France and Greece in a Defense Partnership: A View From Turkey

Greek diplomacy has been visibly active in recent years. Athens has succeeded in building a number of alliances, networks and cooperative arrangements both on the energy and security fronts. Such developments have been facilitated by the deteriorating relations between Turkey and its transatlantic allies, as well as the diplomatic tensions between Turkey and key Middle Eastern and Eastern Mediterranean countries like Israel and Egypt. Given this context, the alliances that Athens has built have the benefit of presenting a common front against Turkey, particularly on matters of energy. The East Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) that includes Greece, Egypt, Israel, Cyprus, Italy, Jordan and Palestine, is the most important of such organizations that exclude Turkey. Instead of probing for diplomatic solutions, Ankara’s premium on a militarized approach to the outstanding problems in the Eastern Mediterranean has deepened its isolation and explains the indifferent response it has received to its legitimate claims.

Athens’ historically rocky relations with Washington have improved considerably. The two allies expanded their defense cooperation agreement to allow indefinite access to US troops to train and operate from four bases in Greece, most notably in Alexandroupolis in Western Thrace. Washington also lifted its arms embargo against the Republic of Cyprus, Athens’ closest ally and collaborator in the Eastern Mediterranean. These moves suggested that Washington was retreating from its traditional role as mediator and adjudicator between Greece and Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean, and that the United States was choosing not to rely solely on Turkey for its moves in the Black Sea. 

It was in such a context that a most notable development took place, that arguably raised the chances of a conflagration in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean Sea. France, which took a very harsh stance against Turkey during the tensions of July and August 2020, has been actively supportive of Athens’ ambitions. This policy has been made evident with the signing of the Defense Agreement between France and Greece in September 2021. This deal between two NATO members (implicitly targeting a third member) raised the stakes in the region, despite reassurances by Paris as to the interpretation of its article 2, ultimately creating a potential for escalation.. 

By firmly siding with Greece in its disputes with Turkey and by eventually concluding a mutual defense treaty, France has not only alienated Ankara but has essentially sidelined itself as a potential partner for Turkey in the longer term. This is the case for instance on the issue of ballistic and air defense. Back in 2017, Turkey opted to purchase the S400 system from Russia. In the post-coup atmosphere, Turkish authorities justified this decision by the erosion of trust towards Washington. As it stood, the argument was that Turkey could no longer rely on the United States’ good will, a country that has supplied weapons to the Syrian Democratic Union Party (PYD), a party linked to the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) .

Washington has also remained indifferent to Turkey’s demands to dismantle the Fethullah Gulen network’s activities within the US. Although a similar claim of lack of trust can be made towards Russia that allows a PKK office in Moscow and engages with the PYD in Syria, a sovereign decision was made in favor of the S400 system. The bilateral relationship and its prospects is a key determinant in a country’s defense planning and decisions related to the acquisition of major platforms.