Assad and Netanyahu at Theheight of Their Strength Following Trump’s Decision on the Golan?

Beyond the present to Benyamin Netanyahu, this statement must be contextualised within the American policy agenda in the Middle East and particularly in Syria. It comes as an answer that must be found to the fact that Iran and Russia are maintaining Assad in power - that being seen as a failure for the United States and their European allies. Russia now cultivates close ties with Israel, which has become a more and more Russian country. Indeed, from 1988 to 1998, over a million Russians arrived in Israel, and the population of Russian origin now constitutes nearly 20% of the country. There is a privileged, even trilateral, relationship between Netanyahu and Trump and between Netanyahu and Putin: they are authoritarian, have the same language, the same political culture, and are the bearers of an illiberal democracy model. In the same vein, Israel also has privileged relations with Narendra Modi in India and Xi Jinping in China. Israel has therefore managed to emerge from its diplomatic isolation, but has done it, some would say, in the wrong way, since the world has evolved in a way that favours respect for force above all.

While Israel and Iran are sworn enemies, none of them really want a war. Israel is aware of the difficulty of destroying Iran's nuclear arsenal, and the Iranians, whose regime is weakened by its isolation, are aware that Israeli military superiority remains. 

Trump therefore wants to show that he still exists in the Middle East, since he can influence the Israeli elections. The idea is also that for Iran, Hamas and Hezbollah, the best enemy is Donald Trump’s best ally, namely Benyamin Netanyahu.

How does the resurgence of this question impact the Syrian conflict and Bashar al-Assad's position on the domestic and international scenes? 

MICHEL DUCLOS

The recognition of Israel's annexation of the Golan Heights reinforces the argument of the "axis of resistance" (Iran-Syria-Hezbollah-Hamas). It constitutes such a flagrant denial of law that it can only exacerbate hostility towards Israel and American policy in the region, from Arabs and a fortiori Syrians. It is therefore a gift mainly to Iran and thus, subject to one aspect to which I will return in a moment, to Bashar al-Assad. All the more so since the State Department's statement invokes the Iranian threat to the Golan as a justification for President Trump's decision: this can only strengthen the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic as a leader in defending the rights of Arabs.

As was the case when the American Embassy was transferred to Jerusalem, the recognition of Israel’s annexation of the Golan will be a setback in the movement that was observed - and which remains part of Trump's plan for the Middle East - to bring the Gulf States closer to Israel.

Does this American recognition constitute a breach of international law? What may be the impact on other cases of territorial conflict?

DOMINIQUE MOÏSI

It is a breach of international law in the sense that the United States unilaterally settles an unresolved issue. Can the United States substitute itself for the UN and decide alone that the Golan Heights should go to Israel? The answer is no, but there is law and reality. Who will get the Golan Heights back? No one. What will historians say at first? That Assad saved his regime and lost the Golan Heights. And he does not have the means to get it back.

From the end of the Cold War to the early 2000s, people dreamed of a world where law and strength went hand in hand. Until the late 1990s, the United States were seen as the world's policemen in the name of universal values. Since then, we have entered a world that is getting closer and closer to the law of the strongest, where force prevails over law with a new brutality.
 

MICHEL DUCLOS

All commentators have stressed that the recognition of Israel's annexation of the Golan sets a terrible precedent. Such a precedent may encourage the Israeli right-wing to annex the West Bank as well and, above all, will be interpreted by Moscow as a harbinger of a legitimization of the annexation of Crimea and by Beijing as a precursor of a weaker American attitude regarding its aims in the South China Sea.

Hence a major dilemma for Europeans and all countries committed to international law: the American decision calls for the widest possible condemnation, but what would be the value of a common position with Russia and China, when both do not consider themselves bound by international law? And if Europeans are satisfied with an exclusively European position - assuming they agree - wouldn’t it highlight their relative isolation? Isn't such a position intended to remain platonic?

There is however one path to explore: the text of the State Department's statement explains Donald Trump's decision in the context of the threatening presence of Iran and Hezbollah on Syrian territory in the Golan Heights. While condemning Trump's decision so that there is no ambiguity, perhaps it would be appropriate to minimize its scope. The message could be: "Europeans do not recognize the annexation of the Golan and it is not certain, given the circumstantial nature of Trump's position, which is obviously linked to Israeli domestic political considerations, that the White House's position will still be valid under his successor".