Keep Your Friends Close: Perspectives for Turkey-EU Re-Engagement

Three questions to Nilgün Arısan Eralp

EU Director at the Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey

From tug-of-war to cooperation, the EU-Turkey dynamic is ever evolving. EU accession may not be the next step, but space is opening up for various points of cooperation. The benefits are clear to both parties, but it remains to be seen whether Erdogan will stay on track towards the EU. We spoke to Nilgun Arisan-Eralp, Director of the Center of EU Studies at the Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey.

After the meeting with President Erdogan and Charles Michel on April 6, Ursula von der Leyen stated that "Turkey shows interest in re-engaging with the European Union in a constructive way". In which areas would both the European Union and Turkey benefit from enhanced cooperation?

While membership is not on the cards for the foreseeable future, the need for close cooperation and dialogue between the EU and Turkey is also apparent in areas such as migration, trade, production, energy, climate, security and defense.

There are three concrete areas in which the EU and Turkey would benefit from enhanced cooperation given the current conditions.

One is migration. Both Turkey and the EU are willing to renew the existing deal. As the EU was not able to put together a fair and sustainable asylum policy, European governments could not agree on relocation. They thus have to cooperate with source and transit countries for re-admission. In the meantime, Turkey’s burden has increased as the figures rose from 2.5 million to almost 4 million migrants. There is a need for more support for education, vocational training and integration in addition to humanitarian assistance.

The second area of cooperation, which would be beneficial for both countries, is the modernization of the customs union. It would rekindle a rules-based approach and restart a process of harmonization towards Turkey’s accession to the EU. A customs union modernization would enable the upgrade of the trade relationship, trigger structural reforms in the Turkish economy, necessitate political reforms encompassing rule of law mechanisms, and align Turkish productive sectors with EU norms and standards, including the Green Deal agenda. On the other hand, in the wake of the Covid-19 crisis, the EU is looking to strengthen its resilience by achieving strategic autonomy in its trade and external policies. Turkey, with its already well-integrated business community into the EU, can make a huge contribution to building Europe’s resilience and contributing to the struggle for strategic autonomy.

Turkey can make a huge contribution to building Europe’s resilience and contributing to the struggle for strategic autonomy.

According to empirical impact assessment studies, the modernization of the customs union would bring economic benefits to both parties. These have been studied by both Europe and Turkeyand the findings are more or less similar. The impact assessment of the EU projected the expected gains to reach 5.4 billion euros, or about 0.01% of GDP for the EU and 12.5 billion euros, or 1.44% of GDP for Turkey.

A third area where cooperation is essential and mutually beneficial concerns facilitating Turkey’s adaptation to the Green Deal, by integrating the country further into EU programs and engaging in consultation and coordination. By excluding countries like Turkey, the EU should not deepen the substantial digital and technological disparity between developed and developing countries. The extension of the Green Deal to the Mediterranean could foster a more inclusive multilateral framework in the region, similar to the EU’s orientation towards the Western Balkans. Such a move could help de-escalate tensions prevalent in the energy field and contribute to a more cooperative and inclusive regional framework.

According to Ursula von der Leyen’s statements in the press conference after the three-partite summit in Ankara on April 6, the Green Deal will be extended to Turkey and it will be an essential part of the high level dialogue between the parties.

Turkey remains a candidate country for accession to the EU, but its bid is hampered by mounting concerns over its lack of respect for human rights, judicial independence and press freedom. Although tensions have eased, the bloc remains worried that Erdogan could resume his "erratic behavior". In what direction could cooperation resume?

The cooperation between the parties is very fragile. In recent years, the EU has focused on sustaining interest-driven transactional relations with Turkey, centered around migration, the economy and the foreign and security policy. However, a sustainable positive agenda needs to include not only interest-driven issues, but also rules-based relations and societal dimensions, which take into account the resilience of the country and the multiplicity of political actors beyond the government.

The rapid deterioration of Turkish domestic governance may appear to EU policy makers as Turkey’s having trouble with democracy. However, the truth of the matter is that they are concrete steps towards further weakening Turkey’s ties with the West, regardless of the country’s recent foreign policy overtures in the Eastern Mediterranean. History shows us that stronger relations between the two parties has facilitated Turkey’s track to democracy, a better functioning economy and stability. A democratically resilient, well-governed Turkey, which acts to further European values in and around its region, would be an asset for security and stability in the European continent and a panacea for the resolution of conflicts and security threats. However, strengthening and revitalizing Turkey-EU relations within the framework of a positive agenda must go beyond the EU’s perceived interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. It must be strongly based on democracy and fundamental rights and only then, should include concerted action and engagement in a number of priority areas.

Finally, it is worth keeping an eye on the upcoming informal meeting at the end of April, organized by United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, to discuss ways to restart deadlocked peace talks on the divided island of Cyprus. Involving Turkish and Greek Cypriots and the three guarantor countries (Turkey, Greece and the UK), this meeting could rekindle the conflict between the relevant parties. While Turkey and the administration in Turkish Cyprus support a two-state solution, all the parties stand by a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation.

History shows us that stronger relations between the two parties has facilitated Turkey’s track to democracy, a better functioning economy and stability.

After months of tensions and provocations, President Erdogan seems to be increasingly willing to cooperate with France and the EU. How do you explain this paradigm shift, and his overall behavior towards the EU?

We need to locate the discussion on the EU-Turkey relationship and Turkey’s changing orientation in the Eastern Mediterranean first in the contextual shift in the Transatlantic. Ankara is well aware that its foreign policy choices and rhetoric in the last five years, which has come to be known as "strategic autonomy", is no longer tenable. "Strategic autonomy" was initiated by Turkey as an independent nation state with a weak EU and Western anchor, separating security abroad from democratic backsliding at home as much as possible. Ankara was able to manage this to some extent, mainly because of the declining leverage of the US and the EU both regionally and globally. However, it is now realizing that "strategic autonomy" is no longer possible and that it will ultimately be confronted with the assertive push for multilateralism and the transatlantic alliance by the Biden presidency. Ankara faces a strategic decision to "reset its foreign policy" and explore ways to adapt to the new era of assertive multilateralism and democracy. EU-Turkey relations are not immune to this process. On the contrary, the more assertive multilateralism shapes global and regional politics, the less space there will be for "strategic autonomy" and transactionalism without democracy, which will in turn lead to a mounting challenge to Ankara’s ability and capacity to continue its unilateral, security and hard power-based operations without rules and democracy at home.

Finally, Turkey depends on the EU for economic and commercial reasons: some EU member states have sizable investments in the country. But more importantly, it depends on the EU for international economic credibility. The increasing fragility of the economic situation in the country - namely a declining growth rate, a large and structural current account deficit, heavy reliance on short-term capital inflows, declining foreign direct investment, and a private sector with large foreign currency liabilities - has made the EU indispensable for Turkey and has played a role in the recent change in the Turkish government’s positive messages of engagement with the EU and its signals towards moderation on the Eastern Mediterranean agenda.

Copyright: STEPHANIE LECOCQ / POOL / AFP