The EU Economic Security Doctrine: Just Hot Air?

Far from the fire and fury of the U.S. president that has saturated the geopolitical media space, early December, the European Commission publicly re-energized its 2023 project of reinforcing the continent’s economic security. Nearly three years after its initial launch, the Commission’s recent publication provides an opportunity to take stock of this long-term project.

More a New Working Document Than a Doctrine

In the more muted world of national administration, work continued, and December signaled a new milestone following the 2023 strategy and January 2024 communication. After two years marked by geopolitical tensions, economic coercion and the acceleration of geopolitically-motivated industrial competition, it was time.

Hence, on December 3, the Commission published its strategy to "strengthen Europe's economic security". Expected for over a year, what had been assigned to the European Commissioner for Trade and Economic Security, Maroš Šefčovič, in his mission letter as the elaboration of a doctrine for the use of economic security instruments, turned out to be an update of the 2023 "strategy". In this way, the new Commission work programme aligns the numerous ongoing initiatives, confirms the arrival of some new ones and prefigures a change in direction of specific instruments. While this vast overview is structured around six high-risk zones, in terms of prioritizing efforts, requested by several well-informed observers, it will require revisiting, particularly as the scope of what is considered critical remains too broad to be clear.

Digital Governance at Last Centre of Attention

While not the most publicized aspect of the many contributing domains of our economic security, the doctrine invests heavily in our collective organizational stakes in digital governance, a multidimensional theme. Addressed in detail are both governance in the EU-27 and information sharing, as much between public bodies as with the private sector. Often obscure to the general public, these dimensions are nonetheless essential for a proper understanding of a subject notable for its ubiquity.

The end of the partitioning of defense and diplomatic issues in the analysis of the relations between powers, what could be considered as the operational definition of geopolitics, now imposes the integration of these domains which, hitherto, were considered rigorously oriented towards other objectives. The supply of medicines or digital services from suppliers all dependent on a dubiously reliable foreign power, is undoubtedly no longer purely a health or economic-related concern. The same is true for the repurchasing of a cutting-edge business in semiconductors, the hosting of sensitive data or even, beyond the economy, development funding and aid or science and innovation research partners. In more technical terms, economic security requires reintegrating power considerations into international interactions from which one might have liked to exclude them. It also obliges transcending form our traditional public policy silos (defense, national security, health, the economy, education, diplomacy, energy, etc.).

The network could also leverage information produced by risk and vulnerability assessments for which these administrations are responsible.

The Commission is also proposing to deepen and widen studies already foreseen in the European framework around critical sectors, technologies and infrastructure, in particular through the EU Observatory of Critical Technologies, launched in 2021. The proposition also foresees the creation of a group of advisors bringing together representatives of the private sector, including them in these often highly technical discussions in which their expertise is particularly valuable, something that decision makers have been missing so far.

The other novelty of note is the full and explicit integration of digital issues at the core of European economic security. Now recognised as critical economic activity sectors in Europe, with cybersecurity also recognised as essential to our resilience (its underlying technologies having long been acknowledged as such). This obvious reality comes against an unpleasant backdrop: the entirety of our economy depends on these tools and the dependencies with regard to the United States in this area are huge.

The concrete shifts in policy announced are more a matter of reinforcing recent strategic orientations than representative of a clear breakaway. They include the reinforcement of cybersecurity standards of critical digital infrastructure and products, European preference in public procurement, and increased support to the semiconductor (with a revision of the Chips Act expected in summer 2026) and quantum sectors.

In the same category of pre-existing announcements comforted by the economic security aim, von der Leyen’s second mandate priorities feature prominently in the workplan: 

• European product preference in critical sectors;
• Conditioning foreign investment in Europe on the tangible value delivered to the continent in these same sectors; 
• Exclusion of "high-risk partners" from industrial and research programmes;
• Integrating economic security considerations into competitiveness and trade defense tool procedures;
• Formal integration of the EU association process into its economic security, from Global Gateway to enlargement and neighbourhood policies;
• Development/continuation of leadership in specific critical technologies;
• Or even support for defense-related industrial capacities.

Several new initiatives also emerge from the document. European coordination on export control, the fight against foreign overcapacity and the diversification of certain critical inputs must be the subject of dedicated studies to determine whether new tools are necessary to defend European interests. Investment screening mechanisms or the exclusion of high-risk actors from public funding will be supported by best-practice guidelines. Initiatives being mostly confined to best-practice guidelines and new studies already offer an indication of the document’s level of ambition.

Resources and Competencies: Decisions Remain Outstanding Despite the Urgency

This lovely overview of European initiatives and intentions should not make us lose sight of the accelerated degradation of our geopolitical environment, and despite the numerous reforms undertaken since, European economic security is today more at risk than it was in 2023. Our dependencies are greater, our partners more frequently willing to resort to coercion and increasingly focused on reducing their own, while our control over critical technologies remains more precarious than that of our main competitors.

The Commission implicitly admits the slowness of the implementation of numerous measures, particularly in the international cooperation area of our economic security agenda. New partners to secure specific supplies are once again mentioned, despite neither progress having been made nor a renewed approach proposed. The same is true for G7-format partnerships, of which France takes the presidency in 2026, even though the context appears to have significantly deteriorated. Trade and clean investment partners (CTIP), who were spearheading the security strategy on the partnering front only a year ago, are no longer explicitly mentioned. The same can be said for the diversification of our partnerships through trade agreements. Despite the fact that the most important ratification of them all, the Mercosur, has been made to wait since 2019; perspectives have, nevertheless, become clearer in recent days. At the intersection of external partnerships and domestic regulation, economic security standards for diversified, transparent and trustworthy supplies still feature prominently, this time giving priority to minerals and semiconductors. Finally, Europe’s ability to deter foreign powers from employing coercive strategies against us remains yet to be proven.

The relative slowness of our reactions faced with amplifying threats can be explained by two factors outside of this document-and even the Commission’s-scope: the additional political and economic costs we are willing to devote; the distribution of these costs and associated risks for Europeans, including what we are willing to pool together collectively in order to do so (indifferent of the method, federal or confederal).

Ultimately, public opinion will not be deceived and will hold them accountable for the political successes and failures during national elections.

Between economic difficulties, budgetary tensions and political polarization, there is nothing simple about these decisions. Getting out of critical dependencies will increase costs for European households, local authorities and businesses, and will not occur without retaliation from our partners. Monitoring our strategic economic assets more closely will also require additional resources. Doing all of this in close collaboration among Europeans presupposes a certain level of mutual oversight among all twenty-seven Member States.

Preoccupied with the urgent demands of defense and support for Ukraine, and dumbfounded by the course of transatlantic relations under the Trump administration, European leaders have sunk into a sort of inertia on the economic security agenda. Yet necessary clarifications regarding the prerogatives of each-Member States, Commission, Council, Parliament-on issues at the intersection of the economy (a primarily EU competence) and national security (national competence) have not been made. Moreover, no new consequential resources have been allocated and the discussions around the next budgetary framework are heading, at best, toward a flat budget.

With some of the emergencies behind us, let us hope that contrary to the 2023 document, European heads of state will fully embrace the guidance of this one and provide us with the means to our security in a, sadly, increasingly threatening world. Without decisive action, the Commission will be confined to overviews of our shortcomings, and Europeans, on the geopolitical front, to the "slow agony" Mario Draghi dreaded with relation to economic competitiveness.

Copyright image : Roslan RAHMAN / AFP
Maros Sefcovic, Commissioner for Trade and Economic Security, May 7, 2025.