[Decoding France] - All's Well That Ends Well?

Welcome back to Decoding France. This January issue is the very first installment for 2026. It focuses on three key developments: the long-awaited prospect of the adoption of a budget for 2026, the crucial appeal trial facing Marine Le Pen and the National Rally, and preparations for the March municipal elections, which are slowly beginning to take shape.

However, beyond these headlines, a broader-and, at first glance, paradoxical-impression emerges: early 2026 feels strikingly apolitical.

A Strangely Depoliticized Start to the Year

Before addressing each of these three topics, it should be noted that what feels like a profoundly apolitical start to the year should be cause for surprise-and perhaps even unease. France is now entering an electoral year, with municipal elections just two months away and the presidential race drawing ever closer. By the same point in 2016 and 2020, politics dominated public debate and media coverage. Today, by contrast, we are witnessing the continuation of a deeper trend: the gradual hollowing out of politics itself. Paradoxically, some of the key actors seem almost embarrassed by their involvement in politics-as if it had become something to conceal rather than to assert.

The budget debate-to which we will return shortly-is one of the clearest symptoms of this malaise. There have been hundreds of hours of parliamentary discussions so opaque that even seasoned commentators have struggled to follow them. These debates seem to reflect neither any political impulse from the government nor any clear counter-offensive from the opposition. Politics appears to be overwhelmed-not least by international developments, which increasingly dictate the agenda and overshadow domestic decision-making.

This has long been common in small towns but is now spreading to the major cities. In Toulon, National Rally MP Laure Lavalette announced her "non-partisan" candidacy, albeit with RN backing. In Lyon, former Olympique Lyonnais president Jean-Michel Aulas also presents himself as running "without a label," despite support from both the conservative right and the Macronist center. The same applies to Éric Ciotti in Nice and to Sarah Knafo, a new contender in Paris.

A final-and telling-symptom is the behavior of Marine Le Pen herself. During her appeal trial, she has chosen to keep a low profile, adopting a far less political posture than during the first instance, when she repeatedly accused judges of political bias and of seeking to bar her from the 2027 presidential race.

All of this leads to a fundamental question: What power does politics still have today?

A Budget at Last-But at What Cost?

After announcing last October that he would not resort to Article 49.3 of the Constitution to pass the budget, Prime Minister Sébastien Lecornu ultimately reversed course. He is now preparing to use not one but three instances of 49.3: first to pass the revenue section, then the expenditure section, and finally the budget as a whole-with final adoption expected by mid-February.

According to the prime minister himself, this represents a "semi-failure" and a "semi-success." There was indeed a partial success at the end of last year, when the government managed to pass the social security budget without invoking 49.3. But this method could only work once. Faced with the impossibility of securing a parliamentary vote on the state budget, Lecornu has now decided to take responsibility.

If he can do so, it is because he knows that-in all likelihood-he will not be toppled. A non-censure pact has been struck with the Socialist Party, which is the clear winner in this budgetary sequence. In exchange for not bringing down the government, the Socialists secured several concessions: an increase in the in-work benefit, €1 meals for all students, and additional funding for social housing providers and the green transition fund.

These measures are largely financed by a surcharge on very large companies-a tax already included in the 2025 budget that was initially presented as exceptional and not intended to be renewed. Its expected yield is €8 billion. The prime minister has insisted it will affect only a small number of firms and will no longer apply to mid-sized companies. The rationale is clear: to avoid raising household taxes. Still, when "exceptional" taxation becomes permanent, there is an obvious risk of further undermining economic confidence and firms’ capacity to invest and innovate.

The government is also seeking an additional €2 billion in savings from state agencies and public operators. Overall, the objective is to bring the deficit down to 5 percent of GDP in 2026.

Despite the procedural "strong-arming," the budget is substantively the result of a compromise with the Socialists. This represents a win-win situation for them: Without voting for the budget-and thus avoiding political compromise-they can claim tangible policy victories. The narrative is that of a "constructive opposition" that simultaneously refuses to endorse the budget and refuses to censor the government, thus appearing credible and ready to govern.

The adoption of the budget will unlock progress on other legislative priorities-but above all, it will shift political and media attention away from the National Assembly and back to the city halls, where elections with real democratic stakes are about to unfold. The mayors remain the only elected officials to be largely spared the country’s deep political distrust. This election must not be squandered-it could contribute to a much-needed civic and democratic revitalization ahead of 2027.

France cannot afford instability beyond its borders, either. In the face of US pressure and mounting geopolitical tensions, political paralysis is a luxury the country can no longer afford. Continuing to project abroad what one editorial in The Economist scathingly described as an "utter merde show" is simply not sustainable.

Marine Le Pen’s Appeal Trial and a Strategic Shift

The appeal trial of Marine Le Pen and the National Rally runs until February 12, with a ruling expected in early summer.

To recall the stakes: In the first instance, Marine Le Pen was sentenced to five years of ineligibility with immediate effect and to four years in prison, including two years to be served under electronic monitoring. The key questions on appeal are whether the ineligibility sentence will be upheld, for how long, and whether it will be immediately enforceable.

Given that she began serving her sentence last March, if the sentence is reduced to two years, she would still be eligible to run in 2027. If it exceeds two years, she would be barred from the race.

Marine Le Pen appears to have chosen a markedly less political approach this time round, with fewer attacks on the judiciary and less rhetoric about politicized justice. The aim appears clear-to ensure that the trial generates far less noise than it did at the first instance.

• 42 percent of French respondents now say they agree with "the ideas defended by the RN"-this represents a historic high.
• 44 percent believe the RN is capable of participating in government, not merely opposing it.
• 30 percent think the RN could "do politics differently," and 31 percent believe it would govern better than the current administration.
• The party increasingly draws support from voters who are close to the traditional right.

Electorally, the RN’s future now appears to rest more on Jordan Bardella than on Marine Le Pen herself. A majority of RN supporters (56 percent) believe Bardella would make a better president.

The main reservation about a potential RN victory lies in the international context. The war in Ukraine, tensions over Greenland, strained relations with the United States, and the need for strong European leadership could all work against the party. The RN remains widely perceived as weak on foreign and defense policy-and its past proximity to Russia has not been forgotten. Although international issues rarely decide French presidential elections, we imagine they will weigh more heavily in 2027.

The Municipal Countdown Begins

Thus far, the municipal campaign has barely begun. National politics-and especially the parliamentary chaos-has absorbed almost all attention, delaying the local contest.

However, mayors remain the most trusted political figures in France: 68 percent of French citizens express confidence in them, compared with just 10 percent for political parties and 20 percent for MPs. Moreover, the 2020 municipal elections were largely disrupted by the COVID-19 pandemic, leaving unfinished democratic business. Therefore, this vote carries real civic importance.

For the National Rally, the objective is not so much to win the major cities with over 100,000 inhabitants-which it knows remains unlikely-but to secure enough municipal councillors to serve as grands électeurs in the Senate elections in autumn 2026. Gaining just seven additional senators would allow the RN to form its own group in the upper chamber, firmly anchoring it within France’s institutional landscape.

Potential RN gains are concentrated mainly in the south-Perpignan, Toulon, Menton, Agde, Nice-and in the north, notably Calais. Around six hundred RN candidates are currently running, all of whom have undergone close vetting-particularly of their social media activity-to avoid a repeat of the scandals that marred the 2024 legislative elections.

Paris remains a major unknown following the departure of Anne Hidalgo (Socialist Party). Opinion polls suggest that as many as five candidates could reach the second round, making the race unusually open. The leading contenders are Emmanuel Grégoire (Socialist Party), Rachida Dati (Culture Minister, backed by both the right and some Macronists), Pierre-Yves Bournazel (Renaissance-Horizons), Sophia Chikirou (La France Insoumise), and Sarah Knafo (Reconquête). Thierry Mariani, for the RN, currently trails slightly behind.

Copyright image : Thomas SAMSON / AFP.