[Decoding France] - Calm at Home, Storm Abroad?

The President Rises, the Prime Minister Sinks

According to an Ipsos poll, Emmanuel Macron’s approval rating jumped 5 points in March to 27 percent, while that of his Prime Minister, François Bayrou, dropped 2 points to 25 percent. Macron’s televised address on Ukraine on March 5 worked in his favor, placing him back at the center of the diplomatic stage—an arena where he has always been at ease.

Listening to his solemn and serious speech, it was hard not to think of another moment five years ago: Macron’s March 16, 2020 address during the COVID crisis. “We are at war,” Macron declared, using wartime rhetoric to rally the nation against an “invisible, elusive enemy.” This paternalistic, protective stance benefited him politically at the time. Let’s not forget that, back then, Macron was in dire straits: His popularity had plummeted following the Yellow Vest crisis in late 2018, a decline not helped by the pension reform protests of 2019. Now, once again, Macron seems to be experiencing a phoenix-like revival (albeit a modest one, with just a 27 percent approval rate, hardly a triumphant resurgence), relying on the same rhetorical tools: the president as father of the nation, shielding it from whatever may arise—be it a health, economic, or military crisis.

One Hundred Days for the Prime Minister—But How Many More?

François Bayrou, however, cannot boast the same success. Already weakened by the Bétharram scandal—as detailed in the last installment of this newsletter—the prime minister now faces accusations from labor unions of betrayal after he refused to lower the retirement age back to sixty-two. They claim that he has failed to honor his initial commitments in the ongoing conclave on pension reform.

Of the eight trade unions initially participating in the weekly talks with Bayrou, only six remain. Force Ouvrière (France’s third-largest trade union, traditionally positioned on the left) walked out after the first meeting, followed by U2P (a federation representing small businesses and independent professionals). Soon, there may be just five. The CGT, France’s second-largest union, has now officially decided to withdraw from the conclave after consulting its branches.

The backlash doesn’t stop there. The far-right Rassemblement National is now “considering” a no-confidence motion, La France Insoumise calls the whole process a “scam” that makes censure inevitable, and even Socialist leader Olivier Faure reminds everyone that a motion of no confidence “is always on the table.” For Bayrou, political retirement may come sooner than expected.

Despite this deeply troubled context, another dissolution of the National Assembly does not seem imminent. For all its imperfections, the current political balance suits most parties, which fear the consequences of fresh elections. A weakened Republican Front (the traditional anti-far-right alliance) and a shattered left-wing coalition make snap elections a risky gamble. Furthermore, another major political event is looming: the March 2026 municipal elections, which are crucial for both the right-wing Les Républicains and the Socialist Party. Can political energy really be spent on a high-risk legislative election at the expense of a key local contest?

At this stage, most political forces seem to agree that pushing Macron toward dissolution is not in their best interests—especially with the 2027 presidential race fast approaching.

France and the Growing Risk of War

The threat of dissolution is also fading due to the severity of the international situation and the relative consensus among political parties regarding support for Ukraine and strengthening European defense. With the exception of the far-right Rassemblement National (Marine Le Pen has dismissed the idea of a European army as “a fantasy we will never support”) and the far-left La France Insoumise, which opposes European defense initiatives, all other political forces are aligned with Macron’s ambitions.

Public opinion largely mirrors these political divides. According to a March 4 Elabe poll, 76 percent of French citizens fear the conflict could spread to other countries near Russia, and 64 percent worry it could reach France. These concerns cut across demographics, particularly among those aged 65 and older (of whom 88 percent fear the conflict could spread to Russia’s neighbors and 73 percent fear it could reach France).

Support for military aid to Ukraine remains strong and has grown significantly since June 2024. Currently, 20 percent of French people believe that aid should be increased, while 44 percent support maintaining current levels. Conversely, 18 percent favor reducing assistance, and 17 percent advocate stopping it altogether. Support for continued or increased military aid is especially high among Macron’s party voters (91 percent), the left-wing bloc (79 percent), and conservatives (77 percent). On the other hand, a majority of Rassemblement National voters (59 percent) want to reduce (27 percent) or end (32 percent) military support.

However, sending French combat troops remains a red line: 68 percent of respondents are opposed to deploying troops to fight in Ukraine if the war continues. Yet if a peace deal were reached, 67 percent would support sending French troops to help maintain stability. Once again, Rassemblement National voters are the most opposed (83 percent) to any deployment.

In the end, there is an eye-opening shift in sentiment in France toward its traditional allies: Three in four French citizens now believe that the United States is no longer a reliable ally for France.

Finally, at the intersection of domestic and international affairs, France is currently facing rising diplomatic tensions with Algeria. The crisis, which occurs in an already tense relationship, was triggered by Paris’s recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara—made public on July 30, 2024—and prompted an immediate response from Algiers through the recall of its ambassador. Since then, the arrest of the Franco-Algerian writer Boualem Sansal on November 21 and a stabbing attack in Mulhouse on February 22, committed by an Algerian national, have combined with migration issues to fuel ultimatum rhetoric on the part of Interior Minister Bruno Retailleau and Prime Minister François Bayrou. Some divisions have emerged between Matignon and the Élysée, and the ministers themselves are not speaking with one voice. However, the latest statements from the Algerian president on March 22 hinted that a resolution to the crisis might be possible. Whether this is just another episode in the often-tense relationship between the two countries or a turning point with more lasting consequences remains to be seen.

Copyright image : Ludovic MARIN / POOL / AFP

Emmanuel Macron at the Invalides in Paris, March 12, 2025.