lack of attention by Western powers.

What to do in the absence of an agreement

Still, as was the case at the time – and even though the JCPOA may not have been the “best possible deal” as described by the Obama administration – it might be better overall to live with a moderately constrained Iran than with a totally unconstrained (or constrained only by IAEA obligations it has flouted for decades) Iran. There is no Plan B – or, rather, we’ve already seen what Plan B could be (the so-called “maximum pressure campaign” by the Administration) and it did not exactly work. A major crisis would probably ensue at some point, especially if a hard-line Republican president was to be elected in November 2024. The Iranian program would eventually reach a point where it would change the strategic calculus of key actors in the region. Perhaps Iran would not build operational nuclear weapons and claim only the “capability to do so immediately if need be”. But that is a risky bet: nuclear program history indicates that no country has ever stayed very long at the threshold.

The possible consequences of a nuclear-armed Iran have been analyzed for more than two decades now and, in many ways, such a scenario would be much worse than the North Korean one. Broadly speaking, four consequences are feared.

1. The possession of nuclear weapons would embolden the Islamic Republic in its regional designs, including through the support of terrorist forces.
2. Bilateral deterrence vis-à-vis Israel would not necessarily operate, given that Tehran does not even recognize the existence of that State.
3. Given that, by definition, the international community would have been unable to stop Iran from acquiring the bomb, the whole international order would be shaken.
4. In particular, the loss of confidence in the United States and the erosion of the NPT would heighten the probability of further proliferation in the Middle East and in East Asia.

In many ways, in the absence of an agreement, we would be back to the late 2000s and early 2010s, when a central question was how to avoid two bleak scenarios, “to bomb Iran or to have an Iranian bomb”. So what to do to avoid such a terrible dilemma?

The never-ending Iranian nuclear saga is a critical issue for Europe, not only because of the geographical proximity of the Middle East but also because we Europeans claim to fight for a rules-based world order. This explains why the EU and three of its members (France, Germany and the United Kingdom) have played, and continue to play, a central role in the negotiating process – including in the current phase where Tehran refuses to talk directly to Washington. An additional reason why we have an interest is the looming energy crisis: a successful agreement would bring back Iranian oil and gas to the international market. However, analysts guard against unwarranted expectations in this area, and this should thus not be a reason to haste the negotiations or lower our legitimate demands vis-à-vis Tehran.

Copyright: AFPATTA KENARE / AFP