After Navalny’s Poisoning, What’s the Future of Chemical Weapons?

Certain technical expertise or institutional overlaps could nevertheless occur between institutions and individuals that support state assassination programs, and those institutions and individuals who supported state military programs historically. 

Russia is a State Party to the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. In June 2020, two decisions by the 2019 Conference of the States Parties for amending Schedule 1 of the CWC’s Annex on Chemicals took effect. This was done in order to better ensure that the chemicals employed to poison Sergei and Yulia Skripal in 2018 are explicitly embedded within the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons' (OPCW) routine verification procedures in the future. What role is there for OPCW to reduce the threat of chemical weapons?

The theory and practice of reduction of threats posed by toxic chemicals and their precursors to cause death or other harm within the framework of the CWC is lengthy - and rather open-ended. The question can be approached in technical and operational terms, or in legal and political terms. The question can also be framed in terms of the core objectives of the CWC, or in terms of specific compliance cases. The phrasing and the number of the core objectives change. For example, at the time of the CWC’s entry-into-force in 1997, there were four core objectives. A core CWC objective remains the non-reemergence of chemical warfare. 

Like the UK in 2018, earlier this year, Germany requested an OPCW Technical Assistance Visit (TAV) under paragraph 38(e) of Article VIII of the CWC. In October 2020, the OPCW issued a summary report stating it had confirmed the presence of unspecified biomarkers of a cholinesterase inhibitor in the blood and urine of Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny, which had "similar structural characteristics" to the newly-added Schedule 1 chemicals (organophosphorus nerve agents - including, in principle, all so-called Novichok agent formulations - inhibit the breakdown of the neurotransmitter acetylcholine). 

How Germany and Russia interact remains somewhat unclear to those who are not directly involved. This includes the extent to which their consultations are bilateral or are run through the OPCW (i.e. via the Executive Council and Technical Secretariat). The UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly (First Committee) have also considered this matter. Germany probably feels that if it were to provide certain types of specific information, then this could be used by Russia as a basis to engage in a process of reductionist mischaracterizations not dissimilar to what has occurred with "the Syria file". The OPCW Technical Secretariat endeavors to leave compliance assessments to the States Parties (e.g. within the framework of Executive Council meetings and consultations at the margins of EC meetings). Russia’s Foreign Ministry has stated that Germany and the OPCW each refer it to the other in response to its requests for specific information thus leaving the MFA "empty-handed". 

A similar disruptive dynamic now exists with respect to the so-called Novichok cases, which is perhaps longer lasting and more damaging to the treaty regime and to OPCW as an institution. Russia has informally indicated it is prepared to reconsider its participation in the CWC treaty regime over the Navalny case. This year’s CSP will meet in two sessions due to Covid-19 exigencies. The first session is this week. The second session will convene in 2021. Breaking the meeting into two sessions should provide a degree of "breathing space" for further reflection and consultation among States Parties. The partly virtual meeting format could nonetheless prove to be a poor substitute for traditional in-person diplomacy. 

Areas for possible longer-term institutional engagement include: 

• reviewing multilateral arms control principles and procedures in conjunction with intelligence analysis approaches;
   
• reviewing criminal investigations and prosecutions in the context of contested political narratives;
   
• reviewing gaps, overlaps and complementarities between international legal obligations concerning assassination, terrorism and chemical warfare, respectively; 
   
• revisiting the routine declaration and verification of single, small scale facilities (SSSFs). 

The CWC contains provisions for the routine declaration and verification of SSSFs many of which are located within the defense sectors of States Parties. Such facilities are permitted under the CWC for peaceful purposes, including for the evaluation of detection and protective equipment and pre-exposure and post-exposure treatments. Whether a given facility meets the criteria for declaration depends on the types and quantities of chemicals listed in Schedule 1 of the CWC’s Annex on Chemicals. Since the CWC’s entry-into-force, States Parties have declared just over 10 Schedule 1 facilities (none in Russia). Whether a given facility should be declared as an SSSF is essentially a matter for the State Party concerned. However, the fact that a given State Party has not declared an SSSF is not, in itself, indicative of non-compliance with treaty obligations. The question rather goes to a broader question of what should be the cost, scope and degree of intrusiveness of the treaty regime under routine, annual verification. Nevertheless, the modalities for SSSF declarations under the CWC’s routine verification regime could be further considered in the context of efforts by States Parties to strengthen national implementation in the context of anti-terrorism measures. 

In short, the OPCW has become entangled in the broader geopolitical landscape of competing national priorities, sanctions regimes, and investigation and prosecution efforts concerning the Syria file and, in principle, the so-called Novichok cases of 2018 and 2020. Governments and other interested parties should remain cognizant of the nature of such interlinkages and the broader geopolitical context emanating from these ongoing OPCW verification efforts.

Copyright: JOHN THYS / AFP