Brexit: Europe Confronted with Its British Paradox

Ten years post-Brexit, a paradox has emerged. The moment favors rapprochement, but London and Brussels are no longer speaking the same language. In the UK, the relationship with the EU is once again a decisive political issue. On the continent, it is now treated as one file among many. The two sides of the Channel are looking at each other again without knowing who should make the first move. But do they still share the same direction?

In the UK, Brexit has returned as a major political issue

After the UK’s exit from the EU in January 2020, COVID-19 and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine dominated the political agenda. Brexit, which had been central for four years, faded from the national imagination. Over recent months, however, UK–EU relations have returned to the forefront of public debate for three main reasons.

First, the promises of a post-Brexit future have proven false, both economically and on migration.

A large part of the pre-referendum debate centered on potential economic gains for the UK. Since, the shocks of COVID and the Ukraine war have made it difficult to isolate the economic impact of Brexit. Recent empirical studies, however, have been able to highlight the extent of the economic failure. A recent paper by the National Bureau of Economic Research estimates a UK GDP loss of 6-8% over 2016-2025, investment down 12-13%, and productivity down 3-4%. These observations, that exceed many pre-2016 projections, are now widely accepted in academia. Long dismissed, this reality is only now breaking through into the political sphere.

The same is true for migration, a flagship promise of the Leave campaign. Leaving the EU did not restore control over migration flows. Channel crossings in small boats reached record levels after Brexit, peaking at around 46,000 arrivals in 2022. Net migration also reached a record level of around 672,000,  driven mainly by non-European migration, in 2022-2023 following a liberalisation of migration policies under the Conservative government.

Deprived of EU leverage, the UK has also struggled to assert influence in major international crises (for example in the Middle East). Trade gains have been limited, and its historic reliance on its relationship with the United States no longer guarantees the same level of influence.

Ten years on, the harshest verdict on Brexit may be that no EU member state is considering following the UK’s lead. 

Third, after years of hesitation, UK public opinion has shifted slightly in favour of “Rejoin”.Recent polls suggest 55% support returning to the EU and 34% oppose it. Support reaches 23% even among former “Leave” voters. In June, a member of a Labour government broke the party line for the first time by publicly supporting rejoining the EU, in direct contradiction with the party’s 2024 manifesto. No clear position is likely before the end of the current parliamentary term.

On the right of the political spectrum, there is no movement toward rejoining or even closer alignment, with the rise of Reform UK a strong constraint. Even as public opinion evolves, the political cost of reversing Brexit remains high for the Conservatives who are already losing voters to the Farage camp. The increasingly plausible prospect of Andy Burnham leading a Labour government adds further uncertainty to UK-EU relations.
 

On the continent, the UK is no longer a priority file

While EU relations return to the agenda in the UK, the European Union has since moved on. Since 2022, the EU has been dominated by two priorities: the war in Ukraine and restoring European competitiveness against the United States and China. Debates in Brussels focus on the Draghi report, defence funding, US tariffs, critical supply chains, the future of the single market, and the next multiannual financial framework. In this strategic context, the UK no longer occupies the central place it held during the 2016 negotiations.

Defence is the main exception. Since 2022, London has been one of Kyiv’s strongest military supporters, with £4.5 billion in aid in 2025 alone, and co-chairing the Ukraine Defence Contact Group alongside Germany. Its industrial capacity, NATO role, and nuclear deterrent make it a key actor in European security. The EU-UK summit of 19 May 2025, which produced a security and defence partnership and sectoral cooperation, illustrates this pragmatic rapprochement.

However, limits persist. Discussions on SAFE (Security Action for Europe), the €150 billion EU defence financing instrument, show that strategic convergence has not resolved post-Brexit constraints. Despite shared interests, disagreements continue to emerge over access to EU funding, defence procurement, and industrial value chains. Cooperation advances case by case.

The risk of a fragmented dialogue

The current paradox lies in this mismatch. In the UK, Brexit has returned as a political issue because its consequences are increasingly visible. In the EU, it is treated as a secondary, segmented issue: defence, fisheries, youth mobility, energy, standards, carbon markets.

First, a pragmatic partnership. This is the current path: sectoral agreements without changing the post-Brexit framework. It is feasible and allows progress on defence, energy, policing, mobility, and standards. But it risks addressing symptoms while leaving the structural issue unresolved.

Second, an expanded European circle: an “associated” state model. The UK would not rejoin the EU but would not be treated as a third country either. It could be associated with European public goods (defence, energy, research, infrastructure) in exchange for regulatory alignment and financial contributions. This would reflect a strategic reality: the UK is outside EU institutions but embedded in multiple European functional spaces. European, but not in the Union.

Third, full return. Politically distant but no longer purely theoretical. A stable majority may be emerging. This raises immediate questions: would the UK accept returning without its previous opt-outs, including on the euro or Schengen? How would Ireland and the Good Friday Agreement be affected? Would EU members reopen accession for a former member while committed candidate countries such as Albania or Ukraine, who express a sustained political will to join the Union, continue to wait? Finally, what would this mean for EU internal balance?

Underlying this debate this is a question rarely made explicit: what precedent is the EU willing to set? A generous relationship risks weakening the lesson that leaving the EU has a cost. A restrictive one risks excluding a major military, diplomatic, and economic power.

Conclusion: the British paradox in full

As the stability of the geopolitical environment continues to deteriorate, both sides have strong incentives to move closer. If full reintegration is not politically feasible in the short term, less ambitious solutions are required.

Ten years after the referendum, Brexit is no longer only about leaving. It is about what comes after. In the UK, this debate is driven by economic and geopolitical realities. In the EU, it proceeds quietly, issue by issue, without an overarching doctrine.

This asymmetry creates a fragile moment. The UK is rediscovering its need for Europe just as the EU is looking elsewhere. Yet neither side can rely indefinitely on incremental arrangements. The question raised by Brexit is no longer separation, but what form European interdependence can take without membership.

Copyright CARLOS JASSO / AFP