Revolution in Slow Motion: Politics of Resentment, Empowerment and Identity in Turkey

In Turkey, the social basis of political power changed: the old elites have either been replaced (except for big business, some members of which had indeed been co-opted and others forced to keep quiet) or lost their autonomous source of power vis-a-vis the party-state; the schools from which the new elites are recruited have shifted; the educational system and national identity began to significantly reflect a Sunni Muslim bias; a new set of religious cultural and social references and practices is being imposed upon a rapidly secularizing society; the directorate of religious affairs has replaced the general staff as the principal source of ideological narrative and legitimation.

AKP has come to power after the instability and traumatic events of the 1990s thoroughly exhausted the legitimacy of the existing ruling elite. This included the military, whose self-ascribed role as the ultimate arbiter in politics was severely damaged when it ousted a civilian government led by an Islamist party in a so-called "post-modern" coup in 1997. In 2001 the country suffered its deepest economic crisis until then. At the time a young, dynamic population mobilized behind the goal of joining the European Union and sought fundamental change. In the 2002 elections, the AKP, as a spinoff from Turkey’s Islamist movement representing its younger "reformist" wing, won 34.3% of the vote with a promise of change, inclusivity and EU membership. In the same election, the Young Party, founded only three months before the elections by a businessman who ran entirely on a populist/nationalist platform, received 7.2%, mainly from the disenchanted youth. As a result, the traditional center-right parties failed to pass the electoral threshold.

As such, the first seven years of AKP in power were a period of growth, increasing prosperity and civilianization cum democratization. The irony was that the AKP itself, the democratizing force of politics, was not democratic or liberal in its constitutive ideology. In retrospect it was a quasi-ideological party that pragmatically used a favorable conjecture to consolidate its power. Unabashedly pro-business and interested in creating its own economic elites and a new middle class, the AKP developed a vast network of patronage in the business community without ignoring the needs of the urban poor. In the words of Demiralp and Balta "through its partisan redistribution of resources to both the urban poor and capital, the AKP has created a winning cross-class coalition and a community bonded around mutual interests" and identified by religious affiliation and outward demonstration of religiosity.

In the wake of a referendum for a constitutional amendment in 2010 and an overwhelming victory in the general elections of 2011 (49.7% of the vote), the authoritarian tendencies came fully to the surface. The referendum effectively made the judiciary the extension of the executive. Along with the security services, the judiciary was where AKP’s partners, the insidious Gülen movement, were strategically located. The Gülen movement would later be dubbed FETÖ - Fetullahist Terrorist Organization - because of their role in the coup attempt in 2016. The elections terminated the need for the ruling party to rely on liberal/secular segments of the public for its political plans and its dependence on them for external legitimacy. The ideological dimension of AKP’s political project was thence accentuated. 

It is true that the drift to authoritarianism was partially a function of the way the main opposition party relied on the military and the judiciary to fight its political fights with the AKP. The military too initiated moves to stop the election of Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül as President and to secure the closure of the party by the constitutional court. It lost on both counts. Such efforts led Erdoğan to unleash the Gülen movement against the military and allowed it to initiate several spectacular court cases that violated the basic procedural aspects of a fair trial, and in many cases were based on trumped-up charges. The result was the emaciation of the military and its relegation to a more professional, less politically influential institution in Turkey’s politics.

The decade of unending elections and referenda, and a false opening

For the rest of the decade, except for 2012 and 2013, Turkey had one or two elections every year and a referendum to amend the Constitution so that the parliamentary system could be transformed into a sui generis Presidential one. But arguably the most promising development for the evolution of Turkish democracy was the initiation of negotiations with the civilian representatives of the Kurdish movement by the government, at the end of 2012 after the PKK declared a ceasefire. The "Kurdish opening" gave the country a welcome respite from the violence that intermittently plagued it since 1984, when the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) began to stage terrorist attacks against security forces and civilians. There was hope that unlike other times when the search for peace was aborted for one reason or another, this attempt would succeed. For the AKP, this opening was also a way of keeping its share of the Kurdish vote consolidated and gaining substantial advantage in national elections. 

He succeeded in keeping its electoral coalition together, as the Kurds did not wish to compromise their own agenda by supporting the Gezi protests. Thus, Erdogan’s AKP won the municipal elections in 2014, despite serious corruption charges against some of his associates and family, brought forward by the Gülenists, who were now seeking Erdoğan’s downfall. 

It was only in the general elections of 2015 that Erdoğan (elected President under a Parliamentary system in 2014 without giving up his control over the AKP) lost his grip on power. His party lost its absolute majority in the Parliament. This was due to the success of the People’s Democratic Party (HDP) in overcoming the electoral threshold and winning the third largest number of seats in the National Assembly. Already, by firmly opposing a Presidential system that Erdoğan desperately sought in order to fully concentrate power in his own hands, the young and forceful leader of the pro-Kurdish (HDP), Selahattin Demirtaş, changed the political landscape. He therefore weakened Erdogan’s already shaken resolve in pursuing the Kurdish opening, which was effectively brought to a standstill before the elections. 

The PKK’s trench warfare met a crushing response from the military and the resulting securitization of all matters ushered in a period of increased repression, that further intensified in the wake of the botched coup of July 2016. 

The failure of the bloody coup attempt, led by the members within the military of AKP’s erstwhile political ally the Gülen movement, enabled Erdoğan and his new allies to institute a state of emergency. Unrestricted by constitutional checks and balances, the government intensified its efforts to suppress all oppositional forces in society, restricted freedoms, purged the judiciary, the academia and the security forces from "subversive" elements and prepared the transition to the Presidential system. The electorate approved the new system by a narrow margin, in a referendum in 2017 that was tainted by irregularities and allegations of foul play. Finally, in 2018, the new system became operational and Tayyip Erdoğan became the all-powerful and unrestrained head of a Presidential system. In nearly full control of the media, the judiciary and his party, which was by now a faint shadow of its former self and steeped in corruption, the consolidation of Erdoğan’s power was almost complete. Having assumed absolute and unrestricted power of action, but beholden to his ultranationalist, anti-Western, anti-Kurdish political allies within and without the state apparatus, Erdoğan continued to antagonize constituencies that did not support him. He vilified them and relentlessly tried to "homogenize an intrinsically heterogenous society through the mobilization of one authentic, ethno-religiously conceived ‘people’". "Terrorism" became the catch-all word to label any and all unwanted political and social activity. 

How the curtain can fall on an era

The seemingly unshakable grip of Erdoğan on Turkey no longer looks so solid. The Presidential system unleashed a harmful process of deinstitutionalization of the Turkish state.

Furthermore, the bureaucracy lost many of its competent members as customary organizational charts, hierarchies and rules, have been all but eroded. All power and decision-making were shifted to the Presidential compound. Lack of accountability, rampant corruption, absence of proper deliberation have led to colossal mismanagement of the economy. Order is maintained via increasing repression and manipulation of the media and judicial censoring of news coverage. The ruling elite appear to have run out of all intellectual energy and are devoid of new ideas and projects that can at least rehabilitate the Turkish economy.

The failure is a function of the inadequacies, intellectual void and lack of skills of the ascending elites and their being singularly devoid of any ethical standards or principles, despite continuous allusions to religious precepts and dogmas. This old "new", therefore, is a spent force and maintains itself in power largely because of its control of the media, the judiciary and the security apparatus. But the absence of a viable opposition until lately also played a significant part in the durability of its rule.    

Economic success was imperative for the AKP to consolidate its rule. The opportunities of the earlier years for AKP constituencies to move up the ladder of income and social status are no longer there. The class alliance that was forged at the beginning that served the interests of a business elite and provided for the urban poor is no longer viable. The resources have been exhausted. But it was not just the economic crisis that brought the AKP to power and maintained the loyalty of its clients in business as well as among the urban poor. Accordingly, the departure of the AKP or Erdoğanism will not be solely based on the failures of the economy. 

Any such program would have to include redistributive policies and reintroduce equality of opportunity as an irreversible goal. Most importantly, the venomous polarizing discourse of the ruling coalition would have to be countered with an inclusive, positive language that inspires hope.  

The opposition is finally pulling itself together even if it is still in dire need of a vision and a strategy to break Erdoğan’s still strong mystique over the population, despite abysmal economic conditions. The success of opposition candidates in Turkey’s metropolitan centers in the 2019 municipal elections give a strong signal that these metropolitan populations are ready for alternative choices. In this context, the loss of Istanbul, the font of urban rents and massive amounts of patronage resources has harmed the Erdogan regime. But more importantly, it has shown what a winning coalition would look like and how a campaign strategy can be forged to avoid falling into the traps of the populist playbook. 

Under the suffocating grip of the authoritarian "new", a new society is emerging and against strong odds it is trying to organize itself in major urban centers. That it is yet to find its political expression is a reality, but not an insurmountable obstacle. Therefore, a break from illiberal democracy/electoral authoritarianism is plausible with the right strategy and a candidate that could gain the trust of an electorate that is undecided about deserting Erdoğan. Such an event would have global ramifications. It will have shown the possibility of success by positive and inclusive mobilization and that democratic principles and institutional arrangements that have been severely damaged under populist assault can be restored. 

Copyright: Adem ALTAN / AFP