[Decoding France] - New Caledonia: A Stress Test for France's Indo-Pacific Security Strategy

New Caledonia, with its 270,000 inhabitants, plays a crucial role in France’s identity as an Indo-Pacific nation. The territory generates an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of 1.3 million square kilometers, a strategic asset that places France at the heart of global maritime issues, although the EEZ of French Polynesia is three times larger.

The 2024 crisis in New Caledonia has often been interpreted through the lens of public order disturbances, or as a series of conventional urban riots. This is a fundamental misunderstanding. From a law enforcement perspective, the 2024 crisis constitutes a historical rupture. Operationally, it was an armed insurrection at the scale of the entire territory. For the first time in contemporary French history, domestic security forces had to confront a high-intensity internal armed conflict on sovereign national territory.

This semantic confusion is far from merely a matter of words. Describing New Caledonia as a case of public disorder underestimates both the level of violence and the nature of the threat. French security forces faced organized groups using live ammunition and engaging armored vehicles with direct fire. This piece is based on exchanges with key actors of the French counter-insurgency operations within Gendarmerie Nationale.

The events of May 2024 were rooted in the collapse of a long-standing institutional equilibrium. Since the 1998 Nouméa Accord, civil peace in New Caledonia had rested on a negotiated decolonization framework structured around three self-determination referendums, held in 2018, 2020, and 2021. Although the option to remain within France prevailed on each occasion, the third vote was boycotted by the pro-independence camp (FLNKS), reducing turnout to 43.87% and triggering a profound legitimacy crisis.

A central pillar of the Nouméa Accord’s political architecture was the "frozen" electoral roll for provincial elections: citizens who had settled in the territory after 1998 were excluded from voting. This mechanism was designed to preserve the demographic and political weight of the indigenous Kanak population within the institutions of self-government.

In this context, the French government launched a constitutional revision in spring 2024 to "unfreeze" the electoral roll, granting voting rights to residents with at least ten years of continuous presence. From Paris’s perspective, the reform addressed a democratic imbalance and was strongly supported by the loyalist camp.

The more radical wing of the independence movement, organized around the CCAT (Field Action Coordination Cell), perceived the measure as a red line. It interpreted the reform as a deliberate strategy to dilute the Kanak vote permanently and to foreclose any remaining prospect of independence through institutional means. At the same time, CCAT saw the crisis created by the reform as an opportunity to trigger an insurrection and generate political momentum toward independence that negotiation and the existing democratic process had failed to deliver.

Perceived locally as a unilateral move imposed by Paris, the reform provided the spark for the insurrection. Foreign interference then seized upon this institutional crisis as an opportunity, amplifying tensions with the apparent objective of transforming a constitutional dispute into a broader attempt to destabilize French authority. 

Analysis of the engagements points to a clear militarization of the threat, rooted in the territory’s exceptionally high level of civilian armament. As stated publicly by Louis Le Franc, High Commissioner of the Republic, on 21 May 2024, the archipelago counts "64,000 declared firearms for 270,000 inhabitants." When illegal holdings are included, state services estimate the total stock at close to 100,000 weapons. Civilian-owned firearms were diverted to support insurrectionary action.

Engagement distances reached up to 800 meters, implying the use of high-powered, shoulder-fired weapons. By contrast, conventional riot situations involve short-range confrontations-typically a few dozen meters for projectiles such as stones or Molotov cocktails. In the absence of a local defense industry, the principal weapons used against law enforcement were large-caliber, long-range hunting rifles. A qualitative shift therefore occurred: insurgents were able to target gendarmes from beyond the effective range of standard law enforcement weapons, compelling security forces to operate under armored protection. Sustained fire at such distances with this type of weaponry indicates a clear lethal intent. 

The resulting level of violence was exceptional for an internal security operation, forcing a change from crowd control into a de facto counter-insurgency environment. More than 350 confirmed rounds struck Gendarmerie vehicles within a matter of weeks. In Saint-Louis, a single armored vehicle sustained twelve direct impacts during one mission. Senior Gendarmerie officers noted that the volume of fire directed at armored units exceeded that experienced during certain phases of Operation Barkhane in Mali.

"Part of the younger generation is currently being manipulated in the shadows by other countries, inciting violence to push for independence," stated the then French Armed Forces Minister Sébastien Lecornu at the 2024 Shangri-La Dialogue defense summit in Singapore. Although there is no evidence of direct military training of insurgents by foreign powers, the crisis was actively fueled by external actors, notably Azerbaijan.

In July 2023, Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev used his chairmanship of the Non-Aligned Movement (2019-2024) to invite French overseas independence representatives and establish an NGO called the Baku Initiative Group (GIB) to denounce French colonialism. Although the NGO is led by Abbas Abbasov, a former official of Azerbaijan's state oil fund, the connection to the Azerbaijani government is firmly established. The Baku Initiative Group’s action is not limited to New Caledonia - in July 2024, leaders from over 15 pro-independence political parties from Corsica, Melanesia, Polynesia, the Caribbean, and the Antilles islands were also invited in Baku. But so far, only New Caledonia has become a relatively fertile ground for Azerbaijan’s destabilization actions.

In May 2024, Viginum, a French government agency established to monitor and protect against foreign digital interference, identified a widespread and coordinated spread of fabricated and misleading content. The massive "Un-notorious BIG" campaign disseminated fabricated content, including doctored material falsely accusing gendarmes of massacres in Saint-Louis. The objective was to transform a local crisis into a global human rights scandal and to fuel escalation.

Beyond the security dimension, the insurrection has imposed a profound and lasting economic toll on New Caledonia. Material destruction is estimated at approximately €2 billion, close to one quarter of the territory’s annual GDP. The scale of damage, affecting infrastructure, businesses, and public facilities alike, represents not only a short-term shock but a structural setback for an already fragile economy.

The crisis has also accelerated demographic erosion. Between 10,000 and 20,000 residents are estimated to have left the archipelago, exacerbating existing social fractures and draining both skills and capital. This outward movement further weakens local demand, investment prospects, and the territory’s long-term development trajectory.

Equally destabilizing is the loss of insurer confidence. Several companies now refuse to cover certain categories of risk, effectively placing segments of the economic fabric in a state of extreme precarity. Without adequate insurance coverage, reconstruction slows, investment stalls, and private actors face heightened uncertainty-locking the territory into a cycle of fragility that extends well beyond the immediate aftermath of the unrest.

Faced with a hybrid threat combining mass unrest, armed violence, and political destabilization, the state made the strategic choice to place the Gendarmerie nationale at the forefront of the response, supported by military logistics, including an air bridge using Airbus A400M Atlas and Antonov An-124 aircraft. In total, 35 mobile squadrons-approximately 3,500 personnel-were deployed.

The Gendarmerie’s hybrid status as an armed force with permanent territorial coverage and peacetime law enforcement responsibilities proved uniquely suited to the nature of the crisis in New Caledonia. It is, in effect, the only state institution capable of operating seamlessly across the full "peace-crisis-war" spectrum.

In contrast to the events of the 1980s, notably the Ouvéa cave hostage crisis, the government deliberately ruled out deploying the Army-whether the Foreign Legion or airborne units-for area control, law enforcement, or counter-insurgency missions. The decision not to engage combat troops, and not to invoke emergency powers, reflected a determination to manage the crisis using ordinary, standing capabilities. Avoiding the deployment of the Foreign Legion was intended to prevent a definitive symbolic rupture with the population and to avoid treating insurgents as "enemies" under the law of armed conflict-an escalation that would have severely complicated any political resolution.

Accustomed to managing overseas crises ranging from natural disasters to episodes of armed insurrection, the Gendarmerie nonetheless had to scale up its posture as violence intensified. Its military character provided the resilience and endurance required to absorb sustained armed attacks, while its judicial and administrative prerogatives ensured that operations remained anchored in the rule of law. This culture of "controlled force" made it possible to respond to military-grade violence with internal security methods. As summarized doctrinally by General Pierre Poty, Commander of the French Overseas Gendarmerie, the objective was to "restore calm to return to reason; de-escalate without bloodshed to return to negotiation."

Taken together, this calibrated and restrained approach prevented the territory from sliding into civil war, despite the intensity and persistence of insurgent aggression.

In the context of a highly militarized threat, traditional riot-control vehicles proved increasingly ineffective-sometimes entirely inoperative. The deployment of 43 armored vehicles, including 16 new Soframe-built "Centaure" models, was therefore essential for operational maneuver.

This reliance on armored assets underscores a fundamental distinction between the Gendarmerie and civilian security forces, such as the CRS. Unlike the National Police, the Gendarmerie is organically equipped with heavy armor, reflecting its mandate to operate at the upper end of the crisis spectrum.

The armored vehicles conferred decisive advantages on three levels:

• Route clearance: Faced with reinforced barricades, often booby-trapped with gas cylinders and covered by snipers, the Centaure’s hydraulic blade (capable of exerting 3.5 tons of pushing force) allowed safe and rapid clearing of roads without exposing personnel.
• Protection of vital convoys: Armored units acted as mobile shields for logistical flows, including medical supplies, food, and casualty evacuations under fire.
• Detection and judicialization: Equipped with the Pilar V acoustic system, the vehicles could instantly locate the source of gunfire, providing critical operational evidence within a constrained judicial framework.

Simultaneously, the response was reinforced through targeted "tactical surgery" operations. While New Caledonia normally hosts a GIGN detachment (AGIGN), the intensity of the insurrection required immediate reinforcements from mainland France. Over 100 operators from this elite counter-terrorism unit were deployed.

Their mission was twofold:

• Maintaining tactical superiority: Only elite forces possess the investigative and intervention skills necessary to act rapidly against armed, organized, and mobile adversaries.
• Judicializing without neutralizing: These units focused on arresting insurgent leaders-often at dawn-decapitating command structures while minimizing collateral damage. This is the hallmark of the GIGN: the ability to apprehend dangerous individuals in hostile environments without firing a single shot.

Through this combination of armored mobility and precision tactical operations, the insurrection was managed not solely as a security challenge but as a judicial police operation, preserving both operational effectiveness and the rule of law.

The security strategy was complemented by a massive judicial maneuver coordinated with the public prosecutor. Over 5,000 legal procedures were opened. More than 2,500 police custodies and 243 pretrial detentions were ordered. Sensitive cases were transferred to the Paris court to guarantee judicial impartiality and by mid-2025, the backlog had been reduced to around 700 cases.

Digitally, the state took the unprecedented decision to neutralize the platform TikTok and restrict network access to break the insurgency’s momentum. This exceptional measure responded to a critical operational assessment: social networks had become the adversary’s center of gravity.

Beyond immediate stabilization, the 2024 crisis served as a stark wake-up call. The risk of renewed violence and increased foreign interference remains a pressing concern that the French state must address decisively. Two long-term strategic challenges now loom over the future of this French overseas territory.

First, the nickel economy still faces profound structural disruption. Nickel resources, which account for 15-20% of New Caledonia’s GDP and remain the island’s main source of employment, are at a crossroads. The departure of Glencore as industrial partner for Koniambo Nickel SAS (KNS) has left the plant in the Northern Province in "care and maintenance" status, halting production while preserving the furnaces. Glencore’s exit, after investing over $9 billion since the project’s inception without ever turning a profit, reflects the economic unsustainability of high-cost New Caledonian operations in the face of depressed global nickel prices, particularly due to the influx of cheaper Indonesian nickel.

Société Minière du Sud Pacifique (SMSP), the local majority shareholder, continues to search for a new industrial partner to replace Glencore’s 49% stake, but major Western miners remain hesitant despite French government support through the "Nickel Pact," which subsidizes energy costs and simplifies exports. While some interest has been reported from Asian or Middle Eastern sovereign wealth funds, no formal deal has been finalized. In the meantime, export liberalization now allows raw ore to leave the island, generating immediate cash flow, but the loss of thousands of jobs at KNS has fueled political and social tensions in the Northern Province, where the plant had long symbolized economic rebalancing.

Second, there is the issue of future challenges to the French EEZ in the Pacific Ocean. While no violations have been reported thus far, the situation could worsen, particularly in a conflict scenario involving China, where France would support its ally, the United States, or in a scenario of Russia-NATO confrontation which China would seek to exploit. The 2024-2030 Military Programming Law (LPM) prioritizes strengthening overseas territories, allocating a budget of 13 billion euros to enhance military capabilities. This includes the delivery of patrol vessels, corvettes, new surveillance and intervention aircraft, and improvements in drone and satellite surveillance. Additionally, plans include strengthening inter-theater air transport and infrastructure, increasing personnel by over 800, and doubling the number of reservists to over 4,200 by 2030. The 2027 French Presidential Election could lead to a renewed emphasis on defense spending, in the context of German rearmament and persisting risks of geopolitical conflicts in Europe and the Indo-Pacific region. 

Protecting and developing New Caledonia’s economy and resilience will require from France’s Indo-Pacific partners an understanding of the nature of the threats this territory has faced in 2024 and could face again in the future. Indeed, the stability of New Caledonia benefits the wider region. It is therefore crucial for Japan, New Zealand, Australia, and the United States that New Caledonia remains secure and does not become a Chinese foothold. A strong French New Caledonia is a matter of regional strategic balance, as any retreat would quickly shift influence toward powers whose interests may destabilize the Indo-Pacific.

Copyright Image: Theo Rouby / AFP

French gendarmes at the entrance of the Riviere Salee disctrict, in Noumea, France's Pacific territory of New Caledonia, on May 29, 2024.