China Trends #21 - China’s Balancing Act with the "Axis of Upheaval"

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Introduction

By François Godement

Everyone remembers George W. Bush’s 2002 designation of an "axis of evil", at the time made of Khamenei’s Iran, Saddam’s Iraq and Kim Jong Il’s North Korea. Today, CNAS experts refer to an "axis of the upheaval" and H.R. McMaster to an "axis of the aggressors" in order to describe the dynamics between China, Russia, North Korea and Iran. Europe is also concerned by the ties between the Asian and European strategic theaters. China is in a state of quasi-alliance with Russia, which has invaded Ukraine, as demonstrated by Marcin Kaczmarski, in "strategic cooperation" with Iran, which entertains its own axis of disruption through the Near East as evidenced by Pierre Pinhas. Meanwhile, Beijing has renewed in 2021 a mutual defense treaty with North Korea - the only such formal alliance that China entertains as Adam Cathcart explains.

As always in these links, one must wonder who is really in control, and who is being driven: junior partners may also pursue autonomy in their decisions, and even bring their senior partner down a road it did not wish to travel.

Junior and Senior Partners, Who Has the Lead?

That question is particularly acute for China. North Korea uses almost any burning international crisis to advance its own agenda. There is increasing suspicion - even in China - that the country’s nuclear and ballistic program benefits from Russian technology obtained against the delivery of weapons and ammunition. The overt quid pro quo is North Korea’s access to food though. Russia may or may not have informed Beijing of its intentions against Ukraine, and its blustering with nuclear threats does not sit well with Beijing. Iran itself, drawn into further conflict by its Hamas proxy and the need to support Hezbollah, has hurt the balance that China was seeking to keep in its relations with Israel. China has been forced to choose Iran over Israel - an opportunistic move that could in the end prove less than opportune…

More broadly, China has struggled to establish significant and profitable economic relationships with countries that are confronted with its current questionable partners. Russia’s war on Ukraine is today the number one security concern of Europe, increasingly described as a European "core interest". China has built profitable relations throughout the Near and Middle East, including all Gulf states and Israel, with which relations had been blooming. China has also achieved a positive trade balance with Japan and recently with South Korea. There is even deeper trade integration of South Korea’s economy into China’s trade sphere.

China’s assertive and even aggressive posture in its neighborhood already creates a backlash as seen in the surge of military spending across Asia and the renewed vigor in defense partnerships with the United States. Still, does the United States have enough military strength and will power to deter China, Russia, Iran and North Korea if they combine forces? China evidently believes that projecting strength and strong-arming neighbors is as effective as making itself economically irreplaceable.

But how far does this strategy extend to other partnerships, if it has undesirable consequences for China? Where to draw the line? China’s responses to this dilemma reflect a balancing act. One should often distinguish between words and deeds. In its public diplomacy, China presents itself as a promoter of peace and a mediator, as a paragon of stability. It acknowledges national sovereignty and territorial integrity - but does not apply explicitly these values to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Lately, it has become a vocal critic of the division of the world in "two camps", a general designation that intends to be broader than its traditional rejection of alliances. The term implies that crises must be solved bilaterally or regionally, avoiding escalation and prioritizing the agency of individual states over strategic alignment. Against this, China’s proclamation of a "friendship without limits" with Russia only days before the invasion of Ukraine does not sit well, nor does its lack of balance in statements concerning specific crises. While there is professed neutrality on Russia’s war with Ukraine, China puts the blame for the conflict with a faulty European security architecture and with NATO eastward’s expansion, while never actually condemning Russia’s moves

A new doctrine on sanctions

Similarly, China proclaims respect and support for the United Nations (UN) as the arbiter of international disputes. Yet, beyond the abstract mention of international law, this respect is no longer accompanied by support for international sanctions. In principle, China may sign up to sanctions endorsed by the UN. In practice, it stands with Russia in blocking any such decision at the Security Council and has effectively neutered the UN committee created to oversee their implementation in the case of North Korea. Indeed, the increased sanctions decided against Russia in 2022 - including the seizure of financial state holdings abroad - have changed China’s calculus. Technological export controls by some of China’s partners are viewed by China as sanctions. It systematically opposes their adoption, while busily creating mirror legislation enabling similar bans.

Today’s sanctions against Russia have even larger loopholes for oil and gas. China has vastly increased its exports with Russia while displacing Europe as a major energy buyer from Moscow.

Rhetorically, it is blurring its stand regarding the most questionable partners by adopting and using the notion of a "Global South". The term originated in the West but is now used by Chinese public diplomacy to its advantage on the Ukraine file. A key claim is that China’s response to the war in Ukraine, including the view that this is both an issue of regional European security and the result of a faulty European security architecture - not to mention American influence - is shared by all countries in the so-called Global South. This includes the refusal of sanctions designated as Western, even though states such as Japan, South Korea and Singapore in Asia actually implement these sanctions.

Strikingly, on the refusal or circumvention of sanctions against Russia, China indeed finds itself in good company. Apart from European and East Asian allies, no nation follows them, except when compelled to do so. Much of China’s trade with Russia flows through countries as diverse as Kazakhstan and Turkey, while re-exported liquified natural gas finds its way to Europe.

But is this the consequence of the "historical change unseen in a century" that China claims in its favor? Is the Global South the safe anchor for China’s most questionable partnerships? This remains doubtful. Even without resurrecting the notion of the Third World, emerging and developing countries - with the exception of directly concerned nations - have never joined Western alliances or formal coalitions, whether during the Korean, Vietnam or Gulf wars. The problem for the United States, its transatlantic and its Pacific allies today is not so much the change of doctrine in the Global South. It is rather the global shift in economic growth that has given much more importance to states often grouped under the mantra of neutrality or non-alignment.

Support without crossing the red lines

Still, China is aware of the risks it runs by exceeding red lines with the quasi-allies in a revisionist axis. Published expertise from China shows awareness of the fault lines in Russia, Iran and North Korea, even if this is said in very restrained ways. North Korea’s aid dependence is cited. There is particular criticism of a new Russia-North Korea alliance, including potential nuclear technology transfer, and also because it would spark stronger action by the United States and Asian allies.

 Interestingly, in December 2022 and June 2024, China has issued statements supporting the United Arab Emirates in efforts to solve the issue of Persian Gulf islands (Abu Musa and Tunb) occupied by Iran.

Apart from the reluctance towards Russia’s ever tighter relationship with North Korea, it is hard to find any distancing away from Moscow. Often cited by others, but not so much in China, is Xi Jinping’s statement with Chancellor Olaf Scholz against the use, or the threat to use, nuclear weapons. Generally taboo in China is any mention of weapon transfers or trade in dual use goods, whether by China itself, or by Iran and North Korea. Is this restraint in words, or restraint in action? Abundant trade in semi-conductors flows through Hong Kong and third countries. But even the United States treads lightly on these issues, perhaps persuaded that practical restraint is better obtained through silence - or by not accusing China of crossing red lines. As for Europe, it has not yet found the key to contain China’s support for Russia.

In the coming weeks and months, it will be very interesting to observe any change in China’s relations with Iran. Will the sudden and huge strategic loss for the ayatollahs in Lebanon and beyond change China’s calculus? As the benefits of supporting Iran dwindle, will its costs be reevaluated? This is an important test of the real motivations of China’s relations with the new "axis of upheaval" countries.

Copyright image : Greg BAKER / AFP

By Pierre Pinhas

Iran has demonstrated remarkable resilience amid internal unrest, escalating tensions with Israel, and the complexities of international power dynamics. From China’s perspective, as the Middle East faces an extremely dangerous escalation, Iran appears "trapped, but not falling." But for how long? Pierre Pinhas, Project Officer at Institut Montaigne, analyzes the latest Chinese perspectives to shed light on Beijing's view of Tehran's stable authoritarian regime and its regional revisionism, including the much-discussed "axis of resistance." He concludes that while Iran’s revisionism aligns with China’s interests to some extent, there are clear limits to the risks Beijing is willing in providing tacit support to Iran’s various aggressive actions in the Middle East.

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By Adam Cathcart

Until Russia is caught supplying missile or nuclear technology to Kim Jong Un, China will remain North Korea’s indispensable ally. In a comprehensive review of policy literature, Adam Cathcart, Associate Professor at Leeds University, explores Chinese analyses and debates on a key dilemma for Beijing: the deepening strategic cooperation between North Korea and Russia amid the ongoing invasion of Ukraine, which Pyongyang actively supports by supplying ammunition and artillery to Moscow. At this stage, experts in China argue that the China-North Korea relationship requires greater political coordination to enhance cross-border trade, manage inter-Korean tensions, and ensure the flow of food aid, emphasizing the softer side of their bilateral ties.

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By Marcin Kaczmarski

History has often been an obstacle to Moscow and Beijing formalizing their cooperation in an alliance-like form. Marcin Kaczmarski, Lecturer in Security Studies at the University of Glasgow, examines recent sources to reveal that, while the positive aspects of China-Russia relations are the ones emphasized and direct criticism is quasi-absent, Chinese commentaries still express obvious reservations about Russia’s actions. All in all, different threat perceptions and security environment mean that the Russian side is the one in more direct need to deepen cooperation with China, in order to counter the "collective West".

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China Trends seeks understanding of China from Chinese language sources. In an era where the international news cycle is often about China, having a reality check on Chinese expressions often provides for more in-depth analysis of the logic at work in policies, and needed information about policy debates where they exist. China Trends is a quarterly publication by Institut Montaigne’s Asia Program, with each issue focusing on a single theme.

The introduction article to this edition of China Trends by François Godement was also published by The Diplomat.