Iran: Facing a Deep Structural Rupture Between Society and the Regime, What Strategy for Europe and France?

Iran stands at a crossroads. Not since 1979 has the gap between Iranian society and the Islamic Republic been so wide or so irreparable. On one side, a young, educated, urban population, outward-looking and explicit in its demands for a democratic rule-of-law state, individual freedoms, and secular governance. On the other, a politico-religious system built on ideological primacy, concentrated power, and a regional revolutionary mission. The January 2026 uprising - and the mass repression that followed - transformed decades of latent tension into an unmistakable structural rupture.

For more than a century, Iranian society has pursued a political trajectory oriented toward limiting state power and strengthening popular sovereignty. From the 1906 Constitutional Revolution to today’s mobilizations, this aspiration has never faded. What has changed is the scale of the disconnect between this historical movement and the nature of the state born of the 1979 Islamic Revolution.

The Islamic Revolution aimed to forge a "new Islamic human being," ideologically disciplined and reintegrated into a theocratic order presented as authentically religious. The "Cultural Revolution" of the early 1980s - closing universities, rewriting curricula, purging dissent—was intended to reshape society in this mold. Forty-seven years later, the result is the opposite: Iran has become one of the most educated and urbanized societies in the Middle East, and remains connected to the world despite sanctions. A large majority of Iranians has repeatedly expressed its democratic aspirations. The simple truth is that the nation has modernized; the regime has not. Hence the rupture.

This rupture is, first and foremost, normative. The regime continues to drive its legitimacy from Velayat-e Faqih and from a transnational revolutionary mission embedded in its Constitution. Society, meanwhile, aspires overwhelmingly to a "normal" nation-state - one integrated into the global economy and protective of individual rights. The rupture has also become moral after the killing of tens of thousands of protesters in January, violence that now amounts to crimes against humanity.

An ever-growing share of the population no longer recognizes the regime as legitimate, while the regime sees its survival only through coercion.

Reinserting Iran into an economic architecture less dependent on Beijing would limit China’s access to discounted Iranian oil and curb the deepening Sino-Iranian strategic alignment. The message to Tehran is clear: a negotiated compromise remains possible, but refusal will come at an ever-increasing cost. In effect: accept the deal now, or pay a higher price after military action. This signals a departure from decades of strategic ambiguity and an attempt to end the logic of "neither war nor peace."

The stated objective is straightforward: avoid war while maintaining credible deterrence. But beyond deterrence, Washington increasingly appears to favor a different path: seeking an outcome from within the regime, not through the opposition. This is not indulgence toward authoritarianism; it is strategic realism.

U.S. officials know the exiled opposition remains fragmented, lacks unified leadership, and has limited organizational capacity or domestic networks. It is not equipped to manage a transition in a country of 90 million people with powerful security institutions and sensitive infrastructure, including nuclear sites. Under such conditions, the sudden collapse of the Islamic Republic would generate major instability with real risks of regional destabilization.

Such a scenario is undesirable for the United States, European capitals, the Gulf Arab states, and Turkey - each aware of how an unstable Iran would affect energy security, migration, and the wider strategic balance.

Within this context, the most plausible trajectory is the emergence of a coalition uniting segments of the armed forces open to political evolution, pragmatic conservatives, and technocrats. Their shared goal would be to marginalize the most ideological factions and initiate a limited opening toward the United States to secure sanctions relief and stimulate economy recovery. To that end, such a coalition might be ready to offer concessions acceptable to the Trump administration.

This scenario could unfold with - or without - a preliminary military confrontation.
Its immediate strategic benefits would be clear: reduced risk of nuclear proliferation and a temporary stabilization of the region. It might also marginally improve economic conditions for Iranians.

But it would not solve the essential issue: political legitimacy.

Recently, seventeen political and civil society figures - including filmmakers Jafar Panahi and Mohammad Rasoulof, Nobel laureate Narges Mohammadi, and political prisoner Mostafa Tajzadeh - called for a peaceful transition to a secular democracy and for the restoration of normal diplomatic relations with the West, as reported by Iran International.

What makes this appeal significant is its strategic clarity. The signatories move beyond protest to outline a concrete political horizon. By urging the armed forces to refuse participation in repression and to stand with the popular will, they seek to create space for drafting a new Constitution through an orderly transition rather than a violent rupture.

The issue, therefore, is not only nuclear or security-related. It is political and civilizational. A tactical arrangement may buy time, but not durable peace. Conversely, pushing for the regime’s collapse without a credible alternative risks opening the door to instability and chaos.

The most realistic approach is to manage short-term risks while supporting the long-term emergence of a credible democratic alternative from within the country.

This aligns with four core expectations consistently expressed by the Iranian people:

1. Tie any sanctions relief to measurable human-rights progress - not only to nuclear concessions.
2. Recognize the Iranian democratic movement as a legitimate political actor and open dialogue with its representatives inside the country.
3. Support unrestricted internetaccess in Iran as a concrete tool of freedom.
4. Impose targeted sanctions on individuals responsibleforrepression.

A fundamental reality stands out: Iranian society has changed profoundly and will continue to push for freedom and democracy through the strength of its civic fabric. A society with a mass democratic aspiration does not disappear. It can be repressed, fragmented, slowed - but not permanently contained.
European policymakers have consistently underestimated this evolution. It is time to reassess it - because what unfolds in Iran will shape the strategic landscape from Central Asia to the Mediterranean and, ultimately, Europe’s own interests and security.

copyright ATTA KENARE / AFP

Tehran, 2026