From Caracas to Kyiv: Major Geopolitical Stakes of 2026

Maintained ambiguity over Ukraine, the threat of interference in Iran, open intervention in Venezuela the "Trump II world" continues to surprise us. At the beginning of this new year, the capture of Maduro, the Venezuelan dictator, is dominating the news. This must not allow us to lose sight of Ukraine, or more generally, the great rift opening up before us between America and Europe.

Role and Alliance Reversals

First, Ukraine. During Zelensky's visit to Mar-a-Lago on December 28, a rapprochement had taken place between the Ukrainian president (backed by the Europeans) and the Trump administration over what a settlement of the conflict might look like. Vladimir Putin likely sensed the danger. The Kremlin rushed to allege a "massive attack" by Ukrainian drones on one of Putin's residences; a pretext for the "hardening" of Russia’s positioning in negotiations.

The Russians were, of course, fully aware that American intelligence services would not be fooled by the maneuver. The actual aim of the Kremlin was to signal its refusal to negotiate and to justify the Russian escalation in attacks against civilian targets in Ukraine (an escalation we are now witnessing). But Trump initially seemed to take the bait. Apparently, it was CIA director John Radcliffe who brought him back - for how long, one might ask - to a more accurate assessment of reality. In the "world of Trump II," even within the administration itself, not to mention more broadly in public opinion, there remain, for the moment, a few safeguards, as documented by the New York Times investigation on the subject-a report that is hardly reassuring, nonetheless.

Beyond the Ukrainian affair, which we will return to a little later, it is the transatlantic relationship, the historical link between Europe and the United States, that has been brought into question. The National Security Review (NSS) published by Washington in late November is not an merely an operational document, but provides a picture of the mindset, the "software" one might say, of the current American leaders: economic and technological competition with China, a desire to focus on the "Northern Hemisphere," not without aggression (Venezuela, Canada, Greenland), a pull towards Russia, continued engagement in the Middle East, and visible animosity displayed towards Europe.

Why this animosity? Reading the NSS - and the tweets of those close to the current American power - one is tempted to highlight three currents that combine in Trump's entourage. First, what is called the "civilizational wing", embodied by Vice-President Vance. This group depict Europe as the stronghold of unrestricted immigration, "woke" culture, and an undue form of tolerance towards Islam, a continent burdened by economic, technological, and demographic lethargy: hence the regretful condemnation of a Europe "in the process of civilizational erasure" detailed in the NSS. The second current: big business and, even more so, tech’s hostility towards the European Union.

These two currents, which are in a way on the surface of things, however powerful they may be, have a third, deeper foundation, with more historical roots, which refers to a classic love-hate relationship between the two sides of the Atlantic, once explored by the novels of Henry James. In the world of Trump II, the traditional elites attached to Europe no longer carry much weight. Behind the facade of "Christian nationalism", the MAGA movement flirts with white supremacy, despite the fact that in 20 to 25 years’ time, the non-Hispanic white population will become a minority in the United States. Leaders of the Trump camp thus give the impression of pursuing in Europe, under the guise of "civilizational" considerations, a battle that has been lost in America itself. To put it another way: the anti-European rhetoric is all the more virulent because, in a sort of unexpected reversal of roles, it is America, two hundred and fifty years after the founding of the Republic in Philadelphia, which today carries the torch of illiberalism, while Europe in its majority remains for now faithful to the ideals of the Enlightenment.

This role reversal highlights, if it does not completely explain, the implicit reversal of alliances between Washington, Moscow, and Europe.

The Tests to Come

It is now becoming increasingly clear that it would be a mistake for Europeans to think that lying low, offering occasional concessions to the Trump administration and waiting patiently for better days is enough. One need only remember how short-lived the "sigh of relief" was among European NATO members following the The Hague summit** (June 24-25, 2025) after solemnly promising to raise defense and security spending to 5% of GDP to satisfy the American protector.**

In the coming months, various tests should give precise indications of the degree of tension that will inevitably affect the US-Europe relationship. Among these are:

• Digital Regulation: Will the few sanctions placed on (non-official) personalities, in the form visa revocations, be followed by heavier penalties (in particular, financial) and be extended to EU or Member State officials? Will European companies be denied licenses in the United States? How will the Commission, under the eyes of the both Member States and the European Parliament, react? A deliberately minimal interpretation of the two regulations in question - the Digital Markets Act (DMA) and the Digital Service Act (DSA) - or even a watered-down revision of the texts in question when the time comes? Or, on the contrary, will the Commission put on a show of strength?
• Tariffs: Amid rising tension, will Washington reopen the Turnberry agreement (July 27, 2025) and proceed with a new round of tariff increases? And this time round, can the European Union choose once again to bow down its head?
• Elections in Europe: In line with recent precedents (Romania, Poland’s presidential election, support for the AfD in Germany and Nigel Farage in the United Kingdom, etc.), during the next elections in Europe, will the Trump administration launch information campaigns in favor of right-wing populist parties? Thus combining its efforts with those of Russia? This would be consistent with the NSS when it professes the administration's intention to "promote patriotic parties [in Europe]" whose growth "give cause for great optimism." One notes in passing that, apart from the Minister Delegate to the Minister of the Armed Forces, Ms. Alice Rufo, few official voices in France have denounced the ruthlessness of the NSS.
• Greenland: While Copenhagen may have hoped to "calm the White House" by ordering a new batch of F35s, Trump has appointed a clearly belligerent, if not "annexationist," "Special Envoy to Greenland". Should we not expect another show of force from Washington at one moment or another? The intervention in Venezuela only makes this hypothesis even more plausible.
• Finally, Ukraine, again: It is largely because of their dependence on America regarding Ukraine that the Europeans, through the Commission, had to yield on tariffs. Would a ceasefire not, if it occurred under viable conditions for the Ukrainians, and provided that the build up of European military capacity really takes off, weaken this dependence, at least in part? Alas, many other hypotheses, in which relations between the two sides of the Atlantic will remain strained, are possible; the prolonging of war, the US abandoning Ukraine, an uncertain truce, or an agreement unfavorable to Ukraine.
   

What European Leadership?

The context created by the U.S. intervention in Caracas is not irrelevant to what comes next. We are likely witnessing a game changer. Moscow and Beijing’s leaders are now certainly unable to ignore that Donald Trump is capable of "biting". In return, they can hope that his administration takes the path of a series of foreign interventions, taking away the focus from European or Asian issues. They also reap a first act of recognition of "spheres of influence," already more or less implicit in the NSS. Furthermore, in terms of the upcoming calendar, the U.S.’ mid-term elections and elections taking place in Europe (particularly in France) will be important factors, likely to reshuffle the cards.

In any event, how can one arrive from the above at any other conclusion than that European leaders must at least prepare for various scenarios of confrontation with the United States in the months ahead? The time should be for contingency planning, yet this sketch of a conclusion itself raises at least two further questions. 

Secondly, to what extent is Europe truly capable of asserting itself against the Trump administration? Good observers point out that Europe is evolving, that it is beginning to adapt, but that it still has a long way to go to compete in "the world of carnivores." In our opinion, much will depend on the arrival of a reconfigured European leadership, which can only pass through Germany, the countries most committed to defense (Poland, Northern Europe), and, one can hope, France if it emerges from its current political and economic uncertainties.

In this regard, the last European Council meeting (December 18, 2025) is worth reflecting on: Paris and Berlin were not on the same wavelength regarding Russian assets (and on Mercosur). One version of events attributes to France the responsibility for contributing to the failure of the German plan for the "use" of Russian assets for the benefit of Ukraine. On the French side, it can be argued that Mr. Macron helped save the EU from a planned political stalemate, given Belgium’s opposition among others, by offering the solution of a €90 billion loan to Ukraine through a Covid-type borrowing on the EU budget. The essential, that is the financing of Ukraine, has therefore been secured. One regrets, however, that the formula proposed by Mr. Merz could not be adopted: it had the merit of provoking the joint ire of Moscow and Washington and thus sending a clear signal of European solidity - a quality so necessary, yet still too rare in these times.

Copyright  image: Jim WATSON / AFP
Donald Trump, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth at the Mar-a-Lago residence on January 3, 2026, during the announcement of the capture of Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela.