Can France Still be Heard on the International Stage?

Is France weakened?

This diagnosis is certainly debatable. The situation in France after the dissolution of the National Assembly is no more difficult politically than in other countries : Germany, with its equally fragile government, the deeply divided United States, or India after a general election that was not very favorable to Mr. Modi. And, of course, there's China's economic hole and Russia's bleeding from its Ukrainian adventure. In terms of soft power, the Paris Olympic Games showed that this old country can still amaze/ surprise  the world. One can also notice that in Europe, if Mr. Macron's prestige has undoubtedly been scratched, his ideas of strategic autonomy have more or less become mainstream; moreover, to advance the common cause, it is always towards Paris that member states end up turning to.

 In the Middle East, even the United States is unable to impose its will, but (in recent months,) the positions expressed by Paris had rarely received so little echo in the region, not to mention in Israel itself of course.

And if there is a "weakening of France", it would be wrong to attribute it solely to recent internal political developments. The causes of France's greater difficulty in making its voice heard date back much further: long-held illusions about Russia, major setbacks in the Sahel and loss of influence in West Africa, questionable priorities in the Middle East (and failure in Lebanon), and declining economic clout in a world where the "middle powers" (of see our summer series) - from Australia to Turkey, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Kazakhstan and many others - are increasingly asserting themselves.

Let's take this observation a step further, by raising two other points: traditional domestic consensus of the Fifth Republic on foreign policy - is no longer guaranteed, whether it concerns Europe, Russia or the Middle East; and it remains to be seen how the President's no less traditional "reserved domain" - that is, the President's recognized freedom of action in matters of foreign policy and defense - will function in a domestic political context that has become more complicated and, at least potentially, more unstable.

What kind of relaunch?

Considering all these factors, how can the Élysée and the government envision a "relaunch" of our foreign policy? And to what extent did the President's recent trip to New York for the United Nations General Assembly mark the beginnings of such a revival?

One option is to play a part in the multilateral management of "global challenges": in his speech at the UN General Assembly in New York, President Macron touched on issues such as development, climate change, artificial intelligence and global governance. This is a field of action in which France has enjoyed a certain credibility since Jacques Chirac's activism in this field and the coup d'éclat represented by the 2015 Paris climate summit. A credibility even more reinforced by the diverse initiatives that Emmanuel Macron multiplied to build on and modernize this legacy (cf. the "One Planet summits" series, among others, or the Paris Peace Forum).

In his speech in New York, President Macron slightly shifted his approach by openly supporting an expansion of the capital of the IMF and World Bank. Addressing developed states that could resist this move, he indicated that they would be taking the risk of allowing others (including, of course, China) to create alternative institutions to the Bretton Woods institutions.

The President - and beyond him, French diplomacy - can play this card all the more - as France will be hosting an international conference on artificial intelligence in February, and a major world summit on the oceans in Nice in June. It's up to the President to follow up on the International Financial Pact - renamed by the Elysée "Paris Pact for the Planet and the People" - which emerged from a summit held in our capital in June last year. This undertaking is designed to release new sources of financing for developing countries, and to reform international financial institutions to this end. Mr. Macron brought together some sixty countries in New York to support the initiative, which has now been joined by Brazil and the United Kingdom.

France's activism in these areas makes perfect sense in the context of an effort to reduce the gap between the global South and the West, as exacerbated by Covid and now by the war in Gaza. But there is no denying the limits of this vast project. So far, for example, the "Paris Pact"'s plans to reform international financial institutions have met with resolute resistance from the US Congress, and thus a "non possumus" from the US administration.

It would be advisable for France to relaunch the efforts it undertook last February, at a meeting of European Heads of State and Government at the Elysée Palace, to develop military aid to Kiev. This was one of the actions that seemed to be eclipsed by the political internal turbulence. A clear stance on the question of in-depth strikes would be another way for Paris to get back into the game. There is also the nagging question of how to prepare for negotiations, which Mr. Zelenski is no longer ruling out. Paris, London, Berlin, Washington and possibly Warsaw must set up a contact group with Kiev in the perspective of negotiating with Russia. Otherwise, it's a foregone conclusion that, in the event of negotiations, everything will take place directly between Washington and Moscow, a fortiori if Donald Trump returns to the White House. A European-US-Ukraine "format" does not rule out building bridges with the major states of the South, which intend to play a role in resolving the conflict.

With regard to Israel and Gaza, or rather, the West Bank and Lebanon, each passing day brings new developments, as the spectacular elimination of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah has shown, with now looming risks of a global escalation in the region.

So far, we've witnessed a massacre in the Palestinian enclave, with Israel unable to defeat Hamas or free the remaining hostages, and an escalation with Iran and Hezbollah, very targeted and controlled, which leaves the impression that the regional war will not happen after all.

In New York, President Macron appears to have made a breakthrough in this area of the Middle East crisis. On September 25, he and President Biden signed an appeal for a 21-day ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah, supported by dozens of Western and regional allies. As we know, Mr. Netanyahu rejected this appeal, and forty-eight hours later Israel pulled off the "big coup" of eliminating Hassan Nasrallah in his headquarters on the outskirts of Beirut. Since then, Israeli strikes on Lebanon have continued.

This may seem counter-intuitive, but it would create the conditions for a settlement at least on Israel's "northern front" (allowing the return of thousands of displaced Israelis). Given the balance of power - and "Hezbollah's Standing Knockout", Israel can afford a unilateral move, which would be eminently reversible. It could offer mediators the possibility of obtaining from Hezbollah and the Lebanese authorities - with the support of the United Nations - the implementation of Resolution 1701. It had put an end to the 2006 conflict and anticipated Hezbollah's withdrawal from the south of the country.

Such action should be taken without prejudice to much stronger, coordinated pressure from the same countries on Israel to cease its policy of accelerated colonization of the West Bank: this policy makes the "two-state solution" that Israel's allies claim to support de facto impossible.

Back to domestic politics

Two common threads unite the analyses we outlined above on global issues, Ukraine and the Middle East.

On the one hand, in all three cases, it is difficult to move forward without a certain coordination with the United States. There is no denying that with this great country "union is a struggle", to use a phrase once used in another context. The fact remains that for Europeans in general, and the French in particular, preparing an in depth approach to the next American administration, whoever it may be, is an essential task. On the other hand, let's not forget that in order for France to regain as strong an audience as possible in the world, and given the erosion of consensus on foreign policy, it is necessary that the governing parties at least support a program that includes the chapter headings we have just outlined. This undoubtedly implies that the President should be less of a lone voice on international policy issues and that, without calling into question the "reserved domain", this policy should be the subject of a more concerted elaboration with the government and at least certain political forces.

This is perhaps even truer for European issues, which are not dealt with in this paper, but which are obviously of central importance. How can we re-establish our position vis-à-vis Brussels in the context of France's budget deficit? How can we support the implementation of Mr. Draghi's proposals to counter Europe's technological and industrial decline, when our German partner doesn't seem to be on the same wavelength? In terms of people, the pedigree of Mr Barnier, the profile of the new Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Barrot, the appointment of Mr Haddad as Minister Delegate for European Affairs attached to both Foreign Affairs and the Prime Minister, all fit in well with the dual need for a more collegial operation of our foreign policy - Mr Barnier spoke of a "shared domain" - and a strong European orientation.

Copyright image : Angela WEISS / AFP