France’s Foreign Policy Outlook 2020

Multilateralism's path strewn with obstacles

Support for multilateralism i.e. institutionalized international cooperation has long been one of France's foreign policy’s pillars. With Emmanuel Macron, this orientation has taken on new prominence. First, due to the President's personal commitment, for example by launching the Paris Forum for Peace on November 11-13 2019, of which Institut Montaigne is a founding member. Second, the paradoxical increased need for international cooperation to deal with global environment or non-proliferation issues in the backdrop of an American backlash against international institutions of which the United States had often been the initial supporter, from the UN to the IMF, World Bank, WTO, NATO, etc.

Yet, the dynamic in favor of multilateralism will be particularly difficult to preserve throughout the year 2020.

• JCPOA and WTO: the Iranians decided on January 7 to free themselves from most of their obligations under the JCPOA nuclear agreement with the five permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany and the EU. As the Americans themselves have withdrawn from the agreement, there is little left of the JCPOA. On a completely different note, Washington's decision to no longer appoint representatives to WTO arbitration bodies paralyzes the very organization which would make an effective instrument for stabilizing trade at a time when the "trade wars" launched by the Trump administration make it so necessary;
   
• G7 and G20: the next G7 is due to be held in June at Camp David under the US presidency. The Trump administration is already preparing this annual meeting of the major industrial democracies... by eliminating most of the preparation channels. Does Donald Trump intend to turn the summit into a  great moment of rehabilitation for Vladimir Putin or an anti-Beijing war council? It will require much dexterity on the part of other participants to demine this exercise. The meeting under Saudi chairmanship of the G20 (the 20 richest countries) in Riyadh in November, at about the same time as the American presidential elections, also raises many concerns such as timing, the Saudi administrations’ inexperience, regional tensions and especially Saudi Arabia’s limited capacity to resist the desires of Washington;
   
• The COP 26 in Glasgow (9-19 November): the Paris Agreement (COP 21 in December 2015) provided that the 2020 meeting would be one of increased commitments by the States. The last COP meeting, held in Madrid a few weeks ago, ended on a pessimistic note: the leap towards a less carbon-intensive economy called for by the Paris Agreement did not happen; greenhouse gas emissions have increased by 1.5% per year over the last decade, putting the planet on a warming path of 3.2°C by the end of the century instead of the 2°C envisaged by the Paris Agreement. Here again, it was the United States’ negative attitude, marked by their withdrawal from the agreement, that was decisive, but also China and India’s hesitations, Europe's poor performance and Brazil's turnaround – all of which could not be offset by Russia's rallying to the Agreement.

In such circumstances, the French authorities must ask themselves how the future can be safeguarded, as Emmanuel Macron brilliantly did at the G7 summit in Biarritz last August, and how the idea of multilateralism be given new impetus. Is it conceivable to find a substitute for the currently failing groupings, or "formats" as diplomats say of the G7, G20 and others?

Dialogue with Russia and the emergence of a geopolitical Europe

Two projects that especially carry Emmanuel Macron's brand will also be put to the test in the coming months.

• Dialogue with Russia: Professor Jackson's reading of General de Gaulle's biography shows that the French approach to relations with Russia, apart from domestic political considerations, is inspired by two factors: a long-term historical purpose to reintegrate Russia into the European sphere, and a short-term tactical concern to have leverage vis-à-vis allies and partners. Considering the reset wished for by the French President since the summer of 2019, it is up to Vladimir Putin tol set the cursor between these two aims, by making concessions in Ukraine or in his diplomatic handling of  the announced participation of the French President in the May 9 ceremonies at the Kremlin – the rehabilitation campaign of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact being a bad omen on this point. Paris' ability to overcome the Russo-scepticism of a large part of Europeans will be greatly contingent on the Russian attitude;
   
• Will there be a geopolitical Europe? The European 2020 agenda will be particularly busy with the Brexit follow-ups, the negotiation of a new multiannual budget, discussions on the "Green Deal" courageously launched by the European Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, and many other dossiers, including European defense and EU-China relations. There is no doubt that with the compositions of the current Commission and the Strasbourg Parliament, France has more assets at its disposal than in any recent years. There is also no doubt that the brief inventory we have just taken here demonstrates the inadequacy of purely national responses to the formidable international challenges before us. It also demonstrates the urgent need for a cultural shift within the European institutions in order to acquire the will to achieve the geopolitical impact that they have lacked until now. In the face of rising tensions between the United States and Iran for instance, Europe must invest in Iraq, mobilizing not only its diplomatic resources but also Brussels authorities’ expertise, financial resources, development aid capacity, etc. As with many other issues, the year 2020 will, as we have seen, be a crucial, pivotal year.

In this respect, one would be tempted to say that an important test will take place in the wake of the US presidential elections: whatever the outcome of these elections, will Europeans collectively be able to offer the next US administration a "new transatlantic contract" likely to restore Europe's relevance in the eyes of US leaders? In the French domestic debate, many commentators often indulge in a double Pavlovian conditioning: whatever the subject or event, France (or Europe) is always decreed as "powerless" on the one hand and "aligned with the United States" on the other, even when Paris and (often) Brussels are opposed to Washington on climate, the JCPOA, Syria, etc. This was again observed in the Soleimani affair. European governments refrained from supporting the elimination of the Iranian general, yet they were somewhat criticized for having not gone further by outrightly condemning Washington's action.

The reality is much more complex than any summary judgments. What holds true is that the time has now come for Europeans to use all the room for maneuver they have, less restricted than is often said, to take the initiative on a series of issues that are critical to the world’s evolution. It is in this spirit that Institut Montaigne for its part, wishes to continue offering its contribution to the public debate.

Copyright: CHARLES PLATIAU / POOL / AFP