Israel Rethinking its Security

On October 7, Hamas launched a surprise offensive, killing nearly 1,200 Israelis and kidnapping another 240. In response, Netanyahu's government initiated an unprecedented military operation in the Gaza Strip, aiming for the maximalist goal of eradicating Hamas.   This objective, both militarily and politically challenging, has sparked extensive media commentary since October. Beyond the ongoing war and beyond Netanyahu's tenure, the desire for complete eradication of the enemy reflects an upcoming debate in Israel. This debate will be both painful and contentious, focusing on what Israel is willing to accept to ensure its population's security. Israeli policymakers are faced with the dilemma of whether to continue tolerating the immediate threats posed by Hezbollah's missiles and Iran's nuclear program, or to take aggressive and preemptive military action to neutralize these dangers.

However, replacing him, even with more moderate figures like Benny Gantz, won't automatically ease the conflict. Regardless of its political composition—whether it's the current right-wing and far-right coalition or a potential future centrist government—no Israeli administration can escape addressing the crucial issue of how to rebuild the Israeli public's trust in their security apparatus and ensure that residents of evacuated border areas can return home safely amidst threats from Hamas in the south and Hezbollah in the north.

This issue is critical not only for Israel but for the entire Middle East. How a future Israeli government approaches security will determine its willingness and ability to restart diplomatic processes with the Palestinians. In essence, Israel will only recommit to peace if its leaders believe they have "restored" their deterrence capabilities.

October 7 through the prism of Israel's strategic doctrine

The Hamas attack on October 7 shattered the foundational beliefs of Israel's strategic doctrine. Since its inception in 1948, Israel has focused on projecting a formidable defense and intelligence presence to its Arab neighbors to prevent the possibility of invasion. Key Israeli figures like David Ben-Gurion and Moshe Dayan emphasized the importance of deterrence—ensuring massive retaliation against Arab states to discourage any attacks against Israel.

This deterrence strategy, which was primarily directed at neighboring states like Egypt and Syria, began to extend to non-state actors in the last two decades, notably Hezbollah following Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, and Hamas after its election in Gaza and the subsequent blockade in 2007.

The shift in Israel's security posture towards violent non-state actors, who may not operate under the same rational considerations as states, particularly those driven by religious fundamentalism, has fueled considerable debate and concern within both the military and the media. 

Despite four wars against Hamas from 2008 to 2021, Israeli policy makers did not view these conflicts as failures of deterrence but rather as opportunities to reaffirm their red lines. 

This belief in the effectiveness of Israeli deterrence allowed the southern population to live relatively normal lives, to the extent that people felt safe attending a music festival near Gaza on October 6, 2023.

However, the October 7 attack shattered this belief system, making the idea of coexistence with Hamas untenable for Netanyahu's government and the majority of Israelis. Even if the Israeli military were to successfully eliminate Hamas's leadership and dismantle its infrastructure, it would not automatically restore the country's faith in its deterrence strategy.

Israeli deterrence and Hezbollah: a strategy under scrutiny

The success of Hamas’s operation on October 7 raises doubts within the Israeli security establishment about the effectiveness of deterrence strategies against neighbors like Hezbollah. Israel Defense Force planners are likely questioning whether the deterrence approach can still work with Hezbollah, considering its failure against Hamas, and whether the Lebanese militia might be encouraged to undertake similar actions against Israel.  There's also concern about the level of uncertainty Israeli leaders are willing to accept as part of the deterrence strategy.

The reluctance to engage in conflict with Hezbollah also stems from the understanding that a war with the Lebanese group would be far more devastating than with Hamas. Hezbollah possesses superior firepower and well-trained paramilitary groups, having gained valuable combat experience in Syria alongside Assad's regime, Iran, and Russia over the last decade.

Since 2006, Israel's deterrence posture towards Hezbollah has been based on the threat of devastating retaliation against Lebanon, encapsulated in the often-misunderstood "Dahiya doctrine", first articulated by Gadi Eisenkot in 2008.   When asked by the Israeli press about how Israel would respond to Hezbollah attacks, Eisenkot stated that the approach used in 2006 against Dahiya—a Beirut suburb hosting Hezbollah's headquarters that was heavily bombed in the 2006 Lebanon War—would be applied to any village from which Israel is attacked.

Contrary to some interpretations, Eisenkot was not advocating for preemptive strikes against Lebanon but for massive retaliation in response to Hezbollah aggression. Hezbollah also adopted a rhetoric aimed at deterrence. In response to Eisenkot, the militant group’s leader Hassan Nasrallah stated in 2010 that an attack on Beirut's airport would be met with a strike on Tel Aviv's airport.

A nuclear Iran: Israel's revised calculus

Beyond Hezbollah, the prospect of a nuclear Iran is poised to quickly return to the forefront. The International Atomic Energy Agency reports that Tehran now possesses enough enriched uranium to produce three nuclear bombs.
Israel's longstanding refusal to accept a nuclear-armed Iran predates the events of October 7, with covert operations targeting Iranian engineers and officials involved in the nuclear program having intensified well before this date.  Should Iran acquire nuclear weapons, Israel's ability to respond to threats from Tehran-supported militias, whether from Lebanon, the Syrian Golan, or the Red Sea, could be significantly limited.

The concern here is not necessarily the prospect of a direct nuclear confrontation, which remains unlikely, but rather the strategic protection such an arsenal would provide to Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards. This protection could embolden Iran's non-state allies to target Israel and its Western partners across the region. A relevant comparison is India's measured response to Pakistan after the 2008 Mumbai attacks by Lashkar-e-Taiba, influenced by Pakistan's possession of nuclear weapons.  Consequently, the possibility of preemptive strikes against Iran's nuclear program is likely to be a central topic of discussion within the Israeli government and in its consultations with the American administration.

France, Europe, and preventing escalation in the region

The complex challenges facing Israel's deterrence strategy and the potential need for preemptive operations are expected to ignite heated debates among defense officials. These security challenges underscore the pivotal role international allies play in mitigating regional tensions, notably the United States through its military support and diplomatic influence in the Middle East, including with key countries like Egypt, Jordan, and the Gulf states.

France recently proposed an agreement requiring Hezbollah to withdraw its fighters ten kilometers from the border, though this proposal has been ignored by both the Lebanese government and Hezbollah, the latter demanding an end to hostilities in Gaza before any dialogue.

A de-escalation mechanism between Israel and Hezbollah could include a significant deployment of the Lebanese army in the south of the country. The issue is less about operational capability—Lebanese soldiers are fully capable—than about political concerns, specifically Beirut's fear of escalating tensions with Hezbollah. To support the Lebanese army and prevent internal tensions, France could also advocate for enhancing the capabilities of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), which plays a crucial role in mediating and intervening between Hezbollah fighters and the Israeli army.  UNIFIL is unique in its ability to communicate directly with both parties on the ground, but its resources are limited.  After the 2006 war, contributing countries, including France, Spain, and Italy, committed to deploying 15,000 soldiers, a number that has never been reached and currently stands at about 10,000. Strengthening UNIFIL would not only reaffirm its credibility in southern Lebanon, following months of exchanges of fire, but also send a strong signal to Israel about European countries’ commitment to preventing such conflicts.

Whether Israel's security concerns are deemed legitimate or not, they will shape the ability and willingness of any future leader in Tel Aviv to pursue peace with the Palestinian Authority.

Copyright image : Jack GUEZ / AFP